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Introduction
The level of education grows steadily. Between 1980 and 2014, the percentage of male
regular full-time workers in West Germany with a degree from a university or university
of applied science rose from six to twenty percent. In other words, the share of workers
with tertiary education increased by 0.4 percentage points every year. However, human
capital is not equally distributed in Germany.1 On the one hand, there are regions where
over 30 percent of the workforce went to university or university of applied science. On
the other hand, there are regions in which less than five percent of the workforce studied
at a university (source: IAB-SIAB, own calculations).
At least since Smith (1776), von Thünen (1826) and Marshall (1890) scholars argue
that human capital raises the productivity of workers and societies. Analogously to invest-
ments in physical capital, investments in human capital increase production capabilities
and efficiency. Economists, therefore, believe that human capital is crucial for economic
development and explain income differences between countries by differences in their
human capital endowments (Lucas, 1988; Mankiw et al. , 1992). Specifically, the eco-
nomic literature highlights the role of human capital in implementing new technologies
(Nelson & Phelps, 1966), the generation of new ideas (Romer, 1990) and demonstrates
how human capital creates incentives for firms to invest in physical capital (Acemoglu,
1996).
The literature also postulates that individuals themselves benefit from investments in
their human capital. Prominently, Mincer (1958) shows that schooling and work expe-
rience raise earnings. Importantly, workers not only benefit from general investments in
human capital, like schooling, they also gain from training on the job (Blundell et al. ,
1 Human capital refers to the skills and knowledge people possess and encompasses a variety of di-
mensions (Fisher, 1897; Mincer, 1958; Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1962). Students acquire very general
abilities in schools, craftsmen learn their trade in formal training programs and by adopting the techni-
cal aptitude of their colleagues, and engineers earn their qualification through university lectures and
practical experience on the job. Social competences, like management skills and the ability to work in
teams, are also part of the human capital stock of individuals. Commonly, empiricists measure human
capital by the level of formal education of individuals or by the complexity of their jobs.
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1996). Furthermore, when switching jobs, workers can transfer their task-specific human
capital to their new occupations (Gathmann & Schönberg, 2010). In addition to the indi-
vidual returns to human capital, human capital might create positive spillover effects and
raise the productivity of peers (Schultz, 1988).
This thesis contributes to two research areas on human capital in labor economics.
First, I add to the literature on human capital externalities, which investigates spillover
effects from individual human capital on peers. In particular, I aim to add new perspec-
tives on the dynamics and the spatial scope of human capital externalities to the existing
literature. Second, I contribute to the literature on the labor market consequences of glob-
alization. Here, I highlight the importance of firm-internal restructuring of the workforce
as an understudied adjustment channel to foreign direct investment. While the former
research area focuses on the external effects of human capital on workers, the latter ad-
dresses the development of human capital of workers after an exogenous shock. In the
following paragraphs, I provide brief overviews of the literature on human capital ex-
ternalities and the literature on the labor market effects of globalization. Furthermore, I
highlight research gaps and explain how this thesis aims to fill them.
Human capital externalities
Whenever people interact, they potentially learn from each other. Therefore, investments
in individual human capital may cause positive externalities.2 A vast body of the litera-
ture empirically supports this hypothesis. Rauch (1993) provides first empirical evidence
that the regional level of schooling raises wages beyond individual returns to education.
Furthermore, Moretti (2004) shows that an increase in the local share of college-educated
workers raises the wages of locals. He uses panel data to compute knowledge spillovers
and therefore is able to abstract from ability driven regional sorting of individuals. Fur-
thermore, he exploits exogenous variation in the share of college-educated workers from
the lagged regional demographic structure and the presence of land-grant colleges (estab-
lished by the Morrill Act over a century ago).
Moretti (2004) investigates externalities from expansions at the upper part of the skill
distribution. Plausibly, raising the education of low- and high-skilled individuals may
create different kinds of externalities. Krueger & Lindahl (2001) suggest that increases of
human capital at the upper part of the skill distribution induce technological development,
whereas expansions at the lower end of the distribution lead to reductions in crimes and
2 Intuitive examples of knowledge spillovers are when people share their knowledge or when they adopt
novel technologies or production procedures from their peers. Naturally, knowledge spillovers trans-
mit through social networks and are thus likely to be regionally limited.
3welfare participation. Consequently, there is almost no empirical evidence for productive
externalities from expansions at the lower part of the skill distribution. For example,
Acemoglu & Angrist (2000) use variation in the regional level of human capital that
comes from changes in compulsory schooling laws and child labor laws. According to
Moretti (2004), their approach therefore primarily captures changes in the lower part of
the skill distribution. Acemoglu & Angrist (2000) find almost no evidence for wage gains
due to human capital externalities. Thus, increases in human capital at the lower part of
the skill distribution may not create externalities that significantly raise the productivity
of peers.
Rauch (1993), Acemoglu & Angrist (2000) and Moretti (2004) motivated a series of
follow-up studies in various countries. For instance, Dalmazzo & de Blasio (2007) in-
vestigate externalities from the regional level of schooling on wages and rents in Italy.
Muravyev (2008) uses exogenous variation from the economic transition at the end of
communism in Russia to estimate wage externalities. Heuermann (2011) explores Ger-
man social security data to measure knowledge spillovers from high-skilled workers on
individual earnings. Additionally, he examines heterogeneous effects across industries.
With Chinese data, Liu (2014) finds that human capital externalities are stronger in non-
state-owned firms than in state-owned firms. Broersma et al. (2016) use data from the
Netherlands to distinguish between consumption and production externalities and pro-
vide evidence for both. Analyzing Swedish data, Mellander et al. (2016) suggest that
both, high-skilled individuals around the workplace and high-skilled individuals around
the place of residence, increase wages of workers. Overall, a large number of studies
empirically underpin that human capital generates positive externalities.
So far, the literature on human capital externalities focuses on spillover effects from
the stock of high-skilled workers within predefined geographical boundaries. This the-
sis aims to add two novel perspectives to the literature. In the first chapter, I analyze
external effects of intra-country migration flows of high-skilled workers. Specifically, I
decompose the regional stock of high-skilled workers into immigration and emigration
of high-skilled workers, as well as labor market entries and exits of high-skilled workers.
The decomposition contributes to the understanding of knowledge spillovers and enables
me to assess how knowledge spillovers accrue over time. In the second chapter, I in-
vestigate the spatial decay of knowledge spillovers. For the first time, I apply functional
data analysis (FDA) to geocoded register data to estimate a functional representation of
knowledge spillovers that depends on distance. This approach allows me to determine
the spatial scope of knowledge spillovers and to assess how fast spillovers attenuate with
distance. Furthermore, both chapters use a novel estimation procedure that potentially
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allows disentangling human capital externalities from labor market demand and supply
effects.
The first chapter of this dissertation is joint work with Joachim Möller and studies hu-
man capital externalities from regional in- and outflows of high-skilled workers with Ger-
man social security data. Analyzing flows of high-skilled workers as a source of knowl-
edge spillovers allows assessing the dynamic evolution of spillover effects after individu-
als have moved. Additionally, investigating in- and outflows contributes to understanding
the importance of personal networks in the transmission of knowledge spillovers. While
local personal networks from incoming workers plausibly start small and develop over
time, workers leaving the region generally abandon already well-established networks.
Thus, if human capital externalities were mainly transmitted through personal networks,
we would expect gradually increasing positive effects from inflows but abrupt negative
effects from outflows. Additionally, workers who accumulated knowledge in other labor
markets than the current one might increase the diversity of the local knowledge pool
and thus generate particularly large spillover effects (compare Ottaviano & Peri, 2005;
Timmermans & Boschma, 2014). Consequently, in- and outflows of high-skilled workers
might create asymmetric spillover effects.
So far evidence on asymmetric spillover effects from in- and outflows of high-skilled
workers is limited to the study of Docquier et al. (2014), who examine labor market
effects from international migration. In an earlier version of the paper, the authors present
the first evidence that externalities from in- and outflows are equal in the short run but
different in the long run (Docquier et al. , 2010). In the long run, the positive effects of
immigration are larger than the negative effects of emigration.
There are two major threats when identifying human capital externalities. First, as
Moretti (2004) shows in his theoretical framework, in addition to spillovers, changes in
the local concentration of high-skilled workers induce neoclassical demand and supply
effects. Specifically, demand and supply effects raise the wages of low-skilled workers
and depress wages of high-skilled workers. Acemoglu & Angrist (1999) suggest similar
demand and supply effects in the working paper version of their article. Consequently,
knowledge spillovers are inherently entangled with labor market demand and supply ef-
fects. To the best of my knowledge only Ciccone & Peri (2006) explicitly address this
problem in their empirical strategy. Ciccone & Peri (2006) demonstrate that human cap-
ital externalities correspond to the effect of local human capital on average wages when
holding the skill composition in the local labor market constant and estimate effects ac-
cordingly.3 To disentangle knowledge spillovers from labor market demand and supply
3 Note that the empirical estimates of Ciccone & Peri (2006) provide no evidence for external effects
5effects we suggest an alternative approach. Our approach exploits the different spatial
scopes of human capital externalities and demand and supply effects. While externali-
ties attenuate sharply with distance and are thus strongly localized (Rosenthal & Strange,
2008; Fu, 2007), demand and supply effects are plausibly common within larger areas.
We, therefore, assign regions to functional areas with common labor markets. Our large
panel data set then allows us to eliminate all variation that is common within these labor
market areas, including supply and demand effects, without removing localized knowl-
edge spillovers.
The second major threat to the identification of human capital externalities is the en-
dogenous sorting of individuals into regions (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000). We address
the spatial sorting of individuals with an extensive set of fixed effects. For instance, in our
estimates, we use specific intercepts for every labor market area in every year. These fixed
effects nullify unobserved regional heterogeneity that might attract high-skilled workers,
such as average wages, general labor-market conditions or amenities. Because we al-
low fixed effects to vary over time, our procedure also eliminates temporal labor market
shocks.
Our results suggest that regional immigration and labor market entries of high-skilled
workers significantly raise the wages of locals, whereas emigration and labor market ex-
its of high-skilled workers depress wages. Analyzing the evolution of effects reveals
that positive externalities from immigration and entries grow over time, whereas negative
externalities from emigration and exits remain stable. While in the short run negative
externalities from outflows outweigh positive externalities from inflows, in the long run,
positive externalities from inflows even overcompensate negative externalities from out-
flows. These findings are in line with our considerations that knowledge spillovers trans-
mit through personal networks, that develop over time and that diverse human capital
amplifies externalities.
Plausibly, human capital externalities are regionally limited. However, from a theoret-
ical point of view it is unclear how far knowledge spillovers reach. While most empirical
studies assess knowledge spillovers in predefined regions, Rosenthal & Strange (2008) are
the first to abstract from fixed boundaries and try to estimate the spatial scope of knowl-
from schooling on wages. There are two possible explanations for the insignificant results. First, there
are no positive externalities from schooling and other studies confound spillover effects with labor
market demand and supply effects. Second, insignificant estimates are due to the choice of instru-
ments. Identical to Acemoglu & Angrist (2000), Ciccone & Peri (2006) use changes in compulsory
schooling laws and child labor laws to instrument average schooling. As argued before, changes in the
lower part of the skill distribution might not create productive externalities (Krueger & Lindahl, 2001;
Moretti, 2004). Therefore, the choice of instruments might explain why Ciccone & Peri (2006) find
no evidence for schooling externalities.
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edge spillovers. The authors construct concentric rings around workplaces that quantify
the concentration of human capital within 5 miles, and between 5 to 25 miles and regress
individual wages on the concentration of human capital within these rings. They show
that externalities from the first ring are larger than spillovers from the second ring and
conclude that spillover effects attenuate with distance. Fu (2007) and Verstraten (2018)
adopt the strategy of Rosenthal & Strange (2008) and come to similar conclusions. Al-
though these papers suggest that knowledge spillovers decrease with distance, the exact
scope of effects remains unclear. The second chapter of the thesis is joint work with
Christoph Rust and aims to fill this research gap.
We analyze a large and novel administrative micro panel dataset that has the exact co-
ordinates of nearly all German establishments and rich information on individual workers.
To process the detailed geographic information, we employ a novel estimation approach
and measure the strength of knowledge spillovers with respect to distance in a continu-
ous manner. Specifically, we use methods from functional data analysis (FDA). FDA is
a branch in statistics that extends classical econometric methods to variables with a func-
tional nature, such as curves. Typical examples of such data are temperature curves and
stock prices over time. Continuity of curves entails that adjacent values are related. In
many applications, exploiting this information makes FDA more efficient than classical
multivariate methods. Specifically, we use the estimator of Crambes et al. (2009), which
allows estimating the impact of a functional object (share of high-skilled workers with
respect to distance) on a scalar variable (log wages). Our identification strategy is similar
to that in the first chapter and bases on an extensive set of fixed effects.
We find that high-skilled workers increase the wages of others in their neighborhood.
Moreover, our estimates show that spillover effects decay with distance. Specifically,
knowledge spillovers from the close neighborhood are twice as large as spillovers from
ten kilometers away. After fifteen kilometers, the effects vanish. Our findings imply that
human capital externalities cover entire cities. However, a majority of the effects are
bounded to the closer neighborhood. Individuals in very remote regions do not gain from
knowledge spillovers.
Overall, the first two chapters of this thesis view human capital externalities from
two new perspectives. The first chapter introduces dynamics that allow assessing the
evolution of spillover effects after workers have moved. The second chapter explores the
spatial scope of externalities with novel data and methodologies.
7FDI and job stability
In addition to formal training, individuals invest in their human capital by learning on
the job (Mincer, 1958; Blundell et al. , 1996; Gathmann & Schönberg, 2010). Thus,
employment biographies shape the human capital stock of workers. While employment
disruptions lead to the deterioration of human capital (Ben-Porath, 1967; Phelps, 1972;
Heap, 1980; Möller, 1990), employment in more complex occupations potentially raises
human capital (Mincer, 1958). The third chapter of this thesis, therefore, analyzes the
employment stability of workers after an exogenous shock. Specifically, I investigate the
impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) of firms on the likelihood of separations of
workers and firms, and the probability to up- or downgrade to more or less complex jobs.
There is an ongoing public debate about the employment effects of globalization.
While firms highlight benefits from internationalization through access to greater markets
and the possibility to raise efficiency, politicians and workers are concerned with negative
consequences for the domestic labor market. Scholars argue that globalization leads to a
fragmentation of tasks, which might increase labor demand for some tasks, but decreases
demand for others (Feenstra & Hanson, 1996a,b). Additionally, researchers emphasize
that international trade raises productivity and thus might be beneficial for all workers
(Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Determining the overall effects remains an empiri-
cal question.
The empirical literature on labor market effects of globalization almost exclusively fo-
cuses on effects on earnings and job separations (Hummels et al. , 2018). Overall, results
suggest heterogeneous effects on different groups of workers. On the one hand, there is
evidence that offshoring raises the wages of skilled workers (Feenstra & Hanson, 1997,
1999; Baumgarten et al. , 2013; Hummels et al. , 2014) and workers in non-routine and in-
teractive tasks (Ebenstein et al. , 2014). On the other hand, offshoring depresses the wages
of low-skilled workers (Hummels et al. , 2014; Baumgarten et al. , 2013) and of workers
in occupations with very routine tasks (Ebenstein et al. , 2014). Findings on displacement
effects of offshoring are mixed. For instance, Egger et al. (2007) find no evidence for neg-
ative employment effects from offshoring, whereas Geishecker (2008) present evidence
that offshoring increases the risk of unemployment. Additionally, Munch (2010) illus-
trates that offshoring raises the hazard of being unemployed only for low-skilled workers.
Furthermore, there is initial evidence that workers who lose their job due to offshoring
take up training courses more often than other unemployed individuals (Hummels et al. ,
2012).
Globalization changes the labor demand of firms. Although wages and displacements
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are important channels to adjust the labor force, the literature has overlooked that global-
ization might also incentivize firms to restructure their workforce internally. For several
reasons, firms might benefit from restructuring their workforce internally instead of hiring
and firing workers. First, incumbent workers have firm-specific human capital (Becker,
1962) and are thus ceteris paribus more valuable than outsiders. Second, asymmetric in-
formation about worker skills is less problematic when hiring internally (Waldman, 1984;
Greenwald, 1986). Third, hiring internally might be cheaper than hiring externally (De-
mougin & Siow, 1994). Fourth, especially in regulated labor markets, it might be cheaper
for firms to demote workers than to dismiss them. Together with Linda Borrs, I study
how FDI influences internal restructuring. In particular, we assess the impact of FDI on
internal up- and downgrades of workers to more or less complex jobs.
To the best of our knowledge, only Liu & Trefler (2011) and Baumgarten (2015)
examine the effect of offshoring on job changes. Both papers present evidence that off-
shoring causes workers to switch occupations. However, compared to our contribution,
the articles differ in two important aspects. While Liu & Trefler (2011) and Baumgarten
(2015) analyze effects from industry-level offshoring, we study actual foreign direct in-
vestment of firms. Thus, we focus on a more specific treatment. Moreover, Liu & Trefler
(2011) and Baumgarten (2015) consider very general occupational switches within and
across firms, whereas we intentionally investigate firm-internal switches. As argued be-
fore, firm-internal restructuring itself represents a potential adjustment channel to changes
in labor demand.
To analyze the effect of FDI on occupational up- and downgrades, and separations
of workers and firms, we use a unique administrative linked employer-employee dataset.
The data comprise the entire universe of German firms with Czech affiliates as of 2010
and a huge set of control firms that never invested abroad. We follow workers for twenty
quarters after the investment abroad.
To identify effects, we pursue a three-step procedure. Because only the most pro-
ductive firms conduct FDI (Helpman et al. , 2004), we first construct a balanced sample
of treatment and control firms with equal probabilities to invest. To achieve this, we
propose a new iterative matching procedure based on propensity score matching. Our
iterative matching procedure achieves a distinct one-to-one matching of treatment and
control firms over the entire observation period. In contrast to standard propensity score
matching, our procedure additionally ensures that we match firms exactly in the same
year. Importantly, our matching approach enables us to assign the investment dates of
matched treatment firms as pseudo investment dates to control firms.
We match firms two years before investment. Because of the equal investment prob-
9abilities and the significant time lag between the matching and the (pseudo) investment,
workers should be unable to distinguish between treatment and control firms at the time of
matching. Second, to address unobserved sorting of workers into treatment firms (Abowd
et al. , 1999; Card et al. , 2013), we restrict our data to individuals who already worked
in the firm in the year of matching. Third, we use Cox (1972) proportional hazard mod-
els to compare the likelihood of job upgrades and downgrades and separations between
treatment and control firms at the worker level. We define occupational upgrades (down-
grades) as job switches within the firm to occupations with a higher (lower) share of
analytical and interactive tasks.
We present first evidence that firms internally restructure their workforce after FDI.
When firms invest abroad, the likelihood that workers will upgrade internally to more-
complex jobs increases by 24 percent. The hazard to downgrade to less-complex jobs
increases by 34 percent. Both effects grow over time and become traceable two years
after the investment. Furthermore, we find that only workers performing non-routine and
interactive jobs receive the opportunity to switch occupations internally after FDI. The
same group of workers faces lower risks of employment separations. On average, we find
only weak effects of FDI on separations of workers and firms.
In summary, chapter three shows that FDI raises the chance for workers to upgrade to
jobs that are more complex. Plausibly, upgrades to more complex jobs are an opportunity
for workers to raise their human capital over time. However, FDI also increases the risk of
a downgrade to less complex jobs. Occupational downgrades are likely not beneficial for
the human capital endowment of individuals. It might even be the case that downgrades
deteriorate human capital.
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Chapter 1
Human Capital Spillovers and the
Churning Phenomenon: Analyzing
Wage Externalities from Gross In- and
Outflows of High-Skilled Workers
Abstract*
The article estimates human capital externalities on wages originating from internal gross
migration flows of high-skilled workers. We draw on rich administrative micro panel
data that allow us to disentangle externalities from sorting and labour market supply and
demand effects through an extensive set of time-varying fixed effects. We show that
regional inflows and outflows of high-skilled workers occur simultaneously and that both
are positively correlated. Given the existence of such a churning phenomenon, looking
only at net migration flows might be misleading. Our econometric analysis indicates that
inflows of high-skilled workers increase the wages of locals, whereas outflows decrease
those wages. Although externalities from outflows outweigh those from inflows in the
short run, the opposite holds in the long run. Our results suggest that human capital
externalities are transmitted through the productivity effects of local personal networks,
which, for newcomers, develop over time.
Keywords: high-skilled workers, churning, brain gain, brain drain, human capital externalities,
internal migration, wages
* This part is joint work with Joachim Möller. A revised version of the chapter is published in Regional
Science and Urban Economics (Eppelsheimer & Möller, 2019)
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1.1 Introduction
There is a broad consensus among economists that the amount of human capital in a
location plays a key role in its economic development. Hence, an increase in the share
of high-skilled workers in the total workforce tends to spur economic performance in
that location, whereas a decrease hinders it. Labour market entries and exits as well as
migration of high-skilled workers lead to changes in the human capital endowment of an
area. Migration streams can be regarded as merely an equilibrating force: excess demand
for human capital attracts high-skilled workers, whereas excess supply deters them. Thus,
areas with a high inflow of high-skilled workers should tend to have a low outflow and
vice versa. As figure 1.1.1 shows, however, inter-regional inflow and outflow rates are
even positively correlated in our data. This churning phenomenon corresponds to the
well-established fact in labour economics that job turnover exceeds the minimal amount
of turnover needed for job reallocation (e.g., Burgess et al. , 2000).
Thus far, the literature on the mobility of high-skilled workers almost exclusively
focuses on net flows (Docquier & Rapoport, 2012). Analysing pure net flows neglects the
churning phenomenon and could hide an important part of the story. In particular, net flow
analysis would be inadequate if externalities from gains and losses of human capital were
asymmetric. Consider, for instance, two regions that both have a zero net flow. Assume
that region A has no inflow of high-skilled workers and that its incumbent workers are
immobile, whereas region B has large outflows that are exactly matched by the number of
inflows. If positive externalities from an incoming person do not compensate the negative
externalities from an outgoing person, the effects of aggregate human capital in the two
regions would clearly differ. As a consequence, net flow analysis could be misleading.
On the international level, empirical evidence already supports the existence of asym-
metric effects. Docquier et al. (2014) analyse immigration and emigration streams in
OECD countries to calculate wage and employment effects. Using a structural model,
their study indeed highlights differences in the absolute size of wage effects from in- and
outflows of human capital.1 As the mechanisms of international migration probably work
through different channels than do the changes in the human capital endowment of re-
gions, an investigation of intra-country gross migration flows of high-skilled workers is
required. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to fill this gap.
Generally, the existence of spillovers from high-skilled workers to other workers is
1 In an earlier version of the paper (Docquier et al. , 2010), the authors find that in absolute values,
the negative effects from emigration are roughly equal to the positive effects from immigration in the
short run. In the long run, however, positive effects from immigration outweigh negative effects from
emigration.
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well documented in the literature (e.g., Che & Zhang, 2017; Cornelissen et al. , 2017;
Ciccone & Peri, 2006; Moretti, 2004; Rauch, 1993). Less is known, however, about
the underlying mechanisms of these spillovers. Theoretically, two traditional approaches
address the positive externalities of aggregate human capital in a location. The first (Mar-
shall, 1890; Lucas, 1988) stresses knowledge diffusion, whereas the second points to the
productivity effects of implementing new technologies through high-skilled workers (Nel-
son & Phelps, 1966; Acemoglu, 1998). Empirical studies (Rosenthal & Strange (2008)
and Fu (2007)) find that human capital externalities sharply decay with distance. The re-
sults point to the importance of inter-personal knowledge exchange, for instance, through
face-to-face contacts and local personal networks. A simultaneous analysis of regional in-
and outflows of high-skilled workers, as in our empirical approach, can shed more light
on the importance of personal networks for knowledge spillovers. While local personal
networks from incoming workers plausibly start small and develop over time, workers
leaving the region generally abandon already well-established networks. Thus, if hu-
man capital externalities were mainly transmitted through personal networks, we would
expect gradually increasing positive effects from high-skilled inflows but more or less
abrupt negative effects from corresponding outflows.
An additional effect is related to the diversity literature (see Ottaviano & Peri, 2005;
Timmermans & Boschma, 2014). An inflow of workers who accumulated knowledge
in labour markets other than the current one might generate particularly large spillover
effects. Other things being equal, a region with higher fluctuations in high-skilled workers
should then be better off compared to a region with low mobility. Again, however, if the
benefits of diversity work through personal networks, such a positive effect of diversity
through brain gain should accrue over time.
Our paper scrutinizes inter-regional migration flows of high-skilled workers over two
decades and uses detailed micro panel data on workers. The analysis builds on extensive
research on human capital externalities within the urban economics literature (e.g., Rauch,
1993; Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000; Ciccone & Peri, 2006; Shapiro, 2006) and particularly
on Moretti (2004), who theoretically derives and empirically investigates a relationship
between individual earnings and aggregate levels of regional human capital. Using a
Mincerian approach, Moretti (2004) finds a causal effect of the share of college-educated
workers in an urban region on individual earnings.
We extend Moretti’s approach to incorporate gross flows of high-skilled workers. In
particular, we decompose the regional share of high-skilled workers in period t into the
k-period’s lagged share and inter-regional inflows and outflows of high-skilled workers
between t and t−k. Additionally, we identify labour market entries of young high-skilled
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Figure 1.1.1: Correlation between inter-regional inflows and outflows of high-skilled
workers in 402 German counties
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Notes: The figure shows the correlation between inter-regional gains and losses of human capital. We
measure the human capital gain as the sum of incoming high-skilled workers over a period of ten years
relative to the size of the workforce in the focal year. Accordingly, human capital losses are measured as
the sum of emigrating high-skilled workers relative to the regional workforce in the focal year. The mean
human capital gain is 0.1. Hence, within ten years, regions receive, on average, 10 high-skilled workers per
100 local workers through inter-regional migration.
workers and exits of retiring workers and extend the decomposition accordingly. In the
spirit of Moretti, we employ Mincerian wage equations to estimate externalities from the
separate components of regional human capital.
Moretti (2004) raises the concern that spillovers from high-skilled workers are in-
herently entangled with conventional labour market supply and demand effects that arise
when the skill composition of the local labour market changes. To the best of our knowl-
edge, only Ciccone & Peri (2006) explicitly address this problem in their identification
strategy. The authors theoretically show that the size of human capital externalities is
identical to the effect of human capital on the average regional wage when holding the
skill composition constant, and they estimate spillover effects accordingly. We propose an
alternative approach to disentangle spillover effects from conventional supply and demand
effects. Our approach exploits the different spatial scopes of human capital externalities
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on the one hand and supply and demand effects on the other. Externalities attenuate
sharply with distance and are thus strongly localized (Rosenthal & Strange, 2008; Fu,
2007). Therefore, the spatial scope of externalities should typically not exceed our ba-
sic spatial unit of observation, the county level. By contrast, supply and demand effects
are plausibly common within larger areas. We therefore assign counties to functional
areas with common labour markets. Our large panel data set allows us to eliminate all
variation that is common within these labour market areas, including supply and demand
effects. Technically, we achieve this by introducing time-varying fixed effects on the
labour-market-area level in our econometric model.
When estimating human capital externalities, another major concern is endogenous
sorting of highly productive workers into prosperous regions (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000;
Moretti, 2004). To address this problem, we adopt the strategy of Cornelissen et al.
(2017), who deal with worker sorting on the firm level to estimate knowledge spillovers
within establishments, and we control for an extensive set of (time-varying) fixed effects.
First, the panel structure allows us to control for time-constant unobserved individual and
regional heterogeneity and thus nullify general push and pull factors that might draw high-
wage workers into regions with high wages and high levels of human capital. Second, we
account for labour market shocks that could create temporal push and pull factors (see
Moretti, 2004). These shocks might originate from global and local sources. To address
shocks stemming from global sources, we purge the data for unobserved yearly variation
on the industry and occupational levels. To eliminate shocks on the local level, we cluster
administrative regions into functional labour market areas and add corresponding time-
varying fixed effects to our econometric model. Furthermore, we control for time-varying
observable characteristics of workers and regions. Overall, we assess how changes in the
local concentration of high-skilled workers affect the wages of individuals with identical
observable labour market characteristics, time-constant unobservable traits, who work in
similar labour markets and identical industries and occupations.
We find that regional inflows and labour market entries of high-skilled workers signif-
icantly raise wages in the respective region, whereas the opposite is the case for outflows
and labour market exits of high-skilled workers. As an important result, we show that in
the short run, negative externalities from the emigration of high-skilled workers outweigh
the positive externalities from immigration. Moreover, our econometric analysis supports
the view that externalities from inflows of high-skilled workers grow over time, whereas
externalities from outflows remain constant. Therefore, gains in human capital can even-
tually overcompensate equally sized losses in the long run. The former observation is in
line with our conceptual considerations that externalities are transmitted through personal
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networks that develop over time. Moreover, our findings corroborate the hypothesis that
enhancing diversity by importing the knowledge of high-skilled workers from other re-
gions amplifies human capital externalities. Finally, our study shows that the effects of
the intra-country mobility of high-skilled workers are qualitatively remarkably similar to
what Docquier et al. (2014) find using a fundamentally different empirical approach to
the international migration of human capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, we extend the
theoretical framework of Moretti (2004) and link individual wages in a specific county to
regional gross flows of high-skilled workers. In the same section, we also outline our es-
timation strategy. Section 1.3 summarizes the data. In section 1.4, we sequentially report
our findings. First, we present results from our baseline model, which relates individual
wages to the regional stock of high-skilled workers. Second, we introduce some flexibil-
ity and allow idiosyncratic externalities from gross flows of high-skilled workers. Third,
we illustrate the evolution of externalities over time. Section 1.5 summarizes the results
and discusses some policy implications.
1.2 Theoretical framework and estimation strategy
1.2.1 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework behind our empirical investigation is a modification of Moretti’s
model (Moretti, 2004). We begin by analysing a baseline model with human capital exter-
nalities and examine how changes in the regional share of high-skilled workers generate
externalities that affect individual wages. We then extend this model and replace the re-
gional share of high-skilled workers at time t by its lagged value in t − k and various
gross flows of high-skilled workers between t − k and t (i.e., inter-regional inflows and
outflows as well as labour market entries and exits of high-skilled workers).
Baseline model
Moretti (2004) illustrates externalities from the regional share of high-skilled workers on
wages in a Cobb-Douglas-type production framework. Although this approach is well
suited to analyse fundamental mechanics, we utilize the more general constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) model (Arrow et al. , 1961) instead. The benefit of the CES spec-
ification is that it is capable of distinguishing idiosyncratic external effects from human
capital spillovers for different types of workers. Bratti & Leombruni (2014) were the first
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to allude to this in the given context.
In our setting, output at time t, Yt, is produced by using low-skilled and high-skilled
workers, Lt and Ht, as the only inputs:
Yt =
[
γ(AH,tHt)
σ−1
σ + (1− γ)(AL,tLt)σ−1σ
] σ
σ−1
, (1.1)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution and γ denotes a distributional parameter.
For both types of labour s ∈ {H,L}, the factor productivityAs,t depends on productivity-
enhancing externalities generated by the regional share of high-skilled workers ht :=
Ht/Nt with Nt = Ht + Lt. We allow specific spillovers on low-skilled and high-skilled
workers because empirical evidence suggests that these spillovers vary by worker type
(Rosenthal & Strange, 2008; Heuermann, 2011; Bratti & Leombruni, 2014). For simplic-
ity, let us assume that factor productivity is proportional to the regional share of high-
skilled workers with the corresponding parameter λs:
lnAs,t = λsht, s ∈ {H,L}, λH ≥ λL ≥ 0. (1.2)
Under profit maximization and perfect competition, wages are equal to marginal produc-
tivity:
ln(wL,t) = ln(1− γ) + σ − 1
σ
lnAL,t +
1
σ
ln
(
Yt
Lt
)
and (1.3)
ln(wH,t) = ln γ +
σ − 1
σ
lnAH,t +
1
σ
ln
(
Yt
Ht
)
. (1.4)
Next, we make use of the fact that the Cobb-Douglas production function is a special case
of the CES function. By drawing on a suggestion by Kmenta (1967), we linearize the
terms ln (Yt/Lt) and ln (Yt/Ht) around the Cobb-Douglas case (σ = 1) using Taylor’s
formula.2 Neglecting terms with higher orders than two, the log wages for both types of
workers are:
lnwL,t = ln(1− γ) + lnAL,t + γ
σ
zt +
σ − 1
σ
ct, (1.5)
lnwH,t = ln γ + lnAH,t − 1− γ
σ
zt +
σ − 1
σ
ct (1.6)
2 The Taylor series approximation keeps things tractable. Note, however, that the approximation limits
the analysis to solutions near the Cobb-Douglas case (see Thursby & Lovell 1978; Henningsen &
Henningsen 2012).
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with
zt := ln
(
AH,t
AL,t
)
+ ln
(
ht
1− ht
)
and ct :=
(1− γ)γ
2
z2t .
Substituting equation (1.2) for factor productivities and taking derivatives yields the re-
sponse of wages to an increasing regional share of high-skilled workers:
∂ lnwL,t
dht
= λL +
γ
σ
z′t +
σ − 1
σ
c′t, (1.7)
∂ lnwH,t
dht
= λH − 1− γ
σ
z′t +
σ − 1
σ
c′t (1.8)
with
z′t := λH−λL+
1
(1− ht)ht and c
′
t := (1−γ)γz′t
[
(λH − λL)ht + ln
(
ht
1− ht
)]
.
In the Cobb-Douglas case (σ = 1), both types of workers benefit from identical spillover
effects, γλH + (1− γ)λL > 0. Low-skilled workers additionally gain from a neoclassical
relative supply effect, γ/((1− ht)ht) > 0, whereas this effect reduces the wages of high-
skilled workers, −(1 − γ)/((1 − ht)ht) < 0. However, research on labour demand has
established that low-skilled and high-skilled workers are gross substitutes, i.e., σ > 1 (see,
for instance, Autor et al. (2008); Ciccone & Peri (2005); Card & Lemieux (2001); Krusell
et al. (2000)). Wage effects are then the sum of group-specific effects (λL + (γ/σ)z′t and
λH − ((1− γ)/σ)z′t, respectively) and a general correction term due to deviation from the
Cobb-Douglas form (((σ − 1)/σ)c′t). Note that for σ > 1, specific spillover effects on
high-skilled workers exceed those on low-skilled workers: λH− [(1− γ)/σ] (λH−λL) >
λL + (γ/σ)(λH − λL) > 0. Again, low-skilled workers gain from relative supply effects,
whereas the wages of high-skilled workers are reduced: (γ/σ) × ((1 − ht)ht)−1 > 0,
−(1 − γ)/σ × ((1 − ht)ht)−1 < 0. In absolute values, these relative supply effects are
smaller than in the Cobb-Douglas case. The reason is that – given that the two types of
labour are gross substitutes – the factors are more easily exchangeable, and thus, firms
can react more flexibly to a changing supply of high-skilled workers.
Additionally, a general correction term, c′t, appears in equations (1.7) and (1.8) for
both types of workers. This correction includes a spillover and a relative supply effect
as well as an interaction of the two. Both the spillover and the interaction effect of the
general correction increase the wage, whereas the relative supply effect decreases it.3
3 Actually, the relative supply effect only decreases wages if the regional share of high-skilled workers
is below 50 percent. Because the regional share of high-skilled workers is, in fact, always well below
50 percent in our data, we only consider this scenario. To prevent the model from generating extreme
relative supply effects, we also exclude the possibility of shares of high-skilled workers being close to
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Typically, worker-specific effects dominate the general correction. Hence, if the re-
gional share of high-skilled workers increases, low-skilled workers will benefit from
spillover and relative supply effects. High-skilled workers gain more from spillover ef-
fects, but the relative supply effect reduces their wages. Hence, the total effect on high-
skilled workers is theoretically indeterminate in sign. Note, however, that in the case
of strong spillover effects for the high-skilled workers and low relative supply effects, it
might well be that the total wage effect of human capital spillovers for the high-skilled
workers exceeds the effect for the low-skilled workers.
Average wage effects are a weighted sum of worker-type wage effects:
(1− ht)∂ lnwL,t
∂ht
+ ht
∂ lnwH,t
∂ht
=
∂ lnwL,t
∂ht
+
ht
σ
[
(σ − 1)(λH − λL)− 1
(1− ht)ht
]
.
(1.9)
Clearly, human capital spillovers increase average wages, whereas the sign of the supply
effect depends on the relative number of low-skilled to high-skilled workers. Only for
very large spillover differences (λH − λL  0) does the general correction exceed the
worker-specific effects. In this special case, the overall correction is positive because the
negative supply effect is compensated by the interaction of spillover and supply effects,
which also grows with (λH −λL). Thus, in total, both types of workers would unambigu-
ously benefit from an increasing regional share of high-skilled workers.
Gross flow model
To incorporate the reaction of wages to specific changes in the regional share of high-
skilled workers, we now extend the baseline model. We first decompose the current num-
ber of high-skilled workers, Ht, into the k-period lagged number, Ht−k, and various gross
flows of high-skilled workers between period t− k and t. Let Dt−k,t describe the emigra-
tion of high-skilled workers and Gt−k,t the immigration of high-skilled workers between
periods t − k and t. Correspondingly, Rt−k,t and Et−k,t stand for exits of high-skilled
workers through retirement and new entries into the labour market, respectively. Finally,
Ut−k,t captures all other flows of high-skilled workers that are not explicitly addressed so
zero.
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far.4 Hence, one can write
Ht = Ht−k −Dt−k,t +Gt−k,t −Rt−k,t + Et−k,t − Ut−k,t. (1.10)
Let nˆt−k,t be the growth rate of the total workforce in the region between period t− k and
t and define brain drain and brain gain as the accumulated outflows and inflows between
t − k and t divided by the workforce in period t.5 Using a corresponding definition for
labour market entries and exits, one can re-write equation (1.10) in relative terms
ht =
ht−k
1 + nˆt,k
− Dt−k,t
Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
brain drain
+
Gt−k,t
Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
brain gain
− Rt−k,t
Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
exits
+
Et−k,t
Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
entries
− Ut−k,t
Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
others
= h˜t−k +
5∑
f=1
(−1)f h˙f,t−k,t, for f = 1, · · · , 5 , (1.11)
where h˜t−k := ht−k/(1 + nˆt−k,t), h˙1,t−k,t := Dt−k,t/Nt, and the rates h˙f,t−k,t, f =
{2, · · · , 4} are defined accordingly. Outflows lower the current share of high-skilled
workers (f ∈ {1, 3, 5}), and inflows raise the share (f ∈ {2, 4}). Adjusting the pro-
ductivity shifter in equation (1.2) accordingly yields
lnAs = λ0,sh˜t−k +
5∑
f=1
(−1)fλf,sh˙f,t−k,t, with s ∈ {L,H} and λf,H ≥ λf,L ≥ 0.
(1.12)
The adjusted productivity shifter allows each gross flow to generate a specific spillover
effect. Plugging equations (1.11) and (1.12) into equations (1.5) and (1.6) and taking first
4 The rest term contains temporal transitions into and out of unemployment if the regions where workers
become unemployed and employed are identical within the observation period. The emigration of
middle-aged high-skilled workers out of the economy and immigration from other countries into the
economy are also captured in Ut−k,t. To simplify the following equations, we assign here a negative
sign to flows into Ut−k,t and a positive sign to flows out of Ut−k,t.
5 In the public debate, the terms brain drain and brain gain are often confounded with one-sided value
judgments. The recent literature stresses that brain drain (gain) must not necessarily be negative
(positive) (Clemens, 2016; Docquier & Rapoport, 2012). In the context here, brain drain and brain
gain are understood to be neutral and are only used as shortcuts for emigration and immigration of
high-skilled workers.
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derivatives gives the wage effects of a particular gross flow, h˙f,t−k,t:
∂ lnwL,t
∂ h˙f,t−k,t
= (−1)f
{
λf,L +
γ
σ
z′f,t +
σ − 1
σ
c′f,t
}
and (1.13)
∂ lnwH,t
∂ h˙f,t−k,t
= (−1)f
{
λf,H − 1− γ
σ
z′f,t +
σ − 1
σ
c′f,t
}
(1.14)
with
z′f,t := λf,H−λf,L+
1
(1− ht)ht and c
′
f,t := (1−γ)γz′f,t
[
lnAH − lnAL + ln
(
ht
1− ht
)]
.
In contrast to the baseline model, there are now distinct spillover effects corresponding to
each gross flow. Inflows of high-skilled workers (brain gain and entries) entail positive
spillover effects on both types of workers, whereas outflows (brain drain and exits) entail
negative ones. More precisely, the negative spillover effects of outflows are the forgone
effects that the outflows would have generated had they stayed.
Similar to the baseline model, the supply effects are different for low-skilled and
high-skilled workers. Because their relative scarcity rises, low-skilled workers gain from
the supply effects of an inflow of high-skilled workers and vice versa. In contrast, for
high-skilled workers, spillover and relative supply effects work in the opposite direction.
Therefore, the total impact of an increasing concentration of regional human capital on
high-skilled workers’ wages is theoretically ambiguous. If spillover effects are much
larger for the high-skilled workers, λf,H−λf,L  0, the general correction dominates the
worker-specific effects. In this special case, both types of workers will unambiguously
gain from inflows, while outflows will decrease wages. Moreover, the absolute value of
the spillover effect of a particular gross flow is larger for high-skilled workers than for
low-skilled workers.
1.2.2 Estimation strategy
Based on our theoretical considerations, we aim to empirically investigate the existence
and strength of human capital externalities. We carefully take into account two major
concerns in the related literature, i.e., spatial sorting of workers and the entanglement
of spillover and conventional supply and demand effects (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000;
Moretti, 2004; Ciccone & Peri, 2006). Our empirical strategy is to include various con-
stant and time-varying fixed effects along with a comprehensive set of covariates to isolate
regional human capital externalities from other influences.
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For the empirical analysis, we employ three estimation equations. The first equation
corresponds to our theoretical baseline model and builds on an augmented skill-specific
Mincerian wage equation for an individual i living in region r observed at time t:
lnwsi,r,t,b,o,l,n = η
shr,t + Xi,tα
s + Zr,tβ
s + µi + ρr + τt + ιb + ωo
+ ι˜bt + ω˜ot + φ`t + 
s
i,r,t,b,o,l,n, s ∈ {H,L}. (1.15)
In our theoretical model, the individual log wage of a worker of skill group s responds
to the regional share of high-skilled workers hr,t; hence, the corresponding parameters ηH
and ηL are of particular interest. Xi,t is a row vector of relevant labour market charac-
teristics of the individual worker and his or her workplace, and αs is the corresponding
parameter vector. The row vector Zr,t is related to the parameter vector βs and contains
regional characteristics such as population density or the number of hotel beds as a proxy
for amenities. Confounding variation from local labour market conditions is proxied by
including the regional unemployment rate as control. To capture the effects of changes in
the regional composition of firms, we add separate indicators for openings and closures
of small and large firms to the model.6
To control for unobserved heterogeneity and the sorting of high-skilled workers into
high-wage regions, we include a set of fixed effects for worker (µi), region (ρr), time (τt),
industry (ιb) and occupation (ωo). In particular, the inclusion of worker and region fixed
effects captures general push and pull factors that draw high-skilled workers into thriving
regions. To address temporal shocks stemming from global sources, we expand equa-
tion (1.15) with time-varying fixed effects. These fixed effects should absorb all indus-
try (ι˜bt) or occupation (ω˜ot) specific shocks and thereby substantially reduce the sorting
problem. To further lessen any concern about biased estimates, we additionally clus-
ter administrative regions into functional labour market areas and include time-varying
labour-market-area fixed effects φ`t in the model. In the estimation, we therefore only
exploit variation stemming from administrative regions that deviate from the time trend
of their respective labour market areas, and hence, we eliminate all shocks that are related
to the labour market area.7
6 As indicators for openings and closures of small and large firms, we aggregate the number of regional
openings and closures of firms with fewer and more than 300 employees, respectively.
7 A common strategy to address regional sorting in the urban economics literature is the use of instru-
mental variable estimates. For instance, Moretti (2004) uses the lagged demographic structure and
land grant colleges as sources of exogenous variation. However, an estimation strategy based on in-
strumental variables is (almost) infeasible in our application. The reason is that we would need five
independent instruments in the gross flow model below – one for brain gain, one for brain drain, one
for entries, one for exits and one for the lagged share of high-skilled workers.
24 HUMAN CAPITAL SPILLOVERS AND THE CHURNING PHENOMENON
However, our theoretical model also highlights a second concern expressed in the lit-
erature on human capital externalities, namely, the entanglement of spillovers and conven-
tional supply and demand effects (e.g., Ciccone & Peri 2006). We address this problem
by exploiting the different natures of spillover and supply effects. While spillovers atten-
uate sharply with distance and are hence very localized (Rosenthal & Strange, 2008; Fu,
2007), we argue that supply effects operate within larger areas. Therefore, assigning coun-
ties to functional areas with common labour markets enables us to disentangle spillover
from supply effects. By including time-varying labour-market-area fixed effects in equa-
tion (1.15), we eliminate all variation that is common within functional labour markets,
e.g., supply effects; however, variation that deviates from the common time trend of the
local labour market area remains in the model, e.g., spillover effects.
To define functional labour market areas, we resort to Kosfeld & Werner (2012), who
use a factor analysis to cluster German counties into functional labour markets based on
commuter flows. These labour market areas are designed to represent common seclusive
labour markets. There are 141 such labour market areas in Germany, which integrate
402 counties. The number of counties within a labour market area ranges from one to
eleven and has a mean of four. The majority of labour market areas include three or four
counties.8 9
Overall, our estimation framework measures external effects from changes in the con-
centration of high-skilled workers within counties that are unrelated to changes in the
wider local labour market area. Within counties, changes are also unrelated to industry
or occupation trends. Furthermore, changes in the local share of high-skilled workers are
orthogonal to time-variant observable characteristics of workers and counties as well as
to time-constant unobservable characteristics. In other words, we assess how changes in
the local concentration of high-skilled workers affect the wages of individuals with the
same observable labour market characteristics and equivalent time-constant unobservable
traits who work in similar labour markets and identical industries and occupations. Under
the condition that our extensive set of fixed effects and control variables suffice to ad-
dress the sorting and the entanglement of spillover as well as supply and demand effects,
our estimation framework therefore identifies the impact of human capital externalities on
individual wages.
Our second econometric model corresponds to the gross flow model of subsection 1.2.1
8 Figure 1.A.1 in Appendix 1.A.3 shows a histogram of the number of counties within labour market
ares.
9 If a labour market area consists of only one county, time-varying labour-market-area fixed effects ab-
sorb all regional variation. Thus, affected observations do not contribute to the estimation of spillover
effects. However, as we will see in section 1.4, this does not change the results.
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and includes the same control variables and fixed effects as equation (1.15). However, be-
cause it allows various flows of high-skilled workers to have an idiosyncratic effect on
wages, it is more general. First, we consider gross flows within the past ten years relative
to the current year t:
lnwsi,r,t,b,o,`,n = η
sh˜r,t−10 + Fr,t−10,tθs + Xi,tαs + Zr,tβs + µi + ρr + τt + ιb + ωo
+ ι˜bt + ω˜ot + φ`t + 
s
i,r,t,b,o,`,n, s ∈ {H,L}. (1.16)
Fr,t−10,t represents a row vector that contains the gross flow rates of human capital over
a time period of ten years, and θs is the corresponding parameter vector. More specifi-
cally, Fr,t−10,t includes gains and losses of human capital through inter-regional mobility,
entries of young high-skilled workers into the labour market, retirement of elderly high-
skilled workers and other unspecified changes in the regional concentration of human
capital that are not explicitly modeled:10
Fr,t−10,t :=
(
Dr,t−10,t
Nr,t
,
Gr,t−10,t
Nr,t
,
Er,t−10,t
Nr,t
,
Rr,t−10,t
Nr,t
,
Ur,t−10,t
Nr,t
)
. (1.17)
All gross flows are relative to the number of workers N in region r at time t. To con-
sistently replace the regional share of high-skilled workers by gross flows, it is necessary
to add the lagged share of high-skilled workers divided by the growth rate of the re-
gional workforce, h˜r,t−10, to equation (1.16).11 The remaining control variables in equa-
tion (1.16) are identical to those in the baseline model of equation (1.15).
As illustrated in the introduction (Figure 1.1.1), regional in- and outflows of high-
skilled workers are highly positively correlated. Primarily, strong multicollinearity among
regressors reduces the efficiency of the model. However, as we will see in section 1.4.2,
there is enough variation in the data to precisely estimate spillovers from in- and outflows
of high-skilled workers. Thus, efficiency is not an issue in our application. Furthermore,
10 To implement these flow measures, we impose the condition that entrants must be younger than 30
years and permanent leavers older than 58 years.
11 Including the lagged share of high-skilled workers in equation (1.16) is in accordance with the theo-
retical considerations made in the previous section. Moreover, it accounts for empirical findings sug-
gesting a relationship between the local share of high-skilled workers and its growth. In the US, the
skill composition of regions seems to follow a divergence process, which means that the gap between
locations with high and low concentrations of human capital increases over time (Berry & Glaeser
2005, Glaeser et al. 2014). Waldorf (2009) finds that, on average, regions with a well-educated labour
force attract better-educated migrants than regions with a less-educated labour force. Contrary to the
findings for the US, Südekum (2008) identifies a convergence process of the skill distribution across
German counties. In any case, the regional share of high-skilled workers seems to exert an influence
on its future growth.
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estimating various gross flows within one model isolates each gross flow from the influ-
ences of the others. Thus, point estimates should be valid. Another concern might be that
strong multicollinearity leads to unstable estimates. However, our results clearly rebut
these concerns. We further discuss these topics in section 1.4.5.
Additionally, we investigate how spillovers from in- and outflows of high-skilled
workers evolve over time. To do so, we estimate a third model, in which we split up
the vector of total gross flows between t − 10 and t into five separate two-year gross
flows F˜r,t−τ,t−τ+2, where τ = 10, 8, · · · , 2. Estimating equation (1.16) with these two-
year flows allows us to study the evolution of wage effects over time and to distinguish
between short-term and long-term effects.
Clearly, splitting each gross flow into several two-year flows further impairs the ef-
ficiency of our model. However, as we will see in section 1.4.4, there is still enough
variation in the data to precisely estimate the model. Moreover, the smooth connection
between the calculated point estimates underpins the identification of isolated effects.
Due to the fixed effects in our specifications, variation in the regional concentration of
high-skilled workers comes from two sources. First, for individuals who do not change
their workplace location (‘stayers’), variation stems from changes in the regional con-
centration of high-skilled workers over time. Second, for individuals who change their
location (‘movers’), variation stems from the difference between their new and old loca-
tions. Because most policy implications are particularly relevant for stayers, we restrict
the data to stayers in our main estimates. Focusing on stayers also eases the interpretation
of the results. We define stayers as workers who have not changed the county of their
workplace within a period of at least ten years or since labour market entry. The robust-
ness section shows that the effects on stayers only and stayers and movers together are
very similar.
1.3 Data and descriptive statistics
1.3.1 Data
Our main database is the ‘Sample of Integrated labour Market Biographies’ (SIAB), pro-
vided by the Institute of Employment Research, Nuremberg (IAB). The SIAB is a ran-
dom register data sample of all employees subject to social security in Germany. Self-
employed workers and public servants are excluded. The data set gives information on
wage, age, education and further personal characteristics. Note that information on wages
is highly reliable because employers will face legal sanctions in the event of misreporting.
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We restrict the data to regular full-time workers and thus exclude part-time workers and
marginally employed workers. Furthermore, we only consider workers between the ages
of 18 and 64 who have completed their educational training. We transfer the spell data
into a yearly panel with June 30 as the reference date.
The wage data are top-coded because of the contribution assessment ceiling in the
German social security system. However, this affects no more than 9 percent of our
observations. As a correction method, we use an imputation procedure similar to that
employed by Dustmann et al. (2009) and Card et al. (2013) (see Appendix 2.A.1).
Wages in the data source are given per calendar day of the corresponding employment
spell. We deflate these daily wages by a general price index with 2010 as the base year.
As suggested by Fitzenberger et al. (2005), we improve the education variable in the
data set. Occupations are classified based on Schimpl-Neimanns (2003). The IAB also
provides information on the size, industry and location of employers (BHP)12. We use a
3-digit industry classification that is consistent over our observation period (Eberle et al.
, 2014). Regional information refers to the workplace of individuals, not their place of
residence.
Additionally, we add regional characteristics of the 402 German counties (“Landkreise
und kreisfreie Städte”)13 to the data set. The Federal Institute for Research on Building,
Urban Affairs and Spatial Development supplies information on population density, num-
ber of hotel beds (our proxy for amenities) and the local unemployment rate.
We define the high-skilled as workers with a degree from a university or university of
applied science.14 For simplicity, we refer to all non-high-skilled workers as low-skilled.
Because the years shortly after the German reunification might distort our estimates, gross
flows of high-skilled workers are calculated for the years 1993 and later. Because we
consider flows of high-skilled workers in time frames up to k = 10 years, the multivariate
analysis is restricted to the period 2002-2013. As explained in the previous section, we
restrict our main analysis to stayers (i.e., workers who do not move between regions). As
a result of the selection process, 3,030,957 observations of 469,668 individuals remain in
the sample.
12 For further information on the data provided by the IAB, see Antoni et al. (2016) and Schmucker
et al. (2016).
13 German counties are identical to the NUTS-3 level.
14 Universities of applied science are in general very similar to classical universities. However, universi-
ties of applied science focus more on applied topics and tend to have closer connections to the private
sector than do classical universities.
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1.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1.3.1 gives an overview of key variables at the regional level. The average wage of
full-time workers in Germany is 108 euros per calendar day. The average regional share
of high-skilled full-time workers is 13.1 percent, ranging from a minimum of 3 percent in
some peripheral rural regions to a maximum of 42 percent in the city of Erlangen, which
hosts a technical university and the headquarters of large companies such as Siemens.
Although German re-unification occurred more than 25 years ago, there are still ap-
parent differences between the western and eastern parts of the country. Although the
share of high-skilled workers grew steadily in West Germany and more or less stagnated
in East Germany during our observation period, the average share of high-skilled workers
in East Germany is still larger than that in West Germany. The explanation is the his-
torically high share of (formally) high-skilled workers in East Germany.15 However, part
of the human capital acquired in the socialist system might have become obsolete. Fur-
thermore, Blien et al. 2016 stress the fact that there are almost no headquarters of large
firms located in the new laender. Hence, research and development departments are less
common there. Note that despite the higher shares of high-skilled workers in the east,
average West German wages exceed East German wages by 36 Euros in our observation
period.
Table 1.3.1 also shows gross flows of high-skilled workers for a time frame of k = 10
years. For the complete sample, the average rate of brain gain is 10.4 percent. This
means that an average region experiences the immigration of 10.4 high-skilled workers
per 100 local workers in all skill categories within ten years. The average brain drain
is 10.2 percent and is thus slightly lower than the average brain gain. Both rates vary
considerably across regions. Most of the mobility of high-skilled workers is either within
East or within West Germany. This is especially true for the old laender. For instance,
the average brain drain from a West German county to an East German county is only
0.4 percent and makes up no more than 4 percent of the overall brain drain. Although
the brain drain from East Germany towards West Germany is notably higher, it does not
exceed 16 percent of the overall brain drain.
In contrast to most datasets on international migration, our data include all sending
and receiving regions. Hence, by definition, an emigrant from one region is an immi-
grant in another region. Consequently, the absolute number of immigrations and emi-
grations are equal. However, because we measure brain gain and brain drain in relative
15 Until the early 1970s, East Germany had notably more first-year university students per capita than
West Germany did (Baumert et al. 1994).
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Table 1.3.1: Descriptive statistics of key variables at the county level (2002-2014)
Mean Std. Dev. 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc.
All (402 counties, 12 years)
Daily wage 108.05 30.09 89.35 103.08 120.00
Share of high-skilled 0.131 0.059 0.092 0.119 0.154
Brain Gain 0.104 0.050 0.070 0.093 0.124
Brain Drain 0.102 0.052 0.066 0.091 0.123
Entries 0.041 0.022 0.026 0.035 0.049
Exits 0.016 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.021
West Germany (325 counties, 12 years)
Daily wage 114.84 29.04 96.16 108.51 124.44
Share of high-skilled 0.126 0.058 0.087 0.113 0.150
Brain Gain 0.102 0.051 0.069 0.091 0.121
Brain Drain 0.098 0.052 0.063 0.087 0.117
(within West) 0.094 0.051 0.060 0.083 0.112
(from W. to E.) 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.006
Entries 0.042 0.022 0.027 0.036 0.050
Exits 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.010 0.016
East Germany (76 counties, 12 years)
Daily wage 78.86 11.39 70.57 75.42 84.50
Share of high-skilled 0.151 0.055 0.115 0.137 0.165
Brain Gain 0.110 0.043 0.076 0.100 0.140
Brain Drain 0.119 0.051 0.081 0.108 0.144
(within East) 0.100 0.043 0.068 0.090 0.122
(from E. to W.) 0.019 0.010 0.012 0.018 0.024
Entries 0.036 0.020 0.024 0.031 0.042
Exits 0.036 0.014 0.027 0.034 0.044
Notes: Brain gain and brain drain are measured as in- and out-migrations of
high-skilled workers within the past ten years relative to the total regional
workforce in the focal period. Berlin is only included in the overall sample.
Daily wages represent gross earnings per calendar day.
terms (i.e., relative to the number of workers in sending or receiving regions), the average
brain gain and brain drain would only be identical if all counties had the same number of
workers. Because we simultaneously observe migrants as immigrants and emigrants, the
pre-migration characteristics of workers are identical. Additionally, the data also show
that pre-migration wages relative to wages in sending or receiving regions are almost the
same. Specifically, high-skilled immigrants earn 10 percent less than incumbent high-
skilled workers, and high-skilled emigrants earn 11 percent less than workers who stay in
the region.
Figure 1.4.1 gives a first impression of the relationship between wages of incumbent
workers and the immigration and emigration of high-skilled workers. After purging all
three variables of basic individual, firm and regional characteristics, we see a positive
correlation between wages and brain gain and a negative correlation between wages and
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Figure 1.3.1: Correlation between aggregated individual wages and brain gain / brain
drain (325 West German counties and 76 East German counties)
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Notes: The figure shows the correlation between brain gain / brain drain and wages, purged from basic
individual and regional influences. The control variables used to generate the graphs are age, experience,
tenure, education, gender, nationality, firm size, population density and year dummies. Both axes are
measured in standard deviations. Each dot represents a county-year. Wages are averaged on the county-year
level.
brain drain.
1.4 Empirical results
1.4.1 Baseline model
Before we proceed to examine the gross flow model, we first present estimates of our
baseline model, which explains individual wages by the regional share of high-skilled
workers. With respect to theory and the described differences between the two parts of
the country, separate results are shown for different skill groups for the whole sample and
for West and East Germany separately.
Table 1.4.1 summarizes the findings. The first column shows results without controls
for regional labour market shocks. In column (2), we include the local unemployment
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rate and industry-year dummies. In column (3), we add regional openings and closures
of small and large firms and occupation-year dummies. The most comprehensive spec-
ification in column (4) also contains yearly labour market area fixed effects. Overall,
the results confirm the conceptual implications. In all estimates for the whole sample,
the regional share of high-skilled workers is positively related to wages. Adding more
controls in columns (2) to (4) lowers the estimated coefficient, but it remains statistically
and economically significant. According to the most comprehensive specification in col-
umn (4), a one standard deviation increase in the regional share of high-skilled workers
raises wages by 1.3 percent (100 × 0.213 × 0.059). Compared to the papers by Moretti
(2004) for the U.S. or Heuermann (2011) for Germany, this point estimate is approxi-
mately three-fourths lower. The difference is likely due to the tight set of controls used
in our most comprehensive specification. Note that here, we only exploit variation in the
regional share of high-skilled workers that deviates from the time trend of the labour mar-
ket area, which, from a worker’s perspective, does not stem from shocks or trends in his
or her industry or occupation. Interestingly, our results are similar to those of Cornelissen
et al. (2017), who measure peer effects within establishments and apply a comparable
comprehensive identification strategy.
The inclusion of yearly labour market area fixed effects in columns (4) to (8) poten-
tially allows us to interpret the estimated effects as pure spillovers that are not confounded
by supply effects. Note that the estimated coefficients in columns (3) and (4) are nearly
identical, indicating that the specification of column (3) already absorbs major supply ef-
fects. What also stands out in Table 1.4.1 is that the wage effect of the regional share
of high-skilled workers is considerably smaller and only weakly significant in the East
German sample - a result we will also see in the gross flow model. A possible explanation
for this might be the differences between formal university degrees attained in the Federal
Republic of Germany and West Germany.
In columns (7) and (8), we differentiate between low-skilled and high-skilled workers.
As mentioned in the data description, wages are top-coded. Although this is the case for
only a small fraction of the whole sample, a considerable proportion of the high-skilled
sample is affected. To compare estimates of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, we
therefore restrict the sample to workers younger than 35 in columns (7) and (8). In this
age group, even in the high-skilled group, only 14 percent of wages are top coded.
As modeled in section 1.2, Table 1.4.1 shows that (young) high-skilled workers gain
more from human capital externalities than do low-skilled workers. Through spillovers, a
one-standard-deviation increase in the regional share of high-skilled workers even raises
the wages of the high-skilled by 4.0 percent. However, our conceptual framework also
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Table 1.4.1: Regression results for the baseline model
Dependent variable: individual log wage
Region Skill level
All All All All West East Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share high-skilled 0.442∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.108 0.258∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗
(0.063) (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.042) (0.060) (0.047) (0.211)
Further controls
Unemployment – Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm composition – – Y Y Y Y Y Y
Interaction dummies
Industry × year – Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occup. × year – – Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lab. area × year – – – Y Y Y Y Y
N 3,011,957 3,011,943 3,011,942 3,011,942 2,416,931 464,456 676,122 107,628
Counties 402 402 402 365 299 59 365 365
R¯2 0.879 0.880 0.881 0.881 0.872 0.906 0.883 0.772
Notes: All regressions include worker, occupation, industry, region and year fixed effects. Estimates
also include a constant, worker controls (age, age2, experience, experience2, tenure, tenure2 and educa-
tion dummies), firm size and regional controls (population density and number of hotel beds as a proxy
for amenities). The estimation period is from 2002 to 2013. Column 7 and 8 include workers younger
than 35 only. Two-way robust clustered standard errors with clustering at the individual and region
level in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
predicts that a rising share of high-skilled workers puts downward pressure on high-skilled
wages due to supply effects. Additional results for specifications in which spillover and
supply effects are entangled show that even in the presence of supply effects, high-skilled
workers profit from a higher concentration of other high-skilled workers in the same re-
gion. Hence, we find a clear indication that spillover effects dominate supply effects. The
corresponding regression coefficients are even larger than in the sample of low-skilled
workers. According to the theoretical framework, the overall wage effect for high-skilled
workers can surpass the effect on low-skilled workers only if the elasticity of substitu-
tion between low- and high-skilled workers σ is greater than one. Thus, these additional
findings support the consensus in the literature that low-skilled and high-skilled workers
are gross substitutes (Autor et al. , 2008; Ciccone & Peri, 2005; Card & Lemieux, 2001;
Krusell et al. , 2000). See Appendix 1.A.2 for details.
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1.4.2 Gross flow model
We now turn to the gross flow model that explicitly models externalities from internal im-
migration of high-skilled workers (brain gain), internal emigration of high-skilled work-
ers (brain drain), entries of young high-skilled workers into the labour market and exits
of retiring high-skilled workers from the labour market. Before examining the dynamics,
we analyse the wage effects of gross flows within a fixed time span of ten years. The
subsamples and covariates are identical to the baseline model.
Table 1.4.2 provides an overview of the regression results. Again, the empirical results
support our conceptual expectations. Column (1) presents results without controls for re-
gional labour market shocks. Adding such controls in columns (2) to (4) lowers the esti-
mated coefficient of gross flows of high-skilled workers. As before, we subsequently add
the local unemployment rate and industry-year dummies in column (2), regional open-
ings and closures of small and large firms and occupation-year dummies in column (3)
and yearly labour-market-area fixed effects in column (4).
With few exceptions, the estimated coefficients are statistically and economically sig-
nificant, and the sign pattern corresponds to our theoretical expectations. Typically, in-
flows of high-skilled workers increase wages, while outflows decrease wages. However,
the result does not hold for East Germany. In the corresponding subsample, almost all the
effects are statistically insignificant.
Columns (4) to (8) show pure spillover effects of various gross flows. For instance,
in the results for the overall sample presented in column (4), a one-standard-deviation
increase in brain gain leads to 1.0 percent higher wages, whereas a brain drain of the
same size lowers wages by the same order of magnitude (0.9 percent). The difference
is not statistically significant. Hence, over a time span of ten years, a brain gain can
compensate for an equal-sized brain drain. However, as we will see in the following
section, this is not the case in the short run.
The coefficients for entries of young high-skilled workers into the labour market and
exits of elderly high-skilled workers from the labour market are even larger than those
for gains and losses of human capital through inter-regional mobility. Hence, these two
groups would exert larger spillover effects on local workers if they had the same mag-
nitude as brain gain and brain drain. A possible explanation might be that young high-
skilled workers are especially valuable because of their innovativeness, and elderly high-
skilled workers are valuable because of their work experience (see Frosch 2011 for a
literature survey of age effects on innovative performance). Moreover, exits are related
to residents of the region who are typically well embedded in regional networks. Note,
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Table 1.4.2: Regression results for the gross flow model
Dependent variable: individual log wage
Region Skill level
All All All All West East Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
h˜r,t−10 0.471∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ −0.012 0.217∗∗∗ 0.636∗
(0.073) (0.046) (0.041) (0.043) (0.051) (0.064) (0.061) (0.290)
Gross flows (time frame: 10 years)
Brain Gain 0.413∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.046 0.278∗∗∗ 0.458
(0.060) (0.043) (0.041) (0.046) (0.050) (0.068) (0.065) (0.270)
Brain Drain −0.269∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗ −0.178∗∗ −0.176∗∗ −0.077 −0.224∗∗∗ −0.792∗∗
(0.072) (0.052) (0.050) (0.054) (0.062) (0.069) (0.067) (0.283)
Entries 0.507∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 1.014∗
(0.113) (0.077) (0.071) (0.073) (0.082) (0.096) (0.081) (0.399)
Exits −1.063∗∗∗ −0.618∗∗∗ −0.514∗∗∗ −0.516∗∗∗ −0.829∗∗∗ 0.143 −0.265 −0.446
(0.285) (0.143) (0.134) (0.136) (0.177) (0.116) (0.180) (0.936)
Others 0.306∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.017 0.236∗∗∗ 0.699∗
(0.094) (0.058) (0.054) (0.044) (0.052)
Further controls
Unemployment – Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm composition – – Y Y Y Y Y Y
Interaction dummies
Industry × year – Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occup. × year – – Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lab. area × year – – – Y Y Y Y Y
N 3,011,957 3,011,943 3,011,942 3,011,942 2,416,931 464,456 676,122 107,628
Counties 402 402 402 365 299 59 365 365
R¯2 0.879 0.880 0.881 0.881 0.872 0.906 0.883 0.772
Notes: All regressions include worker, occupation, industry, region and year fixed effects. Estimates
also include a constant, worker controls (age, age2, experience, experience2, tenure, tenure2 and
education dummies), firm size and regional controls (population density and number of hotel beds as
a proxy for amenities). To fully decompose the regional share of high-skilled workers into gross flows
estimates also include the lagged share of high-skilled workes divided by total employment growth
(h˜r,t−10). The estimation period is from 2002 to 2013. Column 7 and 8 include workers younger than
35 only. Two-way robust clustered standard errors with clustering at the individual and region level
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
however, that the variations of flows from entries and exits are smaller than those from
inter-regional mobility. Hence, their actual effects are also lower. For instance, a one
standard deviation increase in entries only leads to 0.6 percent higher wages. Addition-
ally, the coefficient on the lagged share of high-skilled workers (h˜r,t−10) is positive and
significant. Hence, incumbent high-skilled workers also generate positive human capital
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externalities.
Similar to the baseline model, we find strong effects in West Germany but almost
no partial correlations between gross flows of high-skilled workers and wages in East
Germany. Interestingly, the model shows that only entries of young high-skilled workers
raise wages in the East German sample. A possible explanation for these results might
be that formal degrees attained in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Germany
differ in their current relevance.
Also analogous to the results from the baseline model, the point estimates in the high-
skilled sample are larger than in the low-skilled sample, indicating that high-skilled work-
ers benefit more from spillover effects than do low-skilled workers. However, due to the
low number of observations in the high-skilled sample, the effects are less precisely es-
timated. In this sub-population, we do not detect statistically significant wage effects
from brain gain and exits, although we do find spillover effects from brain drain, entries
of young high-skilled workers and incumbent high-skilled workers. Additionally, in the
sample of low-skilled workers, exits of elderly high-skilled workers seem not to affect
wages via spillovers. Because we restrict the samples to workers younger than 35 in
columns (7) and (8), a possible explanation might be that there is an age barrier between
young and old workers. Indeed, additional estimates with the mixed sample of low- and
high-skilled workers younger than 35 also show no effect of exits of elderly high-skilled
workers from the labour market on individual wages.
In addition to the presented regressions, we estimated various alternative specifica-
tions of equation (1.16). In these alterations, we subsequently left out individual, firm,
industry and regional control and dummy variables. Qualitatively, these exercises do not
change the main findings.
1.4.3 Comparing the gross flow model to the baseline model
The empirical results of the gross flow model can be compared to the findings of the
baseline model. To this end, we compute wage effects for each West German county
based on the two models. For the baseline model, we use the estimated coefficient on
the variable ‘share of high-skilled’ in Table 1.4.1 column (5) and calculate the associated
wage effects by multiplying the actual share of high-skilled workers of every region-year
combination with the regression coefficient. To derive wage effects in the gross flow
model, we use the coefficients of Table 1.4.2 column (5) and separately calculate wage
effects for each gross flow and h˜r,t−10. Finally, we add up these partial effects for each
region in every year.
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In the baseline model, the average regional share of high-skilled workers is associ-
ated with wage gains of 2.8 percent. In the gross flow model, the corresponding average
effect is 3.1 percent and is thus only marginally larger. Figure 1.4.2 provides a detailed
visualization of the comparison. Both models predict similar spillover effects, especially
around the mean. Only in counties with large effects does the baseline model predict wage
effects that are lower than the more general gross flow model. For instance, due to human
capital externalities, the gross flow model suggests that a worker in the city of Munich
earns 9.9 percent more than an otherwise observationally equivalent worker from a region
where there are no other high-skilled workers. The baseline model would predict a wage
difference of 8.8 percent. Hence, studies that do not decompose the regional share of
high-skilled workers seem to produce only moderately biased estimates of human capital
externalities.
1.4.4 Dynamics
Having thoroughly discussed the wage effects of gross flows of high-skilled workers
within a time frame of ten years, we now explore the dynamic evolution of these ef-
fects. Based on our full specification and the West German sample, we re-estimate the
gross flow model using five two-year flows of each explanatory variable (equation (1.16)).
Figure 1.4.3 illustrates the results. The four panels of the graph show separate coefficient
estimates on brain gain, brain drain, entries and exits. Each point within a panel represents
an estimated coefficient. For instance, the rightmost point in the first panel corresponds
to the gross inflow of high-skilled workers between t− 10 and t− 8. To make the visual
comparison easier, the figure shows coefficients in absolute values in the panel on brain
drain and exits. All estimated coefficients exhibit the theoretically expected signs. Dashed
lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
The first panel of Figure 1.4.3 illustrates an increase in spillover effects from brain
gain over time. Assume that there is an inflow of high-skilled workers of one percent
within a two-year period. While the effect is minor and statistically not significant in
the first two years, it grows in the years after and becomes statistically significant. After
ten years, an initial brain gain of the given size happens to have raised wages by 0.45
percent. At the 5 percent significance level, this effect is larger than short- or medium-
run effects. The panel on entries of young high-skilled workers into the labour market
portrays a very similar pattern. The estimated effect of human capital externalities on
wages is approximately 0.3 percent in the first two years and grows to 0.6 percent after
eight to ten years. Again, long-run effects are statistically larger than short- or medium-
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Figure 1.4.1: Estimated wage effects: baseline model and gross flow model
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Notes: The figure compares predicted wage premia due to regional spillover effects from high-skilled work-
ers based on the baseline and the gross flow model. Predictions from the baseline model are based on
Table 1.4.1 column (5). Predictions from the gross flow model are based on Table 1.4.2 column (5). The
magnitudes of the effects are in comparison to regions without any high-skilled workers. The graph shows
West German counties only. The orange dots highlight effects in 2013.
run effects. Both patterns are similar to the wage growth effects on rural-to-urban movers
found in the agglomeration literature (De la Roca & Puga, 2017; Lehmer & Möller, 2009;
Maré & Glaeser, 2001). Both the agglomeration literature and our findings suggest that
the transfer of knowledge and other possible externalities of human capital accrue over
time.
There are several possible explanations for growing spillover effects from inflows over
time. First, there should be a certain delay until wages reflect productivity gains. Second,
spillover effects spread through social networks. It appears likely that regional social net-
works of newcomers are relatively small in the beginning but grow over time. Similarly,
the reach and average strength of spillovers should be small in the beginning and increase
over time. Third, especially in the case of entries of young workers, learning on the job
should also play a role. If workers increase their knowledge and skills over time, their abil-
ity to generate spillovers should grow over time as well. In contrast, the negative effect of
forgone spillovers from brain drain remains constant over time. Statistically, the accord-
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Figure 1.4.2: Coefficient estimates for two-year gross flows
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Notes: The figure shows coefficient estimates for two-year gross flows from the West German sample
and our strictest specification (equation (1.16), with F˜r,t−τ,t−τ+2, where τ = 10, 8, · · · , 2). Estimates
are based on 3,011,942 observations in the period 2002-2013. The model includes worker, occupation,
industry, region and year fixed effects. Furthermore, we control for time-varying industry, occupation, and
labour-market-area fixed effects. Estimates also include constant, worker controls (age, age2, experience,
experience2, tenure, tenure2 and education dummies), firm size and regional controls (unemployment rate,
population density and number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). We use two-way robust clustered
standard errors with clustering at the individual and region levels. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at
the 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Vertical lines show 95% confidence intervals. Fitted curves are
obtained from simple quadratic and cubic models and suggest the evolution of spillover effects.
ing coefficients are all of the same size. It seems plausible that the mechanisms through
which regional social networks generate productive effects are immediately weakened af-
ter active members of the network have left the region. For instance, it can be expected
that the probability of face-to-face contacts is instantaneously reduced. Hence, negative
effects from forgone spillovers should appear without a time lag.
When looking at exits of retiring high-skilled workers, we see almost the same picture
as for workers leaving the region, albeit the effects are less precisely estimated. This
result supports the view that social network effects predominately work through contacts
between persons who are still active in the labour force. Externalities of human capital
probably arise mainly through joint project work and cooperation within or between firms
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and research and development institutions. Given the fact that innovations are frequently
made through new ways of combining existing knowledge (Taylor & Greve, 2006), it can
be assumed that there are scale effects of the pool of knowledge, and those effects are
mainly incorporated by economically active high-skilled persons in a region.
Of special interest is the relative size of externalities from brain gain and brain drain
at different points in time. Within two years, the negative effects from the outflow of
high-skilled workers outweigh the positive spillover effects from a corresponding inflow
at the 5 percent level of significance. In the medium run, the effects do not statistically
differ from each other (t − 3 to t − 8). In the long run (t − 9 to t − 10), spillovers from
brain gain surpass negative externalities from brain drain at the 1 percent level. These
results imply that it takes at least three years until a brain gain can compensate for an
equal-sized brain drain. In the medium run, effects counterbalance each other, and in the
long run, a brain gain even overcompensates a brain drain. An explanation of this result
is that immigrating workers increase the local diversity pool and thus cause particularly
large spillover effects (compare to Ottaviano & Peri, 2005; Südekum et al. , 2014, who
find positive labour market effects of cultural diversity).
1.4.5 Net flows and further robustness checks
To check the validity of our results, we carry out several robustness checks. First, we
estimate models examining the effects of net flows instead of gross flows. Second, we
evaluate the gross flow model with various subsamples of the population.
Net flows
As illustrated in the introduction (Figure 1.1.1), regional in- and outflows of high-skilled
workers are highly correlated. Obviously, the collinearity between in- and outflows im-
pairs the efficiency of the gross flow model (equation 1.16). However, as shown in sec-
tion 1.4.2, there is enough variation in the data to simultaneously estimate effects from in-
and outflows. In principle, estimating gross flows within one model isolates each gross
flow from the influences of the other gross flows. Hence, point estimates should be valid.
To buttress these conceptual considerations, we compare the gross flow model to a less
demanding net flow model. We define the net flow model as follows:
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lnwsi,r,t,b,o,`,n = η
shr,t−10 + θsfr,t−10,t + Xi,tαs + Zr,tβs + µi + ρr + τt + ιb + ωo
+ ι˜bt + ω˜ot + pint + φ`t + 
s
i,r,t,b,o,`,n, s ∈ {H,L}., (1.18)
where hr,t−10 represents the ten-year-lagged regional share of high-skilled workers
and fr,t−10,t is the net flow of high-skilled workers within ten years. The net flow is equal
to the sum of gross flows and can also be interpreted as the difference between hr,t and
hr,t−10. The remainder of equation 1.18 is identical to the control variables of the gross
flow model (equation 1.16). In terms of flexibility, the net flow model lies between the
baseline and the gross flow model. The net flow model is more flexible than the baseline
model because it allows different spillover effects from incumbent high-skilled workers
and flows of high-skilled workers. However, it is less flexible than the gross flow model
because it assumes symmetric effects from in- and outflows, whereas the gross flow model
relaxes this assumption.
Table 1.4.3 summarizes the results from the net flow model. In line with Tables 1.4.1
and 1.4.2, column (1) of Table 1.4.3 presents results without controls for regional labour
market shocks. We add such controls in columns (2) to (4). Furthermore, we subse-
quently add the local unemployment rate and industry-year dummies in column (2), re-
gional openings and closures of small and large firms and occupation-year dummies in
column (3), and yearly labour market area fixed effects in column (4). The remaining
columns show results for selected subsamples.
All coefficients are of reasonable size and, with the exception of East Germany, are
also highly significant. In line with the gross flow model, the lagged share of high-skilled
workers and inflows of high-skilled workers raise wages. Effects from incumbent workers
are larger than from inflows. For instance, a one-percentage-point increase in the ten-
year-lagged share of high-skilled workers raises wages by 0.3 percent, whereas the same
increase in inflows raises wages by only 0.2 percent (column 4). Additionally, in line
with our main findings, the effects on high-skilled workers are larger than on low-skilled
workers.
Brain gain and brain drain have a dominant weight within all types of net flows (see
Table 1.3.1), and the corresponding coefficients in the gross flow model (Table 1.4.2)
are of equal size. Hence, there is no asymmetry between the effects of an equally sized
inflow and outflow of high-skilled workers in the 10-year model. Consequently, the coef-
ficient on net flows (Table 1.4.3) should also be of comparable size if both specifications
(equation 1.16 and equation 1.18) are correct. Indeed, this is the case. Absolute values
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Table 1.4.3: Regression results for the net flow model
Dependent variable: individual log wage
Region Skill level
All All All All West East Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
hr,t−10 0.707∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.048) (0.042) (0.046) (0.052) (0.073) (0.065) (0.292)
Net flows 0.371∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.096 0.226∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗
(0.062) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.060) (0.047) (0.207)
Further controls
Unemployment – Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm composition – – Y Y Y Y Y Y
Interaction dummies
Industry × year – Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occup. × year – – Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lab. area × year – – – Y Y Y Y Y
N 3,011,957 3,011,943 3,011,942 3,011,942 2,416,931 464,456 676,122 107,628
Counties 402 402 402 365 299 59 365 365
R¯2 0.879 0.880 0.881 0.881 0.872 0.906 0.883 0.772
Notes: All regressions include worker, occupation, industry, region and year fixed effects. Estimates
also include a constant, worker controls (age, age2, experience, experience2, tenure, tenure2 and educa-
tion dummies), firm size and regional controls (population density and number of hotel beds as a proxy
for amenities). Estimates further include the 10-year lagged share of high-skilled workers hr,t−10. The
estimation period is from 2002 to 2013. Column 7 and 8 include workers younger than 35 only. Two-
way robust clustered standard errors with clustering at the individual and region level in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
of coefficients on brain gain and brain drain (Table 1.4.2) and coefficients on net flows
(Table 1.4.3) are very similar in all estimates.
For the same reason, predicted effects from the net flow model and the gross flow
model should be of comparable size. According to the net flow model with the full set
of control variables, increasing the lagged share of high-skilled workers (hr,t−10) and the
net flow of high-skilled workers by one standard deviation raises wages by 2.5 percent.
According to the gross flow model, increasing h˜r,t−10, as well as all gross flows by one
standard deviation, leads to 2.1 percent higher wages. The small difference further cor-
roborates the validity of our main specification.
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Stayers and movers
For individuals who do not move between regions (‘stayers’), variation in the regional
concentration of high-skilled workers comes from regional changes over time. In contrast,
for individuals who change their location (‘movers’), variation stems from the difference
between their new and their old locations. To ease the interpretation of our main findings,
we restrict the sample to stayers and therefore allow only one source of variation. In the
following, we relax this restriction and allow variation from stayers and movers.
Estimating equation 1.16 with stayers and movers yields Table 1.4.4. Overall, the
results are similar to our main findings, and the estimated coefficients are only slightly
larger. For instance, while a one standard deviation increase in brain gain raises wages of
stayers by 1.0 percent (Table 1.4.2, Column 4), the mixed effect on stayers and movers is
1.1 percent (Table 1.4.4, Column 4). We conclude that the effects on movers and stayers
are of comparable magnitude and that our main findings are not affected by the restriction
on stayers.
Rural and urban
Theoretically, human capital externalities could vary in different types of regions. It might
well be that information flows more easily in densely populated cities than in rural areas.
Table 1.4.5 therefore replicates results from the gross flow model in the 15 largest German
cities (metropolises), other cities and rural areas. To compute effects, we estimate our
main model (Equation (1.16)) with interactions of gross flows of high-skilled workers
and the region type.16 As before, we include controls for local labour market shocks. The
table reports joint coefficients of interaction terms and F-statistics on the joint significance
of effects. Hence, the results can be interpreted directly.
Table 1.4.5 indicates that estimated effects in cities are similar to effects in the full
sample. For instance, externalities from a one-percentage-point increase in brain gain
are only 0.3 percentage points smaller in cities than in all regions (compare Table 1.4.5,
Column 2 to Table 1.4.2, Column 4). Differences from the effects of brain drain are
even smaller. Although point estimates for metropolises are of identical magnitude, they
are less precisely estimated and thus statistically insignificant. This is very likely due to
16 Note that it is impossible to estimate Equation 1.16 with separate samples of metropolises and (most)
cities. The reason is that in such samples, time-varying labour-market-area fixed effects would be
identical to yearly region fixed effects. Hence, all (yearly) regional variation, including flows of high-
skilled workers, would be nullified. In contrast, joint estimates with interactions only wipe out vari-
ation on the labour-market-area year level, and therefore variation from within labour market areas
remains in the data.
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Table 1.4.4: Regression results for the gross flow model (effects on stayers and movers)
Dependent variable: individual log wage
Region Skill level
All All All All West East Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
h˜r,t−10 0.628∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ −0.040 0.222∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041) (0.046) (0.064) (0.057) (0.211)
Gross flows (time frame: 10 years)
Brain Gain 0.500∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.041 0.224∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗
(0.057) (0.040) (0.037) (0.044) (0.049) (0.058) (0.065) (0.219)
Brain Drain −0.346∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗ 0.033 −0.208∗∗∗ −0.795∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.047) (0.044) (0.049) (0.054) (0.070) (0.062) (0.202)
Entries 0.644∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.753∗
(0.107) (0.071) (0.064) (0.060) (0.066) (0.082) (0.075) (0.313)
Exits −1.043∗∗∗ −0.645∗∗∗ −0.533∗∗∗ −0.506∗∗∗ −0.697∗∗∗ 0.087 0.036 −1.159
(0.226) (0.118) (0.110) (0.126) (0.160) (0.102) (0.152) (0.768)
Others 0.397∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.051 0.203∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.054) (0.052) (0.043) (0.051) (0.055) (0.054) (0.235)
Further controls
Unemployment – Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm composition – – Y Y Y Y Y Y
Interaction dummies
Industry × year – Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occup. × year – – Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lab. area × year – – – Y Y Y Y Y
N 3,111,179 3,111,165 3,111,164 3,111,164 2,498,202 476,884 713,542 107,628
Counties 402 402 402 365 299 59 365 365
R¯2 0.877 0.878 0.879 0.879 0.871 0.904 0.876 0.773
Notes: All regressions include worker, occupation, industry, region and year fixed effects. Estimates
also include a constant, worker controls (age, age2, experience, experience2, tenure, tenure2 and
education dummies), firm size and regional controls (population density and number of hotel beds as
a proxy for amenities). To fully decompose the regional share of high-skilled workers into gross flows
estimates also include the lagged share of high-skilled workes divided by total employment growth
(h˜r,t−10). The estimation period is from 2002 to 2013. Column 7 and 8 include workers younger than
35 only. Two-way robust clustered standard errors with clustering at the individual and region level
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
the low number of regions that provide variation (only 15) and thus should not be over-
interpreted. In rural areas, all effects are close to and statistically not different from zero.
These results imply that rural areas benefit much less, if they benefit at all, from human
capital externalities. This result would corroborate the idea that information spread is
less effective in sparsely populated regions. However, these estimates should not be over-
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Table 1.4.5: Regression results for the gross flow model (region types)
Dependent variable: individual log wage
Metropolises Cities Rural areas
(1) (2) (3)
h˜r,t−10 0.445∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ −0.070
(15.88) (17.79) (1.36)
Gross flows (time frame: 10 years)
Brain Gain 0.282 0.226∗∗∗ −0.076
(2.08) (18.81) (1.11)
Brain Drain −0.180 −0.184∗∗∗ −0.010
(1.01) (9.40) (0.02)
Entries 0.189 0.212∗ 0.014
(0.99) (6.12) (0.02)
Exits −0.709∗ −0.832∗∗∗ 0.163
(5.44) (17.72) (1.92)
Others 0.222 0.209∗∗∗ −0.046
(2.09) (14.87) (0.95)
Counties 15 188 199
N per group 675,675 1,479,292 856,975
R¯2 0.88
Notes: The table shows estimation results from our full model (Equa-
tion (1.16)) with additional interaction effects of all gross flows of high-
skilled workers and indicators for metropolises, cities and rural regions.
Estimates come from one model. Columns indicate joint coefficients
(sum of interaction effects). Accordingly, ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate joint
significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively and values in
parentheses are F-statistics based on two-way robust clustered standard
errors with clustering at the individual and region level. We assign the
15 largest cities, with more than 400,000 inhabitants, to Metropolises.
Control variables and fixed effects are identical to those in Table 1.4.2,
Column 4. Estimates include worker, occupation, industry, region, year,
labor market area year, occupation year, and industry year fixed effects.
Estimates also include a constant, worker controls (age, age2, experi-
ence, experience2, tenure, tenure2 and education dummies), firm size
and regional controls (population density and number of hotel beds as
a proxy for amenities). To fully decompose the regional share of high-
skilled workers into gross flows estimates also include the lagged share
of high-skilled workes divided by total employment growth (h˜r,t−10).
interpreted, as the number of observations is relatively low.
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Further robustness checks
Our findings could also be distorted by labour market areas that consist of only one or
very few counties. Therefore, we additionally compute effects for a subsample that only
includes labour market areas with at least three counties. The results are summarized in
Appendix 1.A.3 (Table 1.A.2). The robustness exercise produces very similar results and
supports our main findings.
To corroborate our results regarding the dynamic evolution of effects, we also esti-
mated an alternative version of our third specification, in which we split up gross flows of
high-skilled workers into ten separate yearly flows. Figure 1.A.2 in the Appendix illus-
trates the results. Compared to our main model based on two-year flows (Section 1.4.4),
the results barely change. Two-year flows and yearly flows indicate the same evolution of
externalities over time, and point estimates are of the same magnitude.
In summary, our results are remarkably robust across varying specifications and sam-
ples. Furthermore, consistent estimates across different subsamples also clearly indicate
that multicollinearity among gross flows does not influence the results.
1.5 Conclusions
Descriptive evidence suggests that inter-regional mobility of high-skilled workers is char-
acterized by a churning phenomenon: regional in- and outflows of high-skilled workers
are positively correlated. This phenomenon motivates us to analyse human capital exter-
nalities from gross flows instead of net flows. Changes in the stock of regional human
capital result not only from labour market entries and exits but also from internal migra-
tion of the high-skilled. Based on these flows, we estimate human capital externalities
from various sources. Our analyses are based on a rich administrative micro panel data
set and thoroughly take into account the sorting of workers as well as the entanglement of
externalities and conventional labour market supply and demand effects with an extensive
set of time-varying fixed effects.
We find that a gain of human capital through inter-regional migration and labour mar-
ket entries of high-skilled workers significantly raises the wages of all workers in that
area, whereas the opposite is the case for emigration and labour market exits of high-
skilled workers. For instance, a one-standard-deviation increase in the high-skilled immi-
gration rate, pooled over a period of ten years, increases individual wages of incumbent
workers in the region by one percent. In absolute terms, negative externalities from the
loss of human capital are of similar size. However, a closer investigation of dynamic ef-
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fects shows that positive externalities from inflows increase over time, whereas negative
externalities from outflows remain stable. A suitable explanation for this pattern might
be that externalities transmit through personal networks that develop over time. In the
short run, the negative externalities from an outflow of high-skilled workers outweigh the
positive externalities from a corresponding inflow. However, after approximately three
years, a regional inflow of high-skilled workers compensates for an equal-sized outflow.
In the medium run, effects counterbalance each other, and in the long run, externalities
from inflows eventually overcompensate negative effects from outflows of the same size.
This observation supports the hypothesis that the size diversity in the regional pool of
knowledge, i.e., the knowledge that workers accumulate in other regions, might amplify
human capital externalities.
Our results also indicate that high-skilled workers benefit more from human capital
externalities than do low-skilled workers. Theoretically, this result is consistent with an
elasticity of substitution between the two types of workers exceeding unity. Differentiat-
ing geographically, we find highly robust effects for West Germany but only weak effects,
if any, for East Germany. A possible explanation could be that some of the formal skills
acquired in the East before 1990 became obsolete after unification.
Our findings support the common view that attracting skilled individuals is beneficial
for regions. However, to fully reap the benefits of immigration of high-skilled workers,
regions should also aim to retain their human capital. Of course, the inflow of one region
corresponds to the outflow of other regions for a given total number of high-skilled work-
ers. Our results suggest, however, that on the national level, internal migration is, in sum,
beneficial for the economy if the frequency of relocation is not too high. Otherwise, the
frictional costs of building new local personal networks vitiate potential human capital
externalities.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Imputation of wages
To impute top-coded wages, we follow a two-step procedure similar to that in Dustmann
et al. (2009) and Card et al. (2013). First, we cluster observations by year, by East and
West Germany and by three education groups. For each of these clusters, we estimate
Tobit wage equations, controlling for typical transformations of the variables gender, age,
work experience, tenure, firm size and regional population density. Next, we impute
censored wages by Xβˆ+ σˆΦ−1 [k + u(1− k)], where βˆ are coefficient estimates, σˆ is the
estimated standard deviation, Φ is the standard normal density, u is a random draw from
a uniform distribution between zero and one, k = Φ
[
(c−Xβˆ)/σˆ
]
and c is the censoring
point.
Second, we calculate average worker and firm wages over time, excluding the current
period. If a worker or firm is only observed once, we instead use the sample mean. Next,
we re-estimate the Tobit wage equations from step one, but we include worker and firm
mean wages as well as a dummy that indicates whether the sample mean was used or not.
Again, we impute censored wages by Xβˆ + σˆΦ−1 [k + u(1− k)].
1.A.2 Detailed effects on low-skilled and high-skilled workers
Table 1.A.1 gives a detailed description of wage effects on low- and high-skilled work-
ers. In all estimates, the regional share of high-skilled workers increases wages. The
first and fifth columns show results without controls for regional labour market shocks.
Subsequently, adding such controls in columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8) lowers the es-
timated relationship between the share of high-skilled workers and wages in both sub-
samples. According to the strictest estimates, a one-standard-deviation increase in the
regional share of high-skilled workers raises the wages of low-skilled workers by 1.5 per-
cent; see column (4). The associated effect on high-skilled workers is 4.1 percent and is
thus considerably larger.
Let us now turn to the results where we jointly measure spillover and supply effects
(columns 1-3 and 6-8). Our conceptual framework predicts that a rising share of high-
skilled workers increases the wages of low-skilled workers, while the wages of high-
skilled workers will only increase if spillover effects dominate supply effects. Indeed,
the regression results show that low-skilled workers profit from a higher concentration of
high-skilled workers in the same region. The same applies to high-skilled workers, even
in the presence of supply effects. Hence, spillover effects dominate supply effects, and
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Table 1.A.1: Regression results for the baseline model (detailed effects on low- and high-
skilled workers)
Dependent variable: individual log wage
low-skilled high-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share high-skilled 0.430∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 1.180∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗
(0.055) (0.050) (0.049) (0.047) (0.242) (0.231) (0.222) (0.211)
Further controls
Unemployment – Y Y Y – Y Y Y
Firm composition – – Y Y – – Y Y
Interaction dummies
Industry × year – Y Y Y – Y Y Y
Occup. × year – – Y Y – – Y Y
Lab. area × year – – – Y – – – Y
N 676,140 676,122 676,122 676,122 107,890 107,641 107,641 107,628
Counties 402 402 402 365 402 402 402 365
R¯2 0.879 0.882 0.883 0.883 0.763 0.770 0.772 0.772
Notes: All regressions include worker, occupation, industry, region and year fixed effects. Estimates
also include a constant, worker controls (age, age2, experience, experience2, tenure, tenure2 and
education dummies), firm size and regional controls (population density and number of hotel beds as
a proxy for amenities). To fully decompose the regional share of high-skilled workers into gross flows
estimates also include the lagged share of high-skilled workes divided by total employment growth
(h˜r,t−10). The estimation period is from 2002 to 2013. Only workers younger than 35 included. Two-
way robust clustered standard errors with clustering at the individual and region level in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
the net effects on high-skilled workers are positive.
1.A.3 Tables and graphs
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Figure 1.A.1: Number of counties within labour market areas
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Notes: Frequencies based on counties; N = 402; Mean = 3.9; Median = 4; Number of labour market areas
= 141
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Table 1.A.2: Regression results for the gross flow model (only labor market areas with at
least three counties)
Dependent variable: individual log wage
Region Skill level
All All All All West East Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
h˜r,t−10 0.481∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ −0.092 0.231∗∗∗ 0.711∗
(0.082) (0.052) (0.047) (0.046) (0.052) (0.067) (0.065) (0.306)
Gross flows (time frame: 10 years)
Brain Gain 0.374∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.001 0.267∗∗∗ 0.413
(0.064) (0.046) (0.044) (0.048) (0.051) (0.076) (0.068) (0.282)
Brain Drain −0.231∗∗ −0.179∗∗ −0.134∗ −0.181∗∗ −0.181∗∗ −0.027 −0.215∗∗ −0.774∗∗
(0.080) (0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.064) (0.078) (0.071) (0.292)
Entries 0.485∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 1.302∗∗
(0.126) (0.084) (0.078) (0.078) (0.085) (0.120) (0.087) (0.403)
Exits −1.262∗∗∗ −0.750∗∗∗ −0.637∗∗∗ −0.566∗∗∗ −0.894∗∗∗ 0.176 −0.261 −1.178
(0.373) (0.177) (0.166) (0.146) (0.176) (0.135) (0.193) (0.987)
Others 0.298∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ −0.042 0.240∗∗∗ 0.807∗
(0.114) (0.068) (0.064) (0.047) (0.053) (0.066) (0.064) (0.320)
Further controls
Unemployment – Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm composition – – Y Y Y Y Y Y
Interaction dummies
Industry × year – Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occup. × year – – Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lab. area × year – – – Y Y Y Y Y
N 2,501,314 2,501,292 2,501,291 2,501,291 2,074,971 296,124 552,463 96,065
Counties 311 311 311 311 267 43 311 311
R¯2 0.874 0.876 0.876 0.877 0.870 0.904 0.882 0.768
Notes: All regressions include worker, occupation, industry, region and year fixed effects. Estimates
also include a constant, worker controls (age, age2, experience, experience2, tenure, tenure2 and
education dummies), firm size and regional controls (population density and number of hotel beds as
a proxy for amenities). To fully decompose the regional share of high-skilled workers into gross flows
estimates also include the lagged share of high-skilled workes divided by total employment growth
(h˜r,t−10). The estimation period is from 2002 to 2013. Column 7 and 8 include workers younger than
35 only. Two-way robust clustered standard errors with clustering at the individual and region level
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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Figure 1.A.2: Coefficient estimates for yearly gross flows
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Notes: The figure shows coefficient estimates for yearly gross flows from the West German sample and our
strictest specification (equation (1.16), with F˜r,t−τ,t−τ+2, where τ = 10, 8, · · · , 2). Estimates are based on
3,011,942 observations in the period 2002-2013. The model includes worker, occupation, industry, region
and year fixed effects. Furthermore, we control for time-varying industry, occupation, and labour-market-
area fixed effects. Estimates also include constant, worker controls (age, age2, experience, experience2,
tenure, tenure2 and education dummies), firm size and regional controls (unemployment rate, population
density and number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). We use two-way robust clustered standard
errors with clustering at the individual and region levels. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%
and 5% levels, respectively. Vertical lines show 95% confidence intervals. Fitted curves are obtained from
simple quadratic and cubic models, respectively, and suggest the evolution of spillover effects.
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Chapter 2
The Spatial Decay of Knowledge
Spillovers: A Functional Regression
Approach with Precise Geo-Referenced
Data
Abstract*
This paper analyzes knowledge spillovers from high-skilled workers by applying func-
tional regression to precise geocoded register data. Functional regression enables us
to describe the concentration of high-skilled workers around workplaces as continuous
curves and to estimate a spillover function that depends on distance. Furthermore, our
rich panel data allow us to address the sorting of workers and to disentangle spillover
from supply effects by using an extensive set of time-varying fixed effects. Our estimates
reveal that knowledge spillovers attenuate with distance and disappear after 15 kilome-
ters. Spillovers from the immediate neighborhood are twice as large as spillovers from
surroundings ten kilometers away.
Keywords: knowledge spillovers, functional regression, geodata, wages
JEL Codes: C13, D62, J24, J31, R10, R12
* This part is joint work with Christoph Rust.
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 55
2.1 Introduction
Workers interact with colleagues within and across firms. They share knowledge, discuss
ideas and adopt novel technologies. These interactions potentially increase the produc-
tivity of workers and are a major source of agglomeration economies (Davis & Dingel,
2019; Acemoglu, 1996; Lucas, 1988; Marshall, 1890). Empirical research supports the
existence of such ‘knowledge spillovers’ within predefined geographical boundaries (Cor-
nelissen et al. , 2017; Ciccone & Peri, 2006; Moretti, 2004; Rauch, 1993). However, little
is known about the exact spatial extent of knowledge spillovers. For several reasons,
knowledge spillovers should decline with distance. For instance, distance raises the costs
of planed social interactions, such as meetings. Similarly, distance reduces the likeli-
hood of encounters that lead to the exchange of knowledge. Moreover, distance depresses
information flows within social networks. The reason is that distance generally raises
the number of intermediaries between individuals, and a higher number of intermediaries
hinders information transfers.
Previous empirical studies provide initial evidence for spatially decreasing knowledge
spillovers. Using cross-sectional data from the US, Rosenthal & Strange (2008) construct
concentric rings around workers that measure the concentration of human capital within 5
miles and between 5 to 25 miles. To explore how knowledge spillovers attenuate with dis-
tance, they regress individual wages on the concentration of human capital within these
rings. They find that knowledge spillovers from the inner ring are notably larger than
spillovers from the outer ring. A closely related study by Fu (2007) adopts the strategy of
Rosenthal & Strange (2008) to analyze cross-sectional data from the Boston metropolitan
area. Using more precise geocoded data, Fu (2007) measures the concentration of human
capital within finer rings (i.e., 0-1.5, 1.5-3, 3-6 and 6-9 miles). Fu (2007) finds evidence
that knowledge spillovers may vanish after only three miles. Recent findings from the
Netherlands in a setting with panel data and concentric rings of 0-10, 10-40, and 40-80
kilometers’ distance suggest that knowledge spillovers reach 10 kilometers (Verstraten,
2018). Although these studies provide evidence for the spatial attenuation of knowledge
spillovers, the exact decay of the effects remains unclear because the literature is con-
strained either by relatively imprecise geo-information or by specific data from a single
area. Furthermore, most empirical evidence is restricted to cross-sectional data, which
complicates causal inference. Additionally, the described studies overlook that spillover
effects from high-skilled workers are entangled with labor market supply and demand
effects (Katz & Murphy, 1992; Card & Lemieux, 2001; Borjas, 2003; Moretti, 2004; Ci-
ccone & Peri, 2006). Scholars also investigate spatial patterns in other agglomeration
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effects. For instance, Arzaghi & Henderson (2008) study networking effects within the
advertising agency industry in Manhattan, Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) examine productivity
externalities in Berlin, and Andersson et al. (2019) evaluate productivity effects from
industry specialization and diversity in Swedish cities.
In this paper, we analyze the spatial decay of knowledge spillovers from high-skilled
workers. To this end, we draw on a large and novel administrative micro panel dataset that
features the exact coordinates of nearly all German establishments and rich information
on individual workers over one and a half decades. Since productivity is not available on
the individual level, we follow the existing literature and take individual wages as a proxy
for productivity. This also is in line with standard economic theory, where wages equal
marginal productivity.
To fully exploit the information from exact geocodes of workplaces, we adopt a
methodologically fresh approach and measure the magnitude of knowledge spillovers
with respect to distance in a continuous manner. Recent developments in functional data
analysis (FDA) provide particularly suitable frameworks. FDA is a branch of statistics
that extends classical statistical methods to random variables with a functional nature,
such as curves or surfaces over a continuous domain. Typical examples of such data are
temperature curves, growth curves or the continuous evolution of stock prices over time.
The continuity of curves entails that adjacent values are somehow related. In many appli-
cations, exploiting this information makes FDA more efficient than classical multivariate
methods on discretized data.
While statisticians employ FDA in a wide range of applications (see Ullah & Finch,
2013 for a systematic overview), FDA is applied quite rarely in economics (examples
include Ramsay & Ramsey, 2002, Wang et al. , 2008 and Caldeira & Torrent, 2017).1
This paper, therefore, illustrates the potential of FDA in economic research with high-
dimensional variables. Our approach relies on a functional linear regression model in
which a scalar outcome variable (log wage) is regressed on observations of a functional
random variable (share of high-skilled workers as a function of distance to a worker’s
workplace). For this purpose, we augment the classical scalar-on-function regression
model to incorporate further scalar-valued explanatory variables and use an estimation
procedure, suggested by Crambes et al. (2009), that is based on smoothing splines and
makes it possible to very flexibly model the function-valued spillover parameter. The
estimated spatial spillover function relates wages to the share of high-skilled workers as
a function of distance, which is evaluated at 500 meter intervals up to 50 kilometers.
1 Readers with a general interest in FDA are referred to the textbooks of Ramsay & Silverman (2005);
Ferraty & Vieu (2006); Horváth & Kokoszka (2012) and Hsing & Eubank (2015).
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There are two major challenges in identifying regional knowledge spillovers, namely,
confounding labor market supply and demand effects and the sorting of high-skilled work-
ers into high-wage regions. We address both problems with an extensive set of time-
varying fixed effects. If high- and low-skilled workers are imperfect substitutes, standard
supply and demand models indicate that an increase in the share of high-skilled workers
raises (lowers) the wages of low-skilled (high-skilled) workers (see Ciccone & Peri, 2006
and Moretti, 2004 for detailed explanations in our context). Thus, spillovers are poten-
tially entangled with labor market supply and demand effects. We disentangle spillover
from supply and demand effects by exploiting the different spatial natures of the two
effects. While supply and demand effects are plausibly common within local labor mar-
kets (i.e., supply and demand effects originating in one part of the city uniformly affect
wages throughout the city), the intensity of spillover effects truly depends on distance
(i.e., spillovers affect close neighbors more than distant neighbors). Thus, in the data, we
are able to purge spillover effects from supply and demand effects by eliminating vari-
ation that is common within regional labor markets. To do so, we include time-varying
labor-market-area fixed effects in the econometric specification (i.e., a specific intercept
for every labor market area in each year). Because supply and demand effects may have
different impacts on high- and low-skilled workers, we further interact these labor-market-
area-year fixed effects with a skill dummy.
Following Cornelissen et al. (2017), who, in a related context, address worker sort-
ing at the firm level (Abowd et al. , 1999; Card et al. , 2013), we address sorting of
high-skilled workers into high-wage regions (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000) by including a
comprehensive set of fixed effects. In particular, the above-introduced labor-market-area-
year fixed effects nullify unobserved regional heterogeneity that might attract high-skilled
workers, such as (changes in) average wages, general labor market conditions and ameni-
ties. Importantly, labor-market-area-year fixed effects also cover temporal labor market
shocks that might pull or push skilled workers into or out of regions—a concern raised by
Moretti (2004). Additionally, we account for locational advantages within regions (e.g.,
proximity to infrastructure and facilities) and unobserved individual heterogeneity with
worker-firm match fixed effects.
We find significant spillover effects from the local concentration of high-skilled work-
ers. Moreover, our estimates reveal that spillover effects decay with distance. Knowledge
spillovers from direct neighbors (i.e., high-skilled workers who are located within a 0.5
kilometer radius) are roughly twice as large as spillovers from high-skilled workers that
are located 10 kilometers apart. After 15 kilometers, spillover effects vanish completely.
Overall, an evenly distributed, one-standard-deviation increase in the local share of high-
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skilled workers leads to wage gains of 2%. The magnitude of this effect is comparable to
classical estimates at the aggregate level. In general, our findings are in line with the ur-
ban economic literature and support the existence of knowledge spillovers. Additionally,
our results imply that knowledge spillovers cover entire cities. However, the majority of
their effect is bounded within the near neighborhood of high-skilled workers. Workers
at firms located in, or very close to, a skilled neighborhood, therefore, benefit most from
spillovers. Those who work farther away from skilled neighbors gain less, and workers in
very remote regions do not profit from knowledge spillovers at all.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the
estimator and our identification strategy. Section 2.3 summarizes the data. Section 2.4
presents our main findings, illustrates the statistical properties of the estimator in a simu-
lation study and provides an overview of several robustness checks. Section 2.5 concludes
the paper.
2.2 Estimation strategy
This paper seeks to measure the spatial attenuation and reach of knowledge spillovers.
Therefore, our aim is to describe the share of high-skilled workers around establishments
as continuous curves and model a spillover function that depends on distance. In the
following, we explain the estimator, discuss statistical inference and describe our repre-
sentation of the share of high-skilled workers as curves. Finally, we specify the identifica-
tion strategy that addresses endogenous sorting of workers and confounding labor market
supply and demand effects.
2.2.1 The estimator
The spatial allocation of human capital varies considerably across and within adminis-
trative boundaries. For a given location (say worker i’s workplace), the concentration
of high-skilled workers in the immediate neighborhood, therefore, may differ from the
concentration in the greater neighborhood. Moreover, one can measure the concentration
of high-skilled workers at any distance to worker i’s workplace. It is thus natural to re-
gard the concentration of high-skilled workers with respect to the distance to worker i’s
workplace as a curve. We use curves to assess how the concentration of human capital
influences productivity in space.
The functional linear regression model with a scalar response variable is a suitable
framework to measure such a relationship. With Yi being the scalar dependent variable,
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the model is defined as
Yi =
∫ 1
0
β(z)Xi(z) dz + εi, (2.1)
where Xi ∈ L2([a, b]) are independent and identically distributed (iid) random functions
defined on a common domain, which we set to [0, 1] without loss of generality. The
function-valued coefficient parameter β ∈ L2([0, 1]) describes the influence of Xi on
Yi and varies over distance z. The error term εi is independently distributed and has
a mean of zero and homoscedastic variance (we will later consider heteroscedastic and
autocorrelated errors).
Model (2.1) has received considerable attention in the FDA literature (see Morris,
2015, for an overview). Classically, the estimation of β is based on the Karhunen-Loève
decomposition of the empirical covariance operator of the observed curvesXi. Therefore,
the expansion of the so-called functional principal component (FPC) estimator depends
heavily on the random curves’ correlation structure. In this paper, we instead build on the
smoothing spline estimator proposed by Crambes et al. (2009). This approach has the
advantage that the basis functions are independent of the curves Xi, which results in a
more flexible function space for β̂. From an asymptotic perspective, both estimators have
minimax-optimal convergence rates (Hall & Horowitz, 2007; Crambes et al. , 2009).
In the following, X denotes the n × p matrix holding all n curves Xi(z) observed at
p grid values z1, . . . , zp, and Y denotes the n-vector with observations of the dependent
variable. To estimate β, the approach of Crambes et al. (2009) minimizes the penalized
sum of squared residuals
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
Yi − 1
p
p∑
j=1
β(zj)Xi(zj)
)2
+ ρ
(
1
p
p∑
j=1
pi2β(zj) +
∫ 1
0
(β(m)(z))2 dz
)
. (2.2)
Here, piβ(z) is the best approximation of β(z) by a polynomial of degree m − 1 and
ensures uniqueness without imposing further assumptions on the random functions Xi.
The penalty parameter ρ ≥ 0 controls the flexibility of the estimated parameter function
β̂. With ρ = 0, for instance, equation (2.2) coincides with the least-squares criterion. The
minimizer of equation (2.2) is
(
β̂(z1), . . . , β̂(zp)
)
=
1
n
(
1
np
X′X + ρA
)−1
X′Y, (2.3)
where A = P + pA∗ is a penalty matrix introduced by Crambes et al. (2009). This
matrix is a combination of a classical regularization matrix A∗ ∈ Rp×p and a nonstandard
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projection matrix P ∈ Rp×p projecting into the space spanned by polynomial functions
of degree m − 1. The latter ensures the invertibility of X′X + ρA and is defined by
P = W(W′W)−1W′, where W = (zqj )j,q ∈ Rp×m, q = 0, . . . ,m − 1. Traditional
smoothing splines penalize second derivatives. Thus, we set m = 2, which results in an
expansion of cubic natural splines with knots at z1, . . . , zp. The regularization matrix A∗
is defined as usual by
A∗ = B(B′B)−1
(∫ 1
0
b(2)(z)b(2)(z)′ dz
)
(B′B)−1B,
where B denotes the p× p matrix of the p basis functions, evaluated at the p grid values,
and b(2)(z) is, for given value of z ∈ [0, 1], a p-vector of second derivatives for each of
the p basis functions.
To account for the influence of further explanatory variables, we expand model (2.1)
with a k-vector of scalar-valued explanatory variables Zi and a corresponding parameter
vector γ:
Yi =
∫ 1
0
β(z)Xi(z) dz + Z
′
iγ + εi. (2.4)
Accordingly, we augment the smoothing spline estimator of Crambes et al. (2009) to
incorporate scalar-valued explanatory variables. Let XZ denote the compound data matrix
(X, pZ), where the matrix Z holds the sample values of the k additional scalar explanatory
variables. The compound estimator of (discretized) β and γ then is:
β̂ =
(
β̂(z1), . . . , β̂(zp), γ̂1, . . . , γ̂k
)
=
1
n
(
1
np
X′ZXZ + ρAZ
)−1
X′ZY. (2.5)
Because the scalar-valued explanatory variables do not load into the roughness penalty,
we extend the penalty matrix A by appending k zero columns and k zero rows:
AZ =
(
A 0
0 0
)
∈ R(p+k)×(p+k).
The estimator (2.5) depends on the smoothing parameter ρ that controls the complex-
ity of the estimate of the function-valued slope parameter β. The smoothing parameter ρ
itself has no meaningful interpretation. Instead, a well-established measure for the com-
plexity of the estimate β̂ is the effective number of degrees of freedom (edf):
edf(ρ) = trace
(
HρZ
)
, (2.6)
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where HρZ = (np)
−1XZ ((np)−1X′ZXZ + ρAZ)
−1
X′Z is the hat matrix of model (2.4).
Given a predefined number of degrees of freedom, equation (2.6) allows us to determine
ρ. In our preferred specification, we set edf(ρ) = 2.5; the resulting estimate can thus be
substantially more complex than a straight line. We experiment with different penalties
in appendix 2.A.5. Qualitatively, our results do not depend on the exact choice of the
penalty term ρ.
2.2.2 Inference
From a theoretical perspective, drawing local inference about the slope parameter β in
the functional linear regression model is a difficult issue. When Xi(z) are elements of the
infinite-dimensional Hilbert space L2, the estimator β̂ is not asymptotically normal (w.r.t.
the strong topology on L2). The reason is that such models belong to the class of ill-posed
inversion problems, that is, the (compact) covariance operator of the random curvesXi(z)
has no bounded inverse (see Cardot et al. , 2007, for details).
To quantify the estimation uncertainty, we proceed as in the classical linear regression
framework. In classical linear regression, inference about the model parameters builds on
the variance of the parameter estimates conditional on the observed regressors. Similarly,
the (pointwise) variance of the compound parameter vector β̂ for given observations of
curves and covariates, XZ, and the regularization parameter, ρ, can be computed by (see
also Ramsay & Silverman, 2005, equation 15.16)
Var
(
β̂|XZ, ρ
)
=
1
n2
(
1
np
X′ZXZ + ρAZ
)−1
X′ZΩXZ
(
1
np
X′ZXZ + ρAZ
)−1
. (2.7)
Here, Ω is the covariance matrix of the error term, which does not necessarily have to be
diagonal. By replacing this matrix with an appropriate estimate Ω̂, we obtain an estimate
for the variance of the parameter vector β̂. Furthermore, we estimate the ’meat’, X′ZΩXZ,
based on clustered standard errors at the firm level (see, for instance, Abadie et al. , 2017,
equation 2.3).
We use the variance (2.7) to visualize the pointwise variability of the estimate β̂ with
confidence bands. We obtain confidence bands by multiplying the square-root of the
corresponding diagonal entry of Var
(
β̂|XZ, ρ
)
by appropriate quantiles of the normal
distribution. To account for the family-wise error rate, we divide the significance level
by the effective degrees of freedom. The simulation exercise (section 2.4.2) supports
such a procedure and shows that it indeed controls size when the (global) null is a linear
function. Even if the true parameter β0 is more complex, the estimator is able to resemble
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β0 quite well, although a local bias leads to a pointwise violation of the nominal coverage
probability of the confidence bands.
2.2.3 Calculation of curves
A key feature of our analysis is the representation of the spatial density of high-skilled
workers around workplaces as curves. To calculate these curves from geocoded data,
we compute the values of the functions Xi(z) for each worker i on an equidistant grid
z1, . . . , zp:
Xi(zj) =
nhs[zj − h; zj)
n[zj − h; zj)
. (2.8)
Here, nhs[zj − h; zj) refers to the number of high-skilled individuals for which the spheric
distance between their working location and the workplace of worker i is at least as large
as zj − h and smaller than zj . Similarly, n[zj − h; zj) is the number of all workers (high-
skilled and low-skilled) within the distance window. In other words, the value of the
curve Xi at distance zj indicates the share of high-skilled workers in all workers within
the distance window [zj − h, zj), where h is a fixed bandwidth. To ensure that a firm’s
own skill structure does not affect measurements of its neighborhood, we compute Xi(z1)
without its own number of workers. To balance analytical precision and computational
costs, we choose a bandwidth of h = 500 meters and compute Xi(zj) on the grid zj =
500m, 1000m, . . . , 50000m.
There are several options for the actual measure of the concentration of high-skilled
workers. We, decide to measure density as shares instead of, for instance, in absolute
numbers or high-skilled workers per square meter for several reasons. First, just as the
geographic area covered by [zj − h, zj) increases with distance zj , the absolute number
of high-skilled workers that could potentially populate that area also increases with dis-
tance. Thus, when using absolute numbers, the intensity of high-skilled workers would
increase with distance by definition and would therefore not provide comparable values of
Xi(z) across space. Second, as the data show, the proportion of inhabited land decreases
with z. As knowledge transfers appear only in inhabited areas, using high-skilled workers
per square meter would therefore decrease the intensity of human capital with distance
by construction. Thus, high-skilled workers per square meter would also not suffice to
compare the concentration of high-skilled workers at varying distances. By contrast, the
number of workers within the distance window [zj − h, zj) is a reasonable unit of mea-
surement of the de facto populated area, which, thinking of skyscrapers, not only covers
actual land use but also the intensity of land use. Therefore, we measure the intensity of
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human capital as high-skilled workers relative to the total number of workers (i.e., we take
the share of high-skilled workers). Using shares is also in line with the recent literature
on regional knowledge spillovers following Moretti (2004).
2.2.4 Identification
Having explained the estimator, we will now address confounding labor market demand
and supply effects and endogenous sorting of individuals. The empirical literature has
established that high- and low-skilled labor are imperfect substitutes (e.g., Autor et al. ,
2008; Ciccone & Peri, 2005; Card & Lemieux, 2001; Krusell et al. , 2000). As Acemoglu
& Angrist (1999), Moretti (2004) and Ciccone & Peri (2006) illustrate, changes in the
supply of high-skilled labor entail a market mechanism that affects wages. Due to labor
market demand and supply effects, an increase in the share of high-skilled workers in
the labor market depresses the wages of high-skilled workers and raises the wages of
low-skilled workers.
If, for instance, a firm hires additional high-skilled workers, the functional variable
Xi has a higher value at z for those individuals who work between z − 500m and z away
from that firm (for z = 500m, 1000m, . . . , 50000m). The firm’s decision also leads to an
increase in the share of high-skilled workers within the local labor market and, therefore,
entails a change in the local labor market situation. The corresponding wage effects of this
market mechanism depend on whether the firm’s decision is demand-driven (i.e., the firm
needs more high-skilled workers) or is a result of a larger supply of high-skilled workers
(maybe the firm’s location offers amenities that attract such workers). However, it is not
possible to infer from the data which side of the market was responsible for the firm’s
decision, but ignoring this mechanism in equation (2.4) likely yields a biased estimate of
β(z). The magnitude of the bias depends on the relative number of high- and low-skilled
workers in the local labor market and the elasticity of substitution between the two groups
(see Moretti, 2004).
To disentangle knowledge spillover from labor market supply and demand effects, we
exploit the different spatial nature of the two effects. On the one hand, the intensity of
knowledge spillovers should decay with distance. We therefore expect larger spillovers
from close neighbors than from distant neighbors. On the other hand, labor market supply
and demand effects plausibly uniformly affect the local labor market. Thus, independent
of the exact location, a shift in the supply of high-skilled labor homogeneously affects
wages within a local labor market. We are thus able to nullify labor market supply and
demand effects by eliminating all variation that is common within local labor markets
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without removing intra-regional variation from knowledge spillovers.
As labor market supply and demand shifts vary over time and the direction of such
shifts idiosyncratically affects high- and low-skilled individuals, we expand equation (2.4)
to include time-varying labor-market-area fixed effects for each skill group pirst (i.e., an
intercept for each labor market area and skill group in every year). Our full estimation
equation is:
Yit =
∫ 1
0
β(z)Xit(z) dz + Z
′
itγ + θif + τt + ωo + pirst + uit. (2.9)
Here, Yit is the individual log wage of worker i in year t, and Xit(z) is the share of high-
skilled workers, described as a continuous curve around the workplace of individual i that
depends on distance z. Note that all workers of firm i in year t share the same locational
characteristics, specifically they all have the same curve Xit(z). β(z) is the associated
spillover function that we seek to retrieve from the data. The model controls for time-
varying observable individual, establishment and regional characteristics Zit and a series
of fixed effects. θif is a worker-firm match fixed effect, τt is a year fixed effect and ωo is
an occupation fixed effect.
Endogenous sorting of workers (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000) constitutes another chal-
lenge in identifying regional knowledge spillovers. In our application, sorting threatens
identification on two levels: first on the level of treated individuals (i.e., individuals whose
wages we observe) and second on the treatment level itself (i.e., the spatial density of
high-skilled workers). Regarding treated individuals, the most able workers might sort
into high-skilled neighborhoods. Sorting would thus create a spurious relationship be-
tween wages and the local concentration of human capital. Regarding the treatment level,
high-wage areas might attract high-skilled workers. Sorting would thus lead to reverse
causality. Inspired by Cornelissen et al. (2017), we address sorting with an extensive set
of fixed effects.
Although the empirical literature finds that workers do not sort into cities based on
their (unobserved) abilities (De la Roca & Puga, 2017; Glaeser & Mare, 2001), there
is evidence of ability-driven sorting of workers into firms (Card et al. , 2013; Abowd
et al. , 1999). If more-productive firms locate in neighborhoods with high concentrations
of human capital, sorting of workers would create a spurious relationship between wages
and the local share of high-skilled workers. Thus, to ensure that neither sorting of workers
nor sorting of firms biases the estimates, we include worker-firm match fixed effects (θif )
in our model. Worker-firm match fixed effects additionally eliminate other unobservable
characteristics of workers and firms, such as personal traits and locational advantages
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(e.g., proximity to infrastructure).
Regarding sorting at the treatment level, high-wage areas might attract high-skilled
workers, which would reverse the direction of causality in equation (2.9). However, as
worker-firm match fixed effects (θif ) nullify permanent locational advantages, they also
eliminate general push and pull factors that might draw high-skilled workers into high-
wage regions. Moretti (2004) additionally raises the concern that temporal shocks in the
local labor market might affect the concentration of high-skilled workers. We address
this issue with time-varying labor-market-area fixed effects (pirst). Because time-varying
labor-market-area fixed effects remove temporal variation in the supply of high-skilled
labor, they also remove supply changes due to temporal shocks.
In summary, equation (2.9) allows us to estimate knowledge spillovers that are unre-
lated to labor market demand and supply effects and endogenous sorting of individuals.
The remaining variation of Xit(z) in equation (2.9) stems from temporal intra-regional
changes in the concentration of high-skilled workers.
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Data
In the empirical analysis, we combine administrative data on almost all German firms and
rich data from a representative sample of workers over a period of 15 years. Our panel
data include exact geo-coordinates of establishments and therefore allow us to describe
the distribution of high-skilled workers as spatial functions around workers. We evaluate
the share of high-skilled workers at 500-meter intervals up to a distance of 50 kilometers.
Our main meso-level data sources are the Establishment History Panel (BHP 7516)
and IEB GEO from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).2 The Establishment
History Panel comprises all German establishments with at least one employee on June
30 of each year. The dataset provides establishment-level information on, among other
metrics, the number of employees and the number of employees with tertiary education.
To measure the distribution of high-skilled workers, we classify employees holding a
degree from a university or a university of applied sciences as high skilled.3
2 For a detailed description of the Establishment History Panel, see Schmucker et al. (2016)
3 There are two types of universities in the German tertiary education system: traditional universities and
universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen). Compared to traditional universities, universities
of applied sciences focus more on practical topics. Universities of applied science usually also have
a stronger focus on engineering and technology. Both kinds of universities award bachelor’s and
master’s degrees.
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We expand the dataset with exact geo-coordinates from IEB GEO. IEB GEO is a novel
data source that includes addresses of establishments in the Establishment History Panel
between 2000 and 2014 as geo-coordinates. In Germany, firms are obliged to register at
least one of their establishments per municipality and industry. In general, the registration
of one establishment per municipality provides a detailed description of the geographic
landscape of workplaces. In some cases, however, firms might actually have multiple es-
tablishments within the same industry in a single municipality, which they do not report.
In these cases, we cannot confirm that individuals work where they are registered. We
therefore exclude the following chain-store industries from our data: construction, finan-
cial intermediation, public service, retail trade, temporary agency work and transporta-
tion. With the remaining set of establishments, we compute the density of high-skilled
workers as spatial functions around establishments as described in section 2.2.3.
In the econometric analysis of knowledge spillovers, we merge the constructed spa-
tial functions of high-skilled workers with micro-level data from the Sample of Integrated
Labour Market Biographies (SIAB 7514).4 The Sample of Integrated Labour Market
Biographies is a 2% random sample of social security records. The dataset contains in-
formation on wages, age, work experience and education, among other data, with daily
precision. To join the individual-level data to the establishment-level data we transform
the spell dataset into a yearly panel with June 30 as the reference date.
Because employers face legal sanctions for misreporting, information on wages in
German social security data is generally highly reliable. However, one limitation is that
roughly 10% of earnings are right-censored at the social security maximum. Therefore,
we impute top-coded wages following Dustmann et al. (2009) and Card et al. (2013)
(see appendix 2.A.1 for details). Further, we improve information on education following
Fitzenberger et al. (2005) and restrict the sample to full-time workers aged between 18
and 64. As we are only interested in the effects on individuals in regular employment, we
exclude apprentices, interns, marginally employed workers and trainees. The final dataset
consists of 3,498,536 observations from 539,179 individuals between 2000 and 2014.
To assign workplaces to local labor markets, we use the de facto standard definition
of local labor market areas in Germany from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs
and Energy (BMWi). The goal in designating these local labor market areas is to design
regions with strong internal commuter links but clear detachment from other areas. The
construction is based on Kosfeld & Werner (2012), who use factor analysis on commuter
flows to identify local labor market areas in Germany. The BMWi partitions Germany
4 For a detailed description of the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies, see Antoni et al.
(2016)
2.3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 67
into 258 local labor market areas with an average radius of 21 kilometers. The size of
these local labor market areas corresponds well to the findings of Manning & Petrongolo
(2017), implying that 80% of the effects of local labor demand shocks are measurable
within 20 kilometers. As a rule of thumb, the authors further suggest that treatment areas
for labor demand shocks should be 2.5 times the median commute. In our case the rule
of thumb would suggest 24 kilometers and is therefore close to the actual size of the
labor market areas from the BMWi (Dauth & Haller, 2018, own calculations). Because
labor market areas consist of multiple counties (Stadt- und Landkreise, NUTS-3), we
complete our dataset with county-level indicators on population density, unemployment
and number of hotel beds (as a proxy for amenities) from the Federal Institute for Research
on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR).
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2.3.1 provides an overview of the distribution of high-skilled workers in Germany.
For data protection reasons, the map shows the share of high-skilled workers in 1×1 kilo-
meter grid cells. Note that the data used in the econometric analysis are more precise and
offer exact coordinates. The map illustrates the considerable diversity in the distribution
of high-skilled workers in Germany. For instance, among the largest cities, there is a mas-
sive concentration of high-skilled workers in Munich, Hamburg and Berlin. By contrast,
Nuremberg and Bremen exhibit significantly lower shares of high-skilled workers. More-
over, apart from metropolitan areas, there are several hot spots for skilled labor. For exam-
ple, in Erlangen (15 kilometers north of Nuremberg), Darmstadt (25 kilometers south of
Frankfurt) and Jena (70 kilometers south east of Leipzig) over 30% of full-time workers
hold a degree from a university or university of applied sciences. Moreover, the distribu-
tion of high-skilled workers also varies considerably within administrative regions. The
upper-right panel of figure 2.3.1 shows a substantial cluster of high-skilled workers in the
city center of Berlin. Additionally, there are several smaller clusters along the main traffic
connections. The bottom-left panel focuses on the Rhein-Ruhr area. While high-skilled
workers are evenly distributed in Essen and Dortmund, they appear to be very concen-
trated in the city centers of Düsseldorf, Cologne and Bonn. There are numerous small hot
spots between the cities.
To capture the heterogeneous distribution of high-skilled workers, we compute a spa-
tial function that relates the share of high-skilled workers to distance for each workplace
in our data. Figure 2.3.2 illustrates the resulting curves. The light gray curves are 100
random examples and provide an impression of the variability in the data. The solid line
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Figure 2.3.1: Distribution of high-skilled workers in Germany
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Notes: The figure depicts the share of high-skilled workers in 1 × 1 kilometer grid cells in Germany (left
panel), Berlin (upper-right panel), and the Rhein-Ruhr area (bottom-right panel) in 2014. For data protection
reasons, the maps depict aggregated data in grid cells. For the same reason, we removed cells with fewer
than four establishments from the graphs. Note that the data for our statistical analysis are more precise and
provide the exact coordinates of workplaces. Light blue cells indicate low shares of high-skilled workers,
and dark cells signal high shares (see the scale at the bottom left). For the sake of clarity, values are capped
at 50%. In the left panel, black lines depict the boundaries of federal states. In the right panels, green areas
depict forests, and in the upper-right panel, gray lines and dashed gray lines illustrate streets and railways,
respectively.
shows the average share of high-skilled workers around establishments, and the dashed
lines indicate the pointwise standard deviation around the mean. Although individual
curves have strong variation, the average share of high-skilled workers around work-
places is stable in space. On average, the share of high-skilled workers is 17% in the direct
neighborhood of establishments and gradually declines to 14.5% 50 kilometers away. The
graph shows that there is no inherent distance at which the share of high-skilled workers
suddenly falls. Instead, irregular city sizes and distances between settlements lead to
a stable mean of the intensity of human capital over the whole domain. Note that the
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Figure 2.3.2: Spatial functions of the share of high-skilled workers
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Notes: The figure shows the pointwise mean (solid line) and standard deviation (dashed lines) of the share
of high-skilled workers around workplaces. Throughout the paper, we describe the share of high-skilled
workers with spatial functions that map the share of high-skilled workers to the distance from a workplace.
The graph also illustrates the variability of the spatial functions with 100 randomly selected curves (light
gray lines). Each gray line depicts the spatial distribution of high-skilled workers around an establishment.
slight decline in the standard deviation is an artifact: The share of high-skilled workers
within a distance window [zj − 500m, zj) is the average of a binary variable, and since
the absolute number of workers in [zj − 500m, zj) increases with z, the variance of the
average decreases. Refer to appendix 2.A.2 for illustrative examples on the distribution
of high-skilled workers around workplaces.
To obtain a first impression of the relationship between individual earnings and the
spatial concentration of human capital, figure 2.3.3 shows the correlation between log
wages and the share of high-skilled workers within distance windows [zj−500m, zj), zj =
500m, 1000m, ..., 50000m. While the magnitude of the ordinary correlation has no direct
interpretation, the declining trend signals that the relationship between income and the
spatial concentration of high-skilled labor decays with distance.5
5 The magnitude of the correlation between wages and the share of high-skilled workers in some dis-
tance window has no direct interpretation for two reasons. First, the bandwidth of the distance window
determines the strength of the correlation. We could, for instance, shrink the correlation coefficient
to arbitrarily small values by decreasing the bandwidth of the distance window. Second, the ordinary
correlation does not partial out the relationship between wages and other distance windows than the
focal one. Naturally, neighboring distance windows are (spatially auto-) correlated.
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Figure 2.3.3: Correlation of individual wages and the regional share of high-skilled work-
ers
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Notes: The figure illustrates the correlation between log wages and the share of high-skilled workers within
distance windows [zj−500m, zj ], zj = 500m, 1000m, ..., 50000m. The graph suggests that the correlation
between individual earnings and the intensity of human capital attenuates with distance. Note that the
magnitude of the correlation coefficients cannot be interpreted directly.
One reason that the magnitude of the correlation coefficients has no direct interpre-
tation is that the functions for the share of high-skilled workers are spatially autocorre-
lated. Figure 2.3.4 illustrates this issue. The graph depicts the correlation between the
share of high-skilled workers in three selected distance windows with the remaining 99
measurement points. For instance, the first panel presents the correlation of the share
of high-skilled workers between measurement point t1 and the random curve’s value at
t2, . . . , t100. As the figure shows, adjacent values have a very high correlation compared
to more distant measurement points.
While ordinary correlations (figure 2.3.3) ignore spatial autocorrelation, standard OLS
regression is in principle able to orthogonalize covariates. However, as discussed in the
next section, given the strong correlation between adjacent measurements, an unpenalized
OLS regression does not reveal any relationship at all. For further summary statistics on
individual wages and other covariates in our dataset, we refer to appendix 2.A.3.
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Figure 2.3.4: Spatial autocorrelation at selected measurement points
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Notes: The graphs shows the spatial autocorrelation of the spatial functions of high-skilled workers at
different measurement points. For instance, the panel in the middle shows the correlation of the share of
high-skilled workers 24.5 to 25 kilometers away from workplaces with the share of high-skilled workers
at the other 99 measurement points. The focal points in the remaining two panels are 0 to 0.5 and 37 to
37.5 kilometers, respectively. As is typical with functional data, values close to the focal point have high
correlation. The correlation declines with distance from the focal point. Note that the three selected focal
points well illustrate the general pattern of the underlying three-dimensional correlation function.
2.4 Results
Our main results show that spillover effects from the local concentration of high-skilled
workers significantly increase individual wages. The spillover effects decay with dis-
tance, and the point estimates suggest that after 10 kilometers, the effects are reduced by
half. Beyond 15 kilometers, the effects are no longer distinguishable from zero. In the
following, we present the estimation results and discuss our findings. Next, we corrobo-
rate the robustness of our estimates with a simulation study and a placebo test. Finally,
we summarize several additional robustness checks.
2.4.1 Main findings
We illustrate estimates of the spatial intensity of knowledge spillovers from high-skilled
workers in figures 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. Figure 2.4.1 depicts an unrestricted estimate of equa-
tion (2.9) (i.e., ρ = 0 in equation (2.5)), which coincides with standard OLS regression.
Figure 2.4.2 presents penalized estimates of equation 2.9 (i.e., ρ > 0). Both estimates
control for labor market demand and supply effects and endogenous sorting of individu-
als with an extensive set of fixed effects. In addition to standard controls form the labor
literature, our models include worker-firm match fixed effects and skill-specific yearly
labor-market-area fixed effects. In the graphs, black lines display the estimated spillover
functions. The gray area indicates the associated 99% confidence band. Note that OLS
estimates of equation (2.9) would be mis-scaled by the number of discretization points of
Xit(z). By contrast, our estimates provide an approximation via a Riemann sum and are
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Figure 2.4.1: Unrestricted estimates of spatial knowledge spillovers from high-skilled
workers
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Notes: The figure presents an unrestricted estimation of spatial knowledge spillovers from high-skilled
workers into individual log wages (equation (2.9)). We measure the concentration of high-skilled workers
as the share of high-skilled workers within distance z. The black line illustrates the estimated spillover
function (β(z)), and the gray area indicates the 99% confidence band. The unrestricted estimator (equa-
tion (2.5), with ρ = 0) coincides with the standard OLS estimator. Due to multicollinearity and overfitting,
the estimator cannot retrieve valid estimates of β(z) from the data. The underlying model controls for
worker-firm match fixed effects, skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects, occupation and time
fixed effects and worker characteristics (age, work experience, tenure and the respective second-order poly-
nomials), log establishment size and county characteristics (unemployment rate, log population density and
the log number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). N = 3, 498, 536
thus correctly scaled.
As figure 2.4.1 shows, the unpenalized estimate of equation (2.9) identifies no signif-
icant link between the spatial concentration of high-skilled workers and individual earn-
ings. The point estimates are very unstable, and the confidence bands include the null over
the whole domain. There are two reasons for the unstable behavior of the curve. First,
as described in the previous section, the measurement points of the share of high-skilled
workers are highly correlated. Because the unrestricted estimator is (up to a scale) identi-
cal to the standard OLS estimator, high correlation among a large set of regressors poses
multicollinearity problems. Consequently, the estimates exhibit high variance. Second,
an unrestricted estimator allows one to compute unnecessarily complex functions and is
therefore potentially prone to overfitting the data by modeling noise.
By contrast, the penalized estimates in figure 2.4.2 reveal a clear influence of the
spatial concentration of high-skilled workers on individual wages. The spatial spillover
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Figure 2.4.2: Spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers
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Notes: The figure shows spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers into individual log wages.
We measure the concentration of high-skilled workers as the share of high-skilled workers within distance
z. To compute the spatial spillover function (β(z)) we estimate equation (2.9) with the estimator (2.5).
We restrict the capacity of the β curve to a parabola-like function that may remain flat over some interval,
and we set the penalty parameter ρ accordingly. The black line illustrates the estimated spillover function
(β(z)), and the gray area indicates the 99% confidence band. The graph shows significant spillover effects
that decay with distance. The effect of a p-percentage-point increase in the share of high-skilled workers
within distance z0 and z1 (in a 0 to 1 range) is p times the area bellow the estimated spillover function from
z0 to z1. For instance, a 20-percentage-point increase in the concentration of high-skilled workers within 5
kilometers (z0 = 0, z1 = 550 ) leads to wage gains of 1.75%. The underlying model controls for worker-firm
match fixed effects, skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects, occupation and time fixed effects
and worker characteristics (age, work experience, tenure and the respective second-order polynomials),
log establishment size and county characteristics (unemployment rate, log population density and the log
number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). Refer to table 2.A.2 in the appendix for a complete list of
parameter estimates. N = 3, 498, 536
function depicted in the figure was obtained with 2.5 effective degrees of freedom. With
such a specification, the estimate can be substantially more complex than a straight line.
Estimates with more (fewer) effective degrees of freedom are qualitatively similar but are
of course more (less) flexible (see appendix 2.A.5).
Our estimates in figure 2.4.2 reveal economically significant spillover effects from
the local concentration of high-skilled workers. The spillover effects decay with distance
and vanish after approximately 15 kilometers. The magnitude of the effects from direct
neighbors is roughly twice as large the size of effects from high-skilled workers located
ten kilometers away. In the graph, the effect of a p-percentage-point increase in the share
of high-skilled workers within distance zj and zj′ (in a 0 to 1 range), is p times the area
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bellow the estimated spillover function from zj to zj′ . For instance, a 20-percentage-point
increase in the concentration of high-skilled workers within 5 kilometers leads to wage
gains of 1.75% (≈ 20 × {0.75 × 5
50
+ 1
2
[
(1− 0.75)× 5
50
]}). An evenly distributed ten-
percentage-point (one standard deviation) increase in the share of high-skilled workers
over the whole domain raises individual wages by 2% (≈ 10 × 1
2
(
1× 20
50
)
). Reassur-
ingly, classical estimates at an aggregate level, where we use OLS to model the wage
effect of the share of high-skilled workers within counties and identical covariates as in
equation (2.9), suggest effects of the same magnitude (see appendix 2.A.6).
Our results are also similar to the findings of Rosenthal & Strange (2008) for the US.
The authors regress wages on the number of workers with a college degree or higher
education within 5 miles’ distance and within 5 to 25 miles’ distance. They report that
spillovers from high-skilled workers within 5 miles’ distance are up to 3.5 times larger
than spillovers from high-skilled workers 5 to 25 miles away. Averaging our estimates
within the same distance windows yields a ratio of 6. Although we follow a different
estimation approach with different data, our findings seem to be consistent with those of
Rosenthal & Strange (2008).
Let us now briefly discuss the importance of removing demand and supply effects
when estimating knowledge spillovers. Figure 2.4.3 reports estimates of our model (equa-
tion (2.9)) without skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects (pirst) and thus in-
cludes labor market demand and supply effects that stem from imperfect substitution of
high- and low-skilled labor (see Moretti, 2004; Ciccone & Peri, 2006). Compared to our
main findings, the estimated relationship between individual wages and the concentration
of high-skilled workers appears stronger in these estimates. Specifically, there is a global
upward shift of the estimated β(z) by, roughly, a factor of two. Although pirst also nul-
lifies other confounders (e.g., temporal effects from sorting of high-skilled workers), the
uniform upward shift of β(z) corresponds well to Ciccone & Peri (2006). They find that
the bias from demand and supply effects in Mincerian estimates of knowledge spillovers
amounts to 60-70% of the individual returns to schooling.
2.4.2 Simulation study
As outlined in section 2.2.2, drawing local inference about the function-valued parameter
β is difficult. The following simulation exercise, therefore, is intended to evaluate the
statistical properties of our estimation framework. The results show that our estimation
framework, although yielding locally biased estimates, is reliable in the sense that it is
able to reproduce the structure of the true curve well. We also show that the inference
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Figure 2.4.3: Spurious estimates of spatial knowledge spillovers from high-skilled work-
ers
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Notes: The figure presents estimates of the spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers into indi-
vidual log wages without nullifying labor market demand and supply effects that stem from imperfect sub-
stitution of high- and low-skilled workers. Specifically, the graph depicts estimates of the spatial spillover
function (β(z)) from equation (2.9) without skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects (pirst). We
measure the concentration of high-skilled workers as the share of high-skilled workers within distance z
and compute the model with the estimator (2.5). We restrict the capacity of the β curve to a parabola-like
function that may remain flat over some interval, and we set the penalty parameter ρ accordingly. The black
line illustrates the estimated spillover function (β(z)), and the light gray area indicates the 99% confidence
band. The graph shows a significant relationship between the spatial concentration of high-skilled workers
and wages. However, approximately half of the relationship is attributable to labor market supply and de-
mand effects and other confounders. The underlying model controls for worker-firm match fixed effects,
occupation and time fixed effects and worker characteristics (age, work experience, tenure and the respec-
tive second-order polynomials), log establishment size and county characteristics (unemployment rate, log
population density and the log number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). N = 3, 498, 536
procedure controls for size when the null is a linear function.
In the simulation study, we consider four scenarios. First, we evaluate the estima-
tor’s properties in a situation where the data generating process (DGP) resembles the
particular real-world problem. Therefore, we take the DGP from the preferred estimate
(figure 2.4.2). We also incorporate parameter estimates from all covariates and generate
artificial observations of the dependent variable based on iid errors that are drawn from
N(0, σ̂2u). Here, σ̂u denotes the standard error of the residuals of the estimated model. The
structure of the simulated dataset (e.g., sample size, number of firms, number of workers
per firm), therefore, is the same as in the original sample. The remaining three scenarios
assess the statistical properties of the estimator in different extreme situations. Here, we
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simulate data that have a similar structure as the real dataset. In particular, we replicate
the first two moments of the original data.6 The second and third scenarios evaluate the
accuracy of the inference procedure when the null is the zero function or a linear function.
The fourth and most extreme setting analyzes the performance of the estimator when the
true parameter is a non-smooth step function. To asses the statistical properties of the
estimator, we simulate 1000 replications in each scenario.
Figure 2.4.4 summarizes the results of the four simulations. In each panel, the bold
dashed line depicts the true parameter function β0(z) of the DGP, the light gray areas show
pointwise minimum and maximum of all estimates, and the dark gray areas show the first
and the 99th percentiles of all estimates of the parameter function. The solid line repre-
sents the pointwise mean over all replications. In general, the estimates follow the true
parameter function well, and no replication deviates substantially from the DGP. How-
ever, as is typical for penalized (or nonparametric) models, the estimates deviate from the
true curve in regions with complex structure (i.e., in regions with strong nonlinearities).
In such regions, the estimator possesses a local bias. As one might expect, this behavior
is especially pronounced at the jump discontinuity of the step function in the bottom-
right panel of figure 2.4.4. By construction, however, the smoothing splines estimator
never produces estimates different from zero in regions where the true curve is zero in a
larger neighborhood. Therefore, if the underlying functional shape of the spatial decay
of knowledge spillovers is monotonically decreasing and zero beyond a certain distance,
the regularized estimation captures the true curve well. This appears to be a reasonable
assumption in our application.
Table 2.4.1 provides the integrated squared bias, integrated variance, and the coverage
probability of the confidence bands for each scenario. The integrated (squared) bias is
largest for the setup in which the function-valued parameter is taken from the real-data
application because the true parameter is curved over the whole domain (column 1). Sim-
ilarly, the variance is the largest in this setup. The two scenarios with linear parameter
functions, by the construction of the estimator, show favorable properties and exhibit the
lowest variance and no bias (columns 2 and 3). In this situation, confidence bands based
on equation (2.7) have proper coverage probability that, however, no longer holds with
more complex parameter functions. In the most extreme case (discontinuous β0), the bias
at the jump discontinuity is so large that the confidence bands are unable to cover the true
parameter over the whole domain (column 4).
The implications from the simulation study for our main findings are as follows. If
the true spatial decay of knowledge spillovers is not too complex, our estimates and con-
6 To replicate this part of the simulation study, refer to the code in the online supplement of this article.
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Figure 2.4.4: Performance of the estimator in different simulations
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Notes: The figure shows four Monte-Carlo simulations. The bold dashed line depicts the true parameter
function β0(z), the light gray areas show pointwise minimum and maximum of all estimates, and the dark
gray areas show the first and 99th percentile of all estimates of the parameter function. The solid line
represents the pointwise mean over all replications. Simulated replications of the estimator were obtained
by estimating model (2.9) based on simulated data. The setup corresponding to the top-left panel uses the
predictors from the real-data application, and observations of the dependent variable are simulated based
on estimated coefficients and iid normally distributed errors. All other setups are based solely on simulated
data that mimic the original sample but use different specifications for the functional parameter β(z). In the
top-right panel β(z) = 0, bottom-left: β(z) = 0.4(1− z) and bottom-right β(z) = 0.5 · 1(z < 0.5).
fidence bands are generally reliable. However, because the estimator is locally biased
in regions with a more complex β0, identifying the exact distance at which knowledge
spillovers cease is difficult. A conservative strategy would be to choose a threshold some-
what lower than indicated by the confidence bands. Regarding our main findings, such
a strategy suggests that knowledge spillovers might already be statistically insignificant
after 15 kilometers.
2.4.3 Placebo test: future concentration of high-skilled workers
Following Cornelissen et al. (2017), who identify knowledge spillovers in the workplace,
we corroborate our findings with a placebo test, in which we expand our model with a
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Table 2.4.1: Performance measurements in different simulations
Specification for β0
I II III IV
Integrated squared bias 0.0096 0.0000 0.0000 0.0055
Integrated variance 0.0030 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010
Coverage probability of 99%-CIs 0.7290 0.9920 0.9930 0.0000
Notes: The table contains integrated variance, integrated squared bias and the coverage probability of
confidence bands of the parameter estimate for the functional coefficient for all four setups considered
in the simulation exercise. In the first setup, the data were generated based on the regressors and func-
tional predictors with corresponding coefficients taken from the original estimate. The other setups are
based solely on simulated data but with similar characteristics. In setup II, the functional coefficient of
the DGP is zero; in setup III it is a linear function. The coefficient in the last setup (column IV) is
discontinuous and possesses a discrete jump in the interior of its domain. We compute integrated vari-
ance as 1000−1
∫ ∑1000
r=1
(
β̂r(z)− β(z)
)2
dz and integrated squared bias as
∫ (
βr(z)− β0(z)
)2
dz, where
β(z) = 1000−1
∑1000
r=1 β̂r(z).
one-year lead of the spatial distribution of high-skilled workers. Because workers cannot
receive spillovers from neighbors who have not yet moved in, the future concentration
of high-skilled workers serves as a placebo. As figure 2.4.5 indicates, the future con-
centration of high-skilled workers is almost unrelated to wages (bottom curve). Only
after 17 kilometers’ distance from the workplace does the model detect a small and eco-
nomically negligible negative relationship between wages and the future concentration of
high-skilled workers. Moreover, estimates of the knowledge spillover from the current
share of high-skilled workers change only slightly relative to the baseline specification
(top curve). Overall, the placebo test buttresses our main findings.
2.4.4 Further robustness checks
Appendix 2.A.7 provides details on further robustness checks. In this section, we briefly
summarize the results of these exercises.
As the data source is based on register data from the German social security system,
information on high-skilled workers outside of Germany is not available. Consequently,
in border regions, we construct our measure of the spatial concentration of human capital
with partly truncated information. However, excluding border regions from our model
yields similar results to our main findings. We conclude that truncated information from
border regions does not affect our results.
Another concern may be that global labor market shocks influence our findings through
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Figure 2.4.5: Estimates of knowledge spillovers from the current and the future distribu-
tion of high-skilled workers
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Notes: The figure depicts estimates of the knowledge spillover from the current and future distributions of
high-skilled workers on individual log wages. We measure the concentration of high-skilled workers as the
share of high-skilled workers within distance z and define the future concentration of high-skilled workers
as the one-year lead of the share of high-skilled workers within distance z. We estimate equation (2.9),
expanded with the lead of Xit(z), with the estimator (2.5). The top panel presents estimates of the contem-
poraneous spillover function. The bottom panel depicts estimates of the link between log wages and the
future concentration of high-skilled workers, which serves as the placebo. Black lines illustrate computed
β functions, and gray areas indicate 99% confidence bands. The underlying model controls for worker-firm
match fixed effects, skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects, occupation and time fixed effects
and worker characteristics (age, work experience, tenure and the respective second-order polynomials),
log establishment size and county characteristics (unemployment rate, log population density and the log
number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). N = 2, 959, 357
local industry or occupation clusters. If, for instance, wages and the demand for skilled
labor temporarily rise within a sector and firms in this sector tend to cluster locally, our
estimates would capture a spurious relation between wages and the local concentration of
high-skilled workers. To rebut these concerns, we augment our model with year-specific
industry and occupation fixed effects. Reassuringly, absorbing industry and occupation
trends does not affect our results.
To ensure that our results are not driven solely by urban or rural regions, we separately
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estimate our model in urban and rural areas. Generally, the results in both subgroups are
very similar to our main findings. However, estimates in urban areas are comparably
imprecise and do not allow us to infer the exact spatial reach of knowledge spillovers
within cities. The robustness exercise provides initial evidence that knowledge spillovers
are more widespread (in terms of distance) in rural areas.
Appendix 2.A.5 shows that our results are robust to alternative choices of the penalty
parameter ρ. Finally, appendix 2.A.6 outlines that the magnitude of the effects from our
functional model is close to comparable estimates at the county level.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper studies the impact of knowledge spillovers from the regional concentration of
high-skilled workers into the individual wages of neighboring workers. We use, for the
first time, precise geocoded register data of an entire economy and a novel estimation
method from the field of functional data analysis (FDA) to compute the spatial decay of
knowledge spillovers. We find significant spillover effects from the local concentration of
high-skilled workers that attenuate with distance. Knowledge spillovers from the direct
neighborhood of firms are roughly twice as large as those from high-skilled workers that
are located 10 kilometers away. After 15 kilometers, the effects vanish. Overall, an evenly
distributed one-standard-deviation increase in the local share of high-skilled workers leads
to wage gains of 2%.
Two developments in modern social science are primarily responsible for our abil-
ity to derive a precise functional relationship between the concentration of high-skilled
workers and individual earnings. First, the availability of exact geospatial data enables
us to describe the distribution of high-skilled workers around workplaces as functional
objects with high resolution. Specifically, we evaluate the concentration of high-skilled
workers every 500 meters within a radius of 50 kilometers around almost all establish-
ments in Germany. Second, FDA provides tools to fully exploit such detailed data. We
employ the estimator of Crambes et al. (2009) to regress a scalar outcome (log wage)
on a continuous functional variable (the concentration of high-skilled workers depending
on distance). Our application illustrates the potential of FDA in economic research. FDA
is particularly beneficial when the variable of interest can be regarded as a function over
some continuum.
Generally, our findings imply that education creates positive externalities in local la-
bor markets. Thus, regions benefit from attracting and training skilled workers. Moreover,
to maximize these external effects, firms should settle close to one another. Although
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spillover effects cover entire cities, workers and firms benefit most from the skill distri-
bution in their near neighborhood. Because the effects vanish after 15 kilometers, firms
in remote regions do not gain from knowledge spillovers. Overall, our findings support
Rosenthal & Strange (2008), who argue that the physical concentration of human cap-
ital remains important for economic development. Among other agglomeration effects,
knowledge spillovers help to explain differences in productivity between densely popu-
lated cities and rural areas.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Imputation of wages
A common limitation of social security data is the right-censoring of earnings. To address
this issue, we follow Dustmann et al. (2009) and Card et al. (2013) and impute censored
wages with a two-step procedure.
In the first step, we group observations by year, East and West Germany, and three
levels of education (i.e., no vocational training, vocational training and degree from a
university or university of applied science). Within each group, we fit a Tobit model with
the following list of explanatory variables: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, work experience,
(work experience)2, firm size, and indicators for gender, being older than 40 years and
being foreign born. Additionally, we include interaction terms of age and age2 with the
indicator variable older than 40. At the county level, we further include the predictors
population density, the unemployment rate, the number of hotel beds and the share of
high-skilled workers. With the parameters from the Tobit estimates (ζˆ), we impute wages
by Xζˆ + σˆΦ−1 [k + u(1− k)], where σˆ is the estimated standard error of the regression,
Φ is the standard normal density, u is a random value from a uniform distribution between
zero and one, k = Φ
[
(c−Xζˆ)/σˆ
]
and c is the censoring point.
In the second step, we compute the lifetime average wages of each worker and firm,
excluding the focal period. For workers and firms with only one observation, we as-
sign the sample mean. With the period-specific lifetime average wages as additional
predictors, we repeat the Tobit estimates. Finally, we impute censored wages by Xζˆ +
σˆΦ−1 [k + u(1− k)].
2.A.2 Examples of spatial functions of high-skilled workers
In the paper, we describe the distribution of high-skilled workers as continuous curves.
More precisely, we define spatial functions that map the share of high-skilled workers
to the distance from the workplace. To illustrate these functional objects, figure 2.A.1
provides four randomly drawn examples. In each of the four graphs, red lines represent
the share of high-skilled workers around an establishment. The light gray lines in the
background indicate the pointwise mean and standard deviation in our dataset. For in-
stance, in the first panel, we observe a high concentration of skilled labor of 30% in the
near neighborhood of the workplace. Between 5 and 15 kilometers’ distance, the share of
high-skilled workers declines to 15%. After a decline around 25 kilometers away from
the workplace, the share of high-skilled workers increases again. At the end of the do-
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Figure 2.A.1: Examples of spatial functions of the share of high-skilled workers
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of high-skilled workers around four randomly drawn workplaces
(red lines). The light gray lines indicate the pointwise mean and standard deviation of the share of high-
skilled workers in the dataset. Throughout the paper, we describe the share of high-skilled workers as spatial
functions that map the share of high-skilled workers to the distance from a workplace.
main,the share of high-skilled workers is approximately 15%. The remaining three panels
illustrate different patterns.
2.A.3 Summary statistics
The dataset used in our econometric analysis covers 15 years and consists of 3.5 million
records of 540,000 workers. Table 2.A.1 summarizes the dependent variable (log wage)
and numerical control variables. In the data, the mean daily wage is 111 euros, and the
first and second quartile range from 68 to 129 euros. The average individual in the dataset
is 41 years old and has 15 years of work experience. The median population density in
the dataset is 119 inhabitants per square kilometer (exp(4.78)). Furthermore, 36% of the
observations are from females and 7% are from workers with foreign nationality. The
proportions of low-, medium- and high-skilled workers are 8%, 73% and 19%, respec-
tively.
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Table 2.A.1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc.
daily wage 111.37 78.05 68.17 94.64 129.02
daily log wage 4.55 0.56 4.22 4.55 4.86
age 41.14 10.65 33.00 41.00 49.00
work experience (days) 5528.31 3305.44 2860.00 5105.00 7974.00
tenure (days) 3059.98 2796.97 883.00 2160.00 4398.00
log firm size 4.68 2.10 3.14 4.63 6.10
log population density 3.71 2.38 0.97 4.78 5.66
log hotel beds 3.16 0.70 2.68 3.14 3.53
unemployment rate 8.74 4.11 5.60 7.90 11.00
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of wages and (numerical) control variables. The underly-
ing dataset contains 3,498,536 observations of 539,179 individuals over a period of 15 years. Regional
characteristics come from 402 counties.
2.A.4 Estimates of spatial knowledge spillovers: full table
Table 2.A.2 presents parameter estimates from our preferred specification and accom-
panies figure 2.4.2. In accordance with figure 2.4.2, the table shows strong knowledge
spillovers from high-skilled workers from nearby areas. The effects decay with distance
and become statistically insignificant after 17 to 18 kilometers. The parameter estimates
of worker characteristics are in line with the labor literature. Due to the extensive set
of fixed effects in the model (equation (2.9)), the parameter estimates for county-level
variables are statistically insignificant.
2.A.5 Estimates with different penalties
In our preferred specification, we estimate equation (2.9) with the estimator (2.5) and
a penalty ρ that corresponds to 2.5 degrees of freedom, which restricts estimates of the
spillover curve β(z) to smooth parabola-like functions that may remain flat over some in-
terval. To demonstrate the behavior of the estimator with different penalties, figure 2.A.2
reports estimates with alternative values of ρ. Panels A and B allow for more flexible
curves than our preferred specification, panel C repeats our preferred specification, and
panel D restricts β(z) to a linear function. Qualitatively, all models lead to similar results.
The response of individual wages to an increase in the share of high-skilled workers in the
direct neighborhood is close to unity. When we reach 10 kilometers from the workplace,
the effects are only approximately half the size. In all models, the spillovers become
statistically insignificant after 13 to 23 kilometers. The confidence bands of the four esti-
mates overlap over the whole domain.
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Table 2.A.2: Spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers (full table)
Distance Value Sig. SE Distance Value Sig. SE Distance Value Sig. SE
0.5 1.0654 *** 0.1178 20.5 0.0890 0.0876 40.5 -0.2024 0.1332
1.0 1.0380 *** 0.1151 21.0 0.0723 0.0882 41.0 -0.2037 0.1355
1.5 1.0106 *** 0.1125 21.5 0.0562 0.0888 41.5 -0.2049 0.1379
2.0 0.9831 *** 0.1100 22.0 0.0407 0.0894 42.0 -0.2060 0.1404
2.5 0.9558 *** 0.1076 22.5 0.0258 0.0900 42.5 -0.2070 0.1430
3.0 0.9284 *** 0.1052 23.0 0.0115 0.0907 43.0 -0.2080 0.1456
3.5 0.9011 *** 0.1029 23.5 -0.0023 0.0913 43.5 -0.2088 0.1482
4.0 0.8739 *** 0.1008 24.0 -0.0155 0.0920 44.0 -0.2096 0.1509
4.5 0.8467 *** 0.0987 24.5 -0.0281 0.0926 44.5 -0.2103 0.1537
5.0 0.8196 *** 0.0968 25.0 -0.0401 0.0933 45.0 -0.2109 0.1566
5.5 0.7926 *** 0.0949 25.5 -0.0516 0.0940 45.5 -0.2115 0.1594
6.0 0.7656 *** 0.0932 26.0 -0.0625 0.0946 46.0 -0.2120 0.1624
6.5 0.7387 *** 0.0916 26.5 -0.0729 0.0953 46.5 -0.2124 0.1653
7.0 0.7119 *** 0.0901 27.0 -0.0828 0.0961 47.0 -0.2128 0.1683
7.5 0.6852 *** 0.0887 27.5 -0.0921 0.0968 47.5 -0.2131 0.1714
8.0 0.6585 *** 0.0875 28.0 -0.1009 0.0976 48.0 -0.2134 0.1745
8.5 0.6320 *** 0.0864 28.5 -0.1093 0.0983 48.5 -0.2137 0.1776
9.0 0.6057 *** 0.0854 29.0 -0.1171 0.0991 49.0 -0.2139 0.1808
9.5 0.5795 *** 0.0846 29.5 -0.1245 0.1000 49.5 -0.2142 0.1839
10.0 0.5535 *** 0.0838 30.0 -0.1314 0.1008 50.0 -0.2144 0.1872
10.5 0.5277 *** 0.0832 30.5 -0.1379 0.1018 Controls
11.0 0.5021 *** 0.0827 31.0 -0.1440 0.1027 Age -0.6766 1178.6
11.5 0.4768 *** 0.0824 31.5 -0.1496 0.1037 Age2 -0.0003 *** 0.0000
12.0 0.4518 *** 0.0821 32.0 -0.1548 0.1048 Exper. 0.0814 *** 0.0016
12.5 0.4270 *** 0.0819 32.5 -0.1597 0.1059 Exper.2 -0.0001 *** 0.0000
13.0 0.4026 *** 0.0818 33.0 -0.1642 0.1071 Tenure 0.0042 *** 0.0009
13.5 0.3785 *** 0.0818 33.5 -0.1684 0.1083 Tenure2 -0.0001 *** 0.0000
14.0 0.3548 *** 0.0819 34.0 -0.1723 0.1096 l. firm size 0.0258 *** 0.0009
14.5 0.3315 *** 0.0821 34.5 -0.1758 0.1109 l. p. dens. 0.0011 0.0006
15.0 0.3086 *** 0.0823 35.0 -0.1792 0.1124 l. hotel b. 0.0059 0.0034
15.5 0.2861 *** 0.0826 35.5 -0.1822 0.1139 Unemp. 0.0009 0.0006
16.0 0.2641 *** 0.0829 36.0 -0.1851 0.1155
16.5 0.2425 *** 0.0833 36.5 -0.1877 0.1171
17.0 0.2214 ** 0.0838 37.0 -0.1901 0.1189
17.5 0.2009 ** 0.0842 37.5 -0.1923 0.1207
18.0 0.1809 * 0.0847 38.0 -0.1943 0.1226
18.5 0.1614 0.0853 38.5 -0.1962 0.1245
19.0 0.1424 0.0858 39.0 -0.1980 0.1266
19.5 0.1241 0.0864 39.5 -0.1996 0.1287
20.0 0.1063 0.0870 40.0 -0.2011 0.1309
Notes: The table accompanies figure 2.4.2 and shows the strength of spatial knowledge spillovers from
high-skilled workers at numerous distances on individual log wages. To compute the spatial spillover
function (β(z)), we estimate equation (2.9) with the estimator (2.5). We restrict the capacity of the β curve
to a parabola-like function that may remain flat over some interval, and we set the penalty parameter ρ
accordingly. The table also reports coefficient estimates for the control variables. The underlying model
further controls for worker-firm match fixed effects, skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects,
occupation fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. N = 3, 498, 536
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Figure 2.A.2: Estimates of spatial knowledge spillovers with different penalties
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Notes: The figure shows estimates of the spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers into in-
dividual log wages based on four different penalty parameters. To compute the spatial spillover function
(β(z)), we estimate equation (2.9) with the estimator (2.5). Each panel summarizes estimates with a differ-
ent penalty ρ. The different penalty terms correspond to 5 (top left panel), 3.5 (top right panel), 2.5 (bottom
left panel) and 2 (bottom right panel) effective degrees of freedom. The black line illustrates the estimated
spillover function (β(z)), and the gray area indicates the 99% confidence band. The underlying model con-
trols for worker-firm match fixed effects, skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects, occupation
and time fixed effects and worker characteristics (age, work experience, tenure and the respective second-
order polynomials), log establishment size and county characteristics (unemployment rate, log population
density and the log number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). N = 3, 498, 536
However, depending on the hyperparameter ρ, the estimates of the spillover function
are of course more or less flexible. Up to 20 kilometers’ distance, the more volatile models
in panels A and B are similar to our preferred specification and suggest that knowledge
spillovers decline with distance. After 20 kilometers, however, the point estimates in-
crease. Statistically, the rise at the end of the domain is accompanied by broad confidence
bands. Thus, these estimates are imprecise. Moreover, it seems economically implau-
sible that the intensity of knowledge spillovers follows a U-shaped pattern. Therefore,
we regard the estimates from panels A and B as overly flexible. By contrast, the curve
in panel D is forced to be linear. Again, up to 20 kilometers away from the workplace,
the estimates are similar to our preferred model. Farther away, the point estimates di-
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verge from our preferred specification and proceed to decline even after intersecting the
abscissa. Similar to panels A and B, these estimates are less precise at the end of the
domain. Moreover, theoretically, it seems implausible that knowledge spillovers follow a
linear function. Thus, we regard the estimated spillover function from panel D as overly
inflexible.
2.A.6 County-level effects
In our paper, we model the distribution of high-skilled workers as continuous curves
around workplaces and estimate knowledge spillovers with a functional regression model
based on Crambes et al. (2009). To evaluate the magnitude of our results, let us now es-
timate a classical OLS model, in which we estimate spillovers from high-skilled workers
at an aggregate level. Specifically, we calculate spillovers from the share of high-skilled
workers within counties (NUTS-3, Landkreise and kreisfreie Städte). Apart from this, our
estimation equation is identical to our main model (equation (2.9)):
Yit = αxit + Z
′
itγ + θif + τt + ωo + pirst + uit. (2.10)
Yit is the individual log wage of worker i in year t, and xit is the share of high-skilled
workers within the county of i’s workplace. Accordingly, α is the spillover coefficient we
seek to measure. Identical to our main specification, the model controls for time-varying
observable characteristics of individuals, establishments and regions (Zit) and a series of
fixed effects. θif is a worker-firm match fixed effect, pirst is a skill-specific yearly labor-
market-area fixed effect, τt is a year fixed effect, and ωo is an occupation fixed effect.
To estimate equation (2.10), we use the same dataset as in the paper and cluster stan-
dard errors at the county-level. Table 2.A.3, column 1 summarizes the results. Our model
suggests significant positive spillovers from high-skilled workers into individual wages.
The coefficient of 0.323 indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in the regional
share of high-skilled workers (7.2 percentage points) raises the wages of incumbent work-
ers by 2.3%. The magnitude of this effect is close to our main findings, which imply that
an evenly distributed one-standard-deviation increase in the share of high-skilled workers
increases wages by 2%. Moreover, and similar to our main findings, neglecting skill-
specific labor-market-area-year fixed effects significantly increases the computed coeffi-
cient (column 2). In summary, the predicted magnitude of spillover effects from an overall
increase in the share of high-skilled workers is almost identical in county-level estimates
and estimates based on the exact spatial distribution of workers.
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Table 2.A.3: Knowledge spillovers at the county-level
(1) (2)
Share of high-shilled workers 0.323∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.095)
Worker-firm match fixed effects Yes Yes
Labor-market-area × year × skill fixed effects Yes No
Notes: The table summarizes estimates of the knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers into individ-
ual log wages at the county level. The estimates replicate our main model at an aggregate level and serve
as a comparison of the magnitude of the effects. The underlying models further control for occupation
fixed effects, time fixed effects and worker characteristics (age, work experience, tenure and the respective
second-order polynomials), log establishment size and county characteristics (unemployment rate, log pop-
ulation density and the log number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). Cluster-robust standard errors
are in parentheses.∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 0.1%-level. N = 3, 498, 536
2.A.7 Robustness
Non-border regions
Because we have no data on workers outside of Germany, measurements of the distribu-
tion of high-skilled workers in border regions are partly truncated. For instance, estab-
lishments in the city center of Passau are only two kilometers from the Austrian border.
Therefore, past two kilometers’ distance, we observe the concentration of high-skilled
workers only in southwest to northeast directions. Consequently, information on the dis-
tribution of high-skilled workers comes solely from these data points. Ignoring the partial
truncation, we implicitly assume that the distribution on the Austrian side of the border
is the same as on the German side of the border and that there are no costs from frictions
in information flows across the border. To assess whether these assumptions influence
our estimates, we now remove border regions from our dataset and re-estimate our main
model with establishments that are at least 50 kilometers from the German border.
Figure 2.A.3 summarizes the results. Generally, the estimated curve resembles the
spillover function from the full sample. Identically to our main findings, the function
value is slightly above unity in the direct neighborhood of establishments. However,
the graph implies that spillovers in non-border regions are slightly higher, and the point
estimates reach seven kilometers farther than in the full sample. There are several expla-
nations for the stronger effects in non-border regions. First, due to labor market barriers,
spillovers in border regions might generally be lower, which would reduce measurements
of the overall effect. Second, the concentration of high-skilled labor behind the German
border might be lower than on the German side of the border, which would oppose our
assumption of similar skill distributions on both sides of the border. Third, there are
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Figure 2.A.3: Spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers (without border re-
gions)
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Notes: The figure shows spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers into individual log wages
in regions that are at least 50 kilometers from the German border. We measure the concentration of high-
skilled workers as the share of high-skilled workers within distance z. To compute the spatial spillover
function (β(z)), we estimate equation (2.9) with the estimator (2.5). We restrict the capacity of the β curve
to a parabola-like function that may remain flat over some interval, and we set the penalty parameter ρ
accordingly. The black line illustrates the estimated spillover function (β(z)), and the gray area indicates
the 99% confidence band. The effect of a p-percentage-point increase in the share of high-skilled workers
within distance z0 and z1 (in a 0 to 1 range) is p times the area bellow the estimated spillover function
from z0 to z1. The underlying model controls for worker-firm match fixed effects, skill-specific yearly
labor-market-area fixed effects, occupation and time fixed effects and worker characteristics (age, work
experience, tenure and the respective second-order polynomials), log establishment size and county char-
acteristics (unemployment rate, log population density and the log number of hotel beds as a proxy for
amenities). N = 2, 489, 083
institutional differences between border and non-border regions that depress knowledge
spillovers in border regions. Fourth, by chance, cities in border regions benefit less from
knowledge spillovers than other cities do. Given the multitude of possible explanations, it
seems plausible that estimates in non-border regions differ slightly from those in the full
sample. Reassuringly, the point estimates of the spillover function are nonetheless similar
in both samples, and the confidence bands overlap over the whole domain. Overall, the
robustness exercise therefore confirms our main findings.
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Labor market trends and industry clusters
Another concern may be that industry- or occupation-specific trends in the labor market
influence our results through local clusters. To illustrate this issue, consider the following
scenario. Industry b experiences an economic upswing that raises wages and the demand
for skilled labor. If firms in industry b tend to cluster geographically, wages and the con-
centration of high-skilled labor would simultaneously rise in these areas. In our estimates,
a global labor market shock at the industry level would therefore create a spurious rela-
tionship between wages and the regional concentration of high-skilled workers. The same
applies to labor market shocks to occupations.
To assess whether industry or occupation trends in the global labor market affect our
results, we augment our estimation equation (equation (2.9)) with year-specific industry
and occupation fixed effects. These fixed effects absorb changes in wages and the con-
centration of high-skilled workers that stem from industry- or occupation-wide shifts in
the labor market. Figure 2.A.4 shows the resulting spillover function. The curve is almost
identical to that from our main specification (figure 2.4.1). We therefore conclude that
trends at the industry or occupational level do not influence our results.
Effects in urban and rural areas
Plausibly, marginal travel costs for physical distance differ in cities and rural areas. Addi-
tionally, social interactions in sparsely populated regions might be more costly than those
in dense urban areas. Thus, the intensity and spatial reach of knowledge spillovers in cities
and rural areas might differ. To assess these considerations, we separately estimate knowl-
edge spillovers in rural and urban areas. In the paper, we measure knowledge spillovers
within a distance of 50 kilometers. To thoroughly separate knowledge spillovers in rural
areas from spillovers in urban regions, we therefore define urban areas as regions within
50 kilometers’ distance of a metropolitan city center.7 Accordingly, rural areas are 50
kilometers from metropolitan cities.
Figure 2.A.5 and figure 2.A.6 illustrate the estimates of knowledge spillovers within
rural and urban areas. Generally, the results are in line with our main findings. The
point estimates for both samples indicate that spillovers decay with distance, and the
effects are of reasonable size. Furthermore, the point estimates support the hypothesis
that knowledge spillovers reach farther in rural areas than in cities. However, as the
7 We regard the largest German cities as metropolises: Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt on
the Main, Stuttgart, Düsseldorf, Dortmund, Essen, Leipzig, Bremen, Dresden, Hanover, the regional
cluster Nuremberg (including Erlangen and Fürth) and Duisburg.
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Figure 2.A.4: Spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers (removing industry
and occupation trends)
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Notes: The figure shows spatial knowledge spillovers from high-skilled workers into individual log wages.
We measure the concentration of high-skilled workers as the share of high-skilled workers within distance
z. To compute the spatial spillover function (β(z)), we estimate equation (2.9) with the estimator (2.5). To
control for industry- and occupation-specific trends in the labor market, we additionally control for time-
varying industry and occupation fixed effects. We restrict the capacity of the β curve to a parabola-like
function that may remain flat over some interval, and we set the penalty parameter ρ accordingly. The black
line illustrates the estimated spillover function (β(z)), and the gray area indicates the 99% confidence band.
The graph shows significant spillover effects that decay with distance. The effect of a p-percentage-point
increase in the share of high-skilled workers within distance z0 and z1 (in a 0 to 1 range) is p times the area
bellow the estimated spillover function from z0 to z1. The underlying model further controls for worker-firm
match fixed effects, skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects, occupation and time fixed effects
and worker characteristics (age, work experience, tenure and the respective second-order polynomials),
log establishment size and county characteristics (unemployment rate, log population density and the log
number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). N = 3, 498, 536
99% confidence bands in figure 2.A.6 indicate, the estimates of spillover effects in cities
are relatively imprecise. Thus, we are unable to determine the exact spatial coverage of
knowledge spillovers in cities.
Two reasons for the broader confidence bands in the split samples are the smaller sam-
ple size and tighter definitions of skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects (pirys
in equation (2.9)). As we explain in section 2.2.4, we address labor market demand and
supply effects and the spatial sorting of workers with skill-specific yearly labor-market-
area fixed effects. These fixed effects absorb variation that is contemporaneously common
within regional labor markets. Splitting the sample into rural and urban areas also halves
many labor market areas. Therefore, skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects
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Figure 2.A.5: Spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers (rural areas)
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Notes: The figure shows the spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers into individual log wages
in rural areas. We measure the concentration of high-skilled workers as the share of high-skilled workers
within distance z. To compute the spatial spillover function (β(z)), we estimate equation (2.9) with the
estimator (2.5). We restrict the capacity of the β curve to a parabola-like function that may remain flat
over some interval, and we set the penalty parameter ρ accordingly. The black line illustrates the estimated
spillover function (β(z)), and the gray area indicates the 99% confidence band. The underlying model
controls for worker-firm match fixed effects, skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects, occupation
and time fixed effects and worker characteristics (age, work experience, tenure and the respective second-
order polynomials), log establishment size and county characteristics (unemployment rate, log population
density and the log number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). N = 1.477.584
in separate samples eliminate even more variation from the data than in the full dataset.
Consequently, spatial variation declines, and confidence bands expand. As figure 2.A.7
shows, estimating knowledge spillovers in urban areas without skill-specific yearly labor-
market-area fixed effects increases precision. The graph suggests a statistically significant
relationship between the share of high-skilled workers within 15 kilometers’ distance of
the workplace and individual wages. However, without skill-specific yearly labor-market-
area fixed effects, the estimates are partly due to a spurious relationship between the con-
centration of human capital and wages.
Overall, the separate point estimates for knowledge spillovers in urban and rural sam-
ple support our main findings. Due to the imprecise estimates of spillover effects in cities,
this section provides only weak evidence that the spatial reach of knowledge spillovers is
larger in rural than in urban areas.
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Figure 2.A.6: Spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers (urban areas)
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Notes: The figure shows the spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers into individual log wages
in rural areas. We measure the concentration of high-skilled workers as the share of high-skilled workers
within distance z. To compute the spatial spillover function (β(z)), we estimate equation (2.9) with the
estimator (2.5). We restrict the capacity of the β curve to a parabola-like function that may remain flat
over some interval, and we set the penalty parameter ρ accordingly. The black line illustrates the estimated
spillover function (β(z)), and the gray area indicates the 99% confidence band. The underlying model
controls for worker-firm match fixed effects, skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects, occupation
and time fixed effects and worker characteristics (age, work experience, tenure and the respective second-
order polynomials), log establishment size and county characteristics (unemployment rate, log population
density and the log number of hotel beds as a proxy for amenities). N = 1.331.693
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Figure 2.A.7: Estimates of the spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers
(urban areas, no yearly labor-market-area fixed effects)
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Notes: The figure shows estimates of the spatial knowledge spillover from high-skilled workers into indi-
vidual log wages in urban areas without nullifying labor market demand and supply effects and the spatial
sorting of workers. Specifically, the graph shows estimates of the spatial spillover function (β(z)) from
equation (2.9) without skill-specific yearly labor-market-area fixed effects (pirst). We measure the concen-
tration of high-skilled workers as the share of high-skilled workers within distance z. To compute the spatial
spillover function (β(z)), we estimate equation (2.9) with the estimator (2.5). We restrict the capacity of the
β curve to a parabola-like function that may remain flat over some interval, and we set the penalty parameter
ρ accordingly. The black line illustrates the estimated spillover function (β(z)), and the gray area indicates
the 99% confidence band. The underlying model controls for worker-firm match fixed effects, skill-specific
yearly labor-market-area fixed effects, occupation and time fixed effects and worker characteristics (age,
work experience, tenure and the respective second-order polynomials), log establishment size and county
characteristics (unemployment rate, log population density and the log number of hotel beds as a proxy for
amenities). N = 1.331.693
Chapter 3
The Effects of Foreign Direct
Investment on Job Stability: Upgrades,
Downgrades, and Separations
Abstract*
We use linked employer-employee data to estimate the effect of foreign direct investment
(FDI) on workers’ job stability. We are the first to consider firm-internal job transitions.
Specifically, we examine the impact of FDI on the individual likelihood to up- or down-
grade to occupations with more or less analytical and interactive tasks. To do so, we
propose an iterative matching procedure that generates a homogeneous sample of firms
with equal probabilities of investing. Based on this sample, we use proportional hazard
models to retrieve dynamic effects on workers. We find that FDI increases the likelihood
of up- and downgrades by 24% and 34%, respectively. These effects increase with the
share of non-routine and interactive tasks and become measurable two years after the in-
vestment. FDI does not increase the hazard of separation of workers and firms. Instead,
there is a temporal lock-in effect after the investment. Our results highlight the impor-
tance of firm-internal restructuring as a channel for adjusting to altered labor demand in
response to FDI.
Keywords: FDI, multinational firms, job stability
JEL Codes: F16, F23, F66, J23, J62
* This part is joint work with Linda Borrs.
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 97
3.1 Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are one of the most controversial aspects of globaliza-
tion. While firms benefit from foreign direct investment (FDI) by saving production costs
or by exploiting new markets, MNEs are often criticized for replacing domestic with for-
eign labor. Empirical results on the employment and wage effects of FDI are ambiguous
and can neither support nor fully reject these fears (see Crinò, 2009 and Hummels et al.
, 2016 for recent surveys). We argue that the literature has overlooked another impor-
tant channel by which firms adjust their workforce following FDI—namely, firm-internal
restructuring. Our data imply that the rate of job transitions within MNEs is 1.5 times
higher than that in domestic firms. In this paper, we therefore investigate whether internal
transitions increase when firms turn multinational. Moreover, we distinguish between up-
and downgrading of workers to more- or less-complex jobs.
The question how FDI affects job transitions is closely related to that of how FDI
affects labor demand. Managing foreign affiliates plausibly requires coordination and ad-
ministration. Thus, the demand for interactive and analytical tasks should increase when
firms turn multinational, as shown by previous studies (e.g., Becker et al. , 2013; Hakkala
et al. , 2014; Laffineur & Mouhoud, 2015). Moreover, if FDI is accompanied by global
fragmentation of production chains, MNEs can specialize their domestic workers in fewer
tasks. Such fragmentation might lead to simpler task sets for some workers, while oth-
ers might specialize in more-complex tasks. To adjust to these changes in labor demand,
MNEs can rely on internal labor markets. Incumbent workers possess firm-specific human
capital (Becker, 1962), which represents a productivity advantage over outsiders. Further,
hiring internally reduces asymmetric information on the skills and abilities of workers
(e.g., Waldman, 1984; Greenwald, 1986) and might cost less (Demougin & Siow, 1994)
compared to hiring outside the firm. Moreover, it can be cheaper for MNEs to demote
workers whose tasks become redundant over the course of FDI than to dismiss them.
This might especially apply to labor markets with strict dismissal protection laws, strong
works councils and unions. Thus, in addition to the extensive margin of hires and layoffs,
MNEs have incentives to restructure their workforce internally after investing abroad.
No extant study has investigated the impact of FDI on internal job transitions. The two
papers most closely related to the topic are Liu & Trefler (2011) and Baumgarten (2015).
Both consider the effect of offshoring on occupational switches. Liu & Trefler (2011) find
a positive effect on switches to occupations with higher and lower average wages for US
service offshoring. For Germany, Baumgarten (2015) finds that offshoring is not asso-
ciated with greater occupational instability on average. However, he shows that workers
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with more non-routine tasks face less occupational uncertainty through offshoring. In
contrast to our paper, both studies examine the impact of offshoring in general, not FDI in
particular. Moreover, they do not separately consider firm-internal occupational switches.
We believe that firm-internal restructuring processes play a crucial role over the course of
FDI because establishing or acquiring foreign firms entails deep organizational changes.
Conversely, offshoring does not require comparably extensive organizational changes, as
it mainly covers trade with unaffiliated firms. Moreover, industry-level offshoring data
only permit indirect conclusions for individual workers within industries. By contrast,
we can draw direct conclusions on how a firm’s decision to invest abroad affects the job
stability of its workers.
To investigate the impact of FDI on job stability, we exploit a unique administrative
micro-panel dataset. By using these data, we can follow MNEs, domestic firms and their
workers for two decades with quarterly precision. Specifically, our data comprise the
entire universe of German firms with Czech affiliates as of 2010 and a large pool of
domestic control firms that never conducted FDI in any country. German FDI in the Czech
Republic represents a compelling case of FDI flows, as Germany is the largest economy
in Europe, and the Czech Republic is one of its main recipients of investment among
the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC).1 In contrast to previous studies,
our data also cover small firms with low investment volumes.2 This is an advantage, as
the geographic proximity and low labor costs of the Czech Republic allow small firms
to also invest beyond the border. Our data further include the complete administrative
employment biographies of all workers in the investing and domestic firms.
To identify the effects of FDI on the occurrence of job upgrades and downgrades and
separations of workers and firms, we pursue a three-step procedure. As Helpman et al.
(2004) show, only the most productive firms conduct FDI. We therefore first construct a
balanced sample of MNEs and domestic firms with equal probabilities of investing. We
propose an iterative matching procedure that allows us to achieve a distinct one-to-one
matching of MNEs and domestic firms over the entire observation period. Additionally,
our matching approach ensures that we match firms exactly in the same year. Standard
propensity score matching cannot meet both requirements. Further, our matching ap-
proach allows us to assign the investment dates of matched MNEs as pseudo investment
1 In 2010, approximately 24% of the workers employed by German firms in the CEEC worked in the
Czech Republic (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2014).
2 In the majority of datasets on FDI, small firms with low investment volumes are under-represented
because only investments above a certain threshold need to be registered officially (see Pflüger et al. ,
2013) With regard to our analysis, Schäffler (2016) shows that only one-fourth of Czech affiliates with
a German owner appear in the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) provided by the Federal Bank
of Germany, which is commonly used to study the FDI of German firms.
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dates to domestic firms. We match firms two years before investment. Because of the
equal probabilities of conducting FDI and the significant time lag between the matching
and the (pseudo) investment, it should be impossible for workers to distinguish between
future MNEs and domestic firms at the time of matching. Second, to overcome ability-
driven sorting of workers into MNEs (e.g., Abowd et al. , 1999; Card et al. , 2013), we
restrict our data to individuals who already worked in the firm in the year of matching.
Third, we compare the likelihood of job upgrades and downgrades and separations be-
tween MNEs and domestic firms at the worker level. To reap the benefits of the event
history design of our data, we use Cox (1972) proportional hazard models to estimate the
effects. We define job upgrades (downgrades) as job switches within the firm to occupa-
tions with a higher (lower) share of analytical and interactive tasks, which we refer to as
complex tasks.
This article is the first to show that firms meet altered labor demand due to FDI by
internally restructuring their workforce. More precisely, when firms invest abroad, the
likelihood that workers will upgrade internally to more-complex jobs increases by 24%.
Simultaneously, the hazard to downgrade to less-complex jobs increases by 34%. Both
effects increase over time and become traceable two years after investment. However,
we find that only workers in relatively non-routine and interactive jobs receive the op-
portunity to internally switch occupations. In line with these results, the same group
of workers faces lower hazards of employment separations in MNEs. Altogether, we
find only weak effects of FDI on separations. The average worker has a higher chance
of remaining shortly after the investment, but this lock-in effect disappears after several
quarters. We further investigate whether worker productivity influences their job stability
in the investing firms. Although workers in MNEs are considerably more likely to switch
occupations, MNEs follow the same pattern as domestic firms do when choosing who
to upgrade, downgrade or dismiss. Independent of FDI, firms promote more productive
workers and dismiss or demote less productive workers.
This paper relates to several strands of the theoretical and empirical literature on the
employment effects of FDI in the source country. Theory predicts both positive (e.g.,
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) and negative (e.g., Feenstra & Hanson, 1996a) effects
of FDI on the employment and wages of domestic workers. Thus, determining the net
effects remains an empirical question. Within the empirical literature, our paper is related
to studies on the employment effects of FDI, especially those differentiating between tasks
(e.g., Becker et al. , 2013; Laffineur & Mouhoud, 2015). Specifically, our paper relates to
the empirical literature considering the effects of FDI on employment stability. Becker &
Muendler (2008) were the first to consider job-separation rates of German MNEs. They
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find them to be four percentage points lower than those of domestic firms—half of this
difference can be explained by foreign employment expansions of MNEs. Bachmann
et al. (2014) estimate the effects of both inward and outward FDI on employment security
in Germany. They find that FDI, particularity to CEEC, reduces employment security for
low-skilled and older workers. In contrast to our paper and to Becker & Muendler (2008),
Bachmann et al. (2014) use industry-level data on FDI and cannot analyze the direct
effects of firm-level decisions on FDI.
A larger body of literature considers the job security effects of offshoring, which, in
contrast to FDI, also includes trade with unaffiliated foreign firms. These papers yield am-
biguous results (see, e.g., Liu & Trefler, 2011, Ebenstein et al. , 2014 for the US; Munch,
2010 for Denmark; Egger et al. , 2007 for Austria; and Geishecker, 2008, Bachmann &
Braun, 2011, Baumgarten, 2015 and Görg & Görlich, 2015 for Germany). Within this
strand of literature, some studies also consider occupational switches, although not exclu-
sively within the borders of the firm. Baumgarten (2015) finds that offshoring—measured
by an occupation-specific exposure to imported intermediates—decreases the risk of oc-
cupational switches for highly non-routine jobs. However, these effects are strongest for
transitions to non-employment. He does not distinguish between occupational up- and
downgrades. The only other paper that considers up- and downgrades is by Liu & Trefler
(2011). They are the first to show theoretically and empirically that promotions and de-
motions are a common reaction to offshoring in general. They find that US offshoring to
China and India increases job downgrades by 17% and job upgrades by 4%.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section explains our
identification strategy. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 reports our results
and discusses implications. Section 3.5 summarizes several robustness exercises, and
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical strategy
Our aim in the empirical analysis is to measure the effect of FDI on job stability. Our
approach consists of three steps. First, we construct a panel dataset of MNEs and domestic
firms by using an iterative matching approach. Second, we address endogenous sorting of
workers into firms. Third, we use proportional hazard models to estimate the influence of
FDI on the probability of employment separations and occupational up- and downgrades.
As Helpman et al. (2004) show, only certain types of firms are likely to invest abroad.
Thus, in a first step, we use a broad database of firm characteristics to estimate firm-
specific investment probabilities for each MNE and control firm. We begin with propen-
3.2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 101
sity score matching to create a homogeneous dataset of MNEs and domestic firms with
equal probabilities to invest.3 The resulting dataset consists of comparable MNEs and
domestic firms with a balanced distribution of firm characteristics across the two groups.
One benefit of a matched sample is that it increases the robustness of statistical inference
(Imbens & Rubin, 2015). Furthermore, matching allows us to assign pseudo investment
dates to domestic firms. For workers in MNEs, the onset of the risk of switching occupa-
tions or leaving the firm begins with the investment. For workers in domestic firms, there
is no investment date and thus no inherent interval to observe their risk of each event. We
therefore assign the investment date of the best matched MNE to the domestic firm.
To assign appropriate investment dates, we match firms exactly in the same year.
Further, we require a one-to-one matching of firms over the whole observation period.
Because standard matching procedures cannot satisfy both requirements, we proceed as
follows.4 We assign MNEs two years prior to investment and domestic firms in every
observation year to our pool of firms for the matching. We select a lag of two years for
MNEs to avoid that their investment decision may already affect firm characteristics (see
also Hijzen et al. , 2011). For every MNE, we use propensity score matching to find the
three best matched domestic firms exactly in the same year (e.g., matches MNE A: a2004,
b2004, c2004; matches MNE B: a2006, d2006, e2006). After this first step, domestic firms can
appear multiple times as matches for different MNEs (e.g., a2004 and a2006). In the second
step of the matching approach, we thus find the single best match of treatment and con-
trol firms over the whole observation period by an iterative procedure (see Algorithm 1
in Appendix 3.A.1 for details). Initially, we select the best match out of the three poten-
tial matches for each MNE (e.g., matches MNE A: a2004, b2004, c2004; matches MNE B:
a2006, b2006, c2006).5 From the resulting list of potentially best matches, we retain only
the best match for a domestic firm over the whole observation period (matches MNE A:
a2004; matches MNE B: a2006). Then, we update the list of potential matches for MNEs
and move up second-ranked matches if necessary (matches MNE A: b2004, c2004; matches
3 Propensity score matching has previously been used in the FDI context by a wide range of studies,
e.g., Bronzini (2015), Crinò (2010) and Barba Navaretti & Castellani (2004) for Italy, Hijzen et al.
(2011) for France, Debaere et al. (2010) for Korea, Barba Navaretti et al. (2010) for France and
Italy, Becker & Muendler (2008) and Kleinert & Toubal (2007) for Germany, Hijzen et al. (2007) for
Japan, and Egger & Pfaffermayr (2003) for Austria. However, the majority of these studies consider
FDI effects at the firm, not the individual, level.
4 Although matching without replacement ensures that observations—firm-years in our case—are
matched only once, it does not guarantee that associated observations—firms in our case—are matched
only once. Thus, control firms could be matched to multiple treatment firms in different years.
5 The goodness of a match is defined by the smallest differences in the estimated propensity scores,
which we obtain from first step of our matching procedure. For a detailed description, see Ap-
pendix 3.A.2.
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MNE B: a2006, d2006, e2006). Finally, we repeat the procedure two times, which results in a
one-to-one matching of firms exactly in the same year without using any domestic control
firm multiple times (e.g., final best match MNE A: b2004; final best match MNE B: a2006).
This matching procedure results in a balanced dataset of MNEs and domestic firms with
equal probabilities to invest (for details, see Appendix 3.A.2).
In the second step of our empirical analysis, we link the full employment histories of
workers to the matched firm data. To ensure that workers do not self-select into MNEs, we
restrict our data to individuals who already worked in the firm at the time of the matching
(i.e., two years prior to the (pseudo) investment). It should be impossible for workers to
distinguish between future MNEs and domestic firms at the time of the matching because
of the firms’ equal probabilities of conducting FDI and the significant time lag between
the matching and the (pseudo) investment.
In the final step of our empirical analysis, we estimate the effects of FDI on the indi-
vidual likelihood to switch jobs within the firm and to separate from the firm. To reap the
benefits of the event history design of our data, we use Cox (1972) proportional hazard
models to measure the effects of FDI on job stability.6 We estimate the hazard ratios of
employment separations and occupational up- and downgrades in separate models and
treat competing events as censoring:
log he(t|xijtyro) = h0(t) + γI(FDIj) + xijtβ1 + xijttβ2 + τy + ωr + θo + uijtyro. (3.1)
Here, he(t|xijtyro) is the hazard rate of event e ∈ {separation, upgrade, downgrade}, h0(t)
is the baseline hazard rate, I(FDI) is an indicator variable for the investment, and γ mea-
sures the according treatment effect. Further, xijt is a vector of time-varying worker (i)
and firm (j) characteristics, and xijtt is an interaction of these characteristics and time
since the (pseudo) investment. Our model further purges investment effects from year
(τy), region (ωr) and occupation (θo) fixed effects.
We measure the events e with quarterly precision. In our setting, workers become
at risk of separation or up- or downgrade at the quarter of the (pseudo) investment, and
we then follow them for 20 quarters. We define occupational switches within the firm as
upgrades if the intensity of analytical and interactive tasks is higher in the new job than in
the old one and as downgrades if the intensity of analytical and interactive tasks decreases.
We summarize analytical and interactive tasks by the term complex tasks. Because task
compositions also vary within occupations, we compare old and new jobs at the same
6 Compared to linear probability models and logit or probit models, proportional hazard models offer
several advantages. For instance, they are robust to deviations from the normality assumption and
censored events, and they allow us to include time-varying covariates.
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point in time (i.e., immediately after the job switch). Employment separations occur if
workers leave the firm.
As indicated previously, we treat competing events as censoring. This means that
after the occurrence of an event (e.g., an occupational upgrade), we remove workers from
the risk set of the other two events (e.g., occupational downgrades and job separations).
The underlying rationale is that each possible event is the outcome of a distinct causal
mechanism. In essence, the likelihood of an event e depends on worker performance
and the objective of a firm (P (e) = f(worker performance,firm objective)). Clearly,
worker performance increases the likelihood of occupational upgrades and reduces the
probability of downgrades or separations. In essence, the objective of a firm consists of
two dimensions: (1) firm size and (2) internal task structure. A firm might want to shrink
or grow its domestic plant after FDI and simultaneously might plan to perform more- or
less-complex tasks. Importantly, the objective of the firm distinctly alters the likelihood
of each event for each individual.
For instance, if a firm follows the classical factor-seeking motive of FDI (see, e.g.,
Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 2002) and seeks to reduce labor costs by relocating off-
shorable tasks to a foreign plant, it attempts to (1) shrink, which raises the hazard of
separations, and (2) perform more complex supervisory and management tasks, which
increases the likelihood of upgrades. Since neither of the two objectives facilitates down-
grades, the according probability remains constant. However, fragmentation is often
not as simple as described above because modern production processes are interwoven.
Therefore, offshoring certain production stages also affects tasks in the up- and down-
stream processes of the firm. These changes in the task structure might lead some incum-
bent workers to take over new tasks, which results in (2) up- and downgrades in all areas
of the firm. Another motive is market-seeking FDI (see, e.g., Markusen, 1984, 2002),
where a firm intends to serve the foreign market by production on site. Thus, (1) firm
size remains unchanged or even increases, which reduces the hazard of separations and
(2) the firm requires more complex supervisory and management tasks, which increases
the likelihood of upgrades. Downgrades are not affected. In summary, the complex in-
terplay of worker performance and firm objectives portrays parallel causal mechanisms
that idiosyncratically influence the probabilities of separations and up- and downgrades.
Thus, we regard competing events as censoring. However, as we show in the robustness
section, alternative strategies that do not treat events as mutually exclusive do not affect
the results.
The baseline model (Equation (3.1)) captures time-constant effects of FDI on job sta-
bility, i.e., the average effect over the five-year interval after the investment. However, it
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is possible that the effect of FDI varies over time. If, e.g., workers need further training
to switch occupations within the firm, we will not observe an effect of FDI immediately
after the investment. Thus, we estimate the influence of FDI on job stability over time by:
log he(t|xijtyro) = h0(t)+γ0I(FDIj)+γ1I(FDIj)t+xijtβ1+xijttβ2+τy+ωr+θo+uijtyro,
(3.2)
where I(FDIj)t is the interaction of the investment dummy and time since the investment.
The remainder of Equation (3.2) is identical to Equation (3.1). Because treatment is
assigned to firms (not workers), we cluster standard errors at the firm level in both models
(see Abadie et al. , 2017).
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
Data
To analyze the effects of FDI on workers’ job stability, we synthesize four data sources.
We retrieve information on German FDI in the Czech Republic from the Research on
Locational and Organisational Change database (ReLOC).7 The ReLOC data identify
the entire universe of German firms with affiliates in the Czech Republic in the Czech
commercial register 2010. ReLOC covers 3,406 German investors and the exact date
of their investment.8 To compare developments in investing firms to those in domestic
firms, a control group of 9,700 German firms without any foreign affiliate (in any country)
completes the ReLOC data.
We link the ReLOC data to two administrative micro-datasets from the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB). We receive the establishment-level information from the
Establishment History Panel (BHP 7514v1) and individual-level data from the Integrated
Employment Biographies (IEB V10.00). The BHP contains information on the employ-
ment and wage structure of all German establishments with at least one employee subject
to social security contributions as of June 30 between 1975 and 2014.9 The IEB includes
the complete employment biographies of all individuals in the German social security
system after 1975. In particular, the data offer information on occupations and employ-
ment spells with daily precision. Because both the BHP and the IEB use mandatory social
security notifications for all German employers, they are highly reliable. Applying record
7 Refer to Hecht et al. (2013b) for details on the ReLOC dataset.
8 Hecht et al. (2013a) show in their survey of 459 firms of the ReLOC dataset that almost 70% of the
firms with FDI in the Czech Republic have not invested anywhere else before.
9 Refer to Eberle & Schmucker (2017) for details on the BHP.
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linkage, Schäffler (2014) joins the ReLOC data and the BHP. The resulting dataset groups
establishments into firms and provides investment information at the firm level. We at-
tribute to the firm the region or industry of the largest establishment. Further, we merge
the IEB with the BHP by using their readily available shared identifiers. Our observa-
tion period begins after the fall of the iron curtain, 1990, and ends with the most recent
registered investments in the ReLOC data, 2010.
To identify occupational up- and downgrades, we extend our data with the task struc-
tures of occupations. Therefore, we use data from the BIBB-IAB Employment Surveys
1991, 1999 and the BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2006 (see Hall & Tiemann, 2006).
For each occupation and survey year, we receive the share of each of the five task categories—
i.e., routine-manual, routine-cognitive, non-routine-manual, analytical, and interactive
activities—by using an algorithm described in Matthes (forthcoming).
From the spell data, we construct a quarterly panel with March 31, June 30, September
30, and December 31 as reference dates. If an employee has more than one job notifica-
tion per reference date, we only use the one with the highest earnings. To ensure that we
do not mistake maternity leave or retirement for job separations, we restrict the sample
to male workers between 20 and 55 at the time of the investment. Further, we only con-
sider regular full-time workers for two reasons. First, we are only interested in regular
job changes and not in, e.g., switches from part- to full-time or from marginal to regular
employment. Second, workers in marginal employment might intrinsically aim to im-
prove their labor market positions and thus might distort our findings. To strengthen our
identification strategy, we restrict the sample used for our baseline estimates to workers
who, at the time of the (pseudo) investment, worked for at least for two years in their firm.
We correct inconsistent information on individual education following Fitzenberger et al.
(2005). Furthermore, the wages of approximately 10% of the spells are right-censored
due to the contribution assessment ceiling in Germany. We impute these records using an
imputation procedure that follows Dustmann et al. (2009) and Card et al. (2013).
Descriptive statistics
Figure 3.3.1 presents an overview of individual (first row) and firm (second row) char-
acteristics after applying our matching algorithm. The box plots and bar charts illustrate
that the worker and firm characteristics of MNEs and domestic firms are well balanced in
the quarter of the (pseudo) investment, i.e., two years after matching. Although they were
not part of the matching, worker characteristics are also well balanced. In both samples,
the distributions of employees’ age, experience and tenure are almost identical. Addition-
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Figure 3.3.1: Worker and firm characteristics after matching
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Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
ally, the composition of the workforce with respect to education and nationality are highly
comparable. Moreover, the firm-level characteristics of the treatment and control firms are
almost equivalent in their medians and first and third quartiles. The figure shows that both
firm groups are similar in size, age, average wages, and shares of different worker groups.
Only the firm size of MNEs has a larger variation in the upper part of the distribution.
The focus of this article is on occupational up- and downgrades. Figure 3.3.2 therefore
visualizes changes in analytical and interactive tasks for workers that switch occupations
within the firm. Based on these changes, we define occupational upgrades as job switches
accompanied by an increase in analytical and interactive tasks (bins to the right of zero)
and downgrades as job switches accompanied by a decrease in analytical and interactive
tasks (bins to the left of zero). Common upgrades in our data include, e.g., promotions
from instrument mechanics to technicians or line workers to stock managers. The former
example leads to a broader, less routine set of tasks; the latter example enhances super-
visory responsibilities. Frequent downgrades include, e.g., electricians to metal workers
or metal workers to welders. Both examples lead to a less-complex task set. The graph
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Figure 3.3.2: Histograms of up- and downgrades in MNEs and domestic firms
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of up- and downgrades by percentage point changes of the share
of analytical and interactive tasks for job switches within investing (MNE) and domestic firms. We define
job upgrades (downgrades) as firm-internal job transitions to occupations with a higher (lower) share of
analytical and interactive tasks. Therefore, all upgrades are found to the right of the zero line and all
downgrades to its left.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
shows that for the majority of workers, an occupational switch changes the complexity of
their job by up to 40 percentage points. Of all up- and downgrades, 60% entail changes
in complexity of more than 10 percentage points.
Having defined up- and downgrades, let us now descriptively assess their relative fre-
quencies in MNEs and domestic firms. Figure 3.3.3 illustrates the cumulative hazards of
separations and up- and downgrades. The cumulative hazard indicates the probability of
an event within a given timeframe. The upper-left panel of Figure 3.3.3 shows that the
hazard of receiving a job upgrade is larger for workers in investing firms than for those
in domestic firms. In the quarters immediately following the investment, the difference
is negligible. However, approximately two years after the investment, the likelihood of
a job upgrade in MNEs clearly exceeds that in the control group. After 20 quarters, the
probability of receiving an occupational upgrade is 5.7% in MNEs. In domestic firms, it
is only 4%. The development of the risk of downgrades is similar. However, the hazard of
a downgrade is lower than the hazard of an upgrade. Figure 3.3.3 further illustrates that
the risk of separation is higher than the likelihood of both types of occupational changes
within the firm. However, separation rates differ only barely between MNEs and domestic
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Figure 3.3.3: Cumulative hazards of up- and downgrades and separations in MNEs and
domestic firms
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Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
firms. In fact, they are slightly lower in MNEs than in domestic firms.
In summary, Figure 3.3.3 suggests that most of the adjustments over the course of
FDI take place within the firm. Although the described hazards only provide descriptive
evidence, they mirror well our multivariate findings that follow in the next sections.
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Table 3.4.1: Effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of separations and up- and downgrades
separation upgrade downgrade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI 0.9630 0.8092∗∗ 1.2422∗∗ 0.9960 1.3413∗∗ 0.9781
(0.0440) (0.0691) (0.1315) (0.1896) (0.1980) (0.2094)
FDI × quarter 1.0190∗∗ 1.0252∗ 1.0352∗
(0.0083) (0.0141) (0.0205)
Subjects 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098
Events 102,661 102,661 15,880 15,880 11,731 11,731
Notes: The table presents exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) and cluster robust standard errors
at the firm level (in parentheses). ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Additional control variables in all models are: age, age squared, experience, tenure, a foreign
dummy, skill dummies, firm age and a dummy if the firm existed in 1975 (all interacted with quarters
since treatment), as well as occupation, year, and state dummies. The deviation of the estimated hazard
ratios from one can be interpreted as changes in the probabilities of the events attributable to FDI. For
example, an estimated hazard ratio for separation of 0.8092 indicates that FDI reduces the individual risk
of separation by 19.08% in the quarter of investment. Estimates are based on a matched sample of MNEs
and domestic firms. The full table, including estimates on control variables, can be found in the Appendix
(Table 3.A.4).
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
3.4 Results
Main results
This section presents the estimation results for the impact of FDI on the job stability of the
average worker in the investing firm. We distinguish between effects on the likelihood of
separations of workers and firms and upgrades into more-complex jobs and downgrades
into less-complex jobs within the firm. Table 3.4.1 summarizes the main results. Columns
1, 3 and 5 show the time-independent impact of FDI on the hazard of separation and up-
and downgrades, respectively (see Equation (3.1)). Columns 2, 4 and 6 provide the results
from a dynamic specification. Here, the FDI indicator is interacted with the quarters since
the investment (see Equation (3.2)). The table denotes the effects as hazard ratios, which
have the same interpretation as odds ratios.
As Column 1 indicates, we find no effect of FDI on separations in the static model.
In contrast, the hazard ratios of 1.24 and 1.34 imply that FDI increases the likelihood
of a job upgrade by 24% and the likelihood of a downgrade by 34%. Table 3.4.1 further
shows that the absolute number of promotions and demotions in our sample is much lower
than the number of separations. Nevertheless, the estimated hazard rations indicate that
MNEs adjust their workforce to meet changing labor demand over the course of FDI
mainly through internal occupational changes. However, separations do not seem to be
an important adjustment channel.
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The static model provides average hazard ratios over the five-year period after (pseudo)
investment. However, it is possible that the hazard of each event changes over time. Be-
cause estimates from the dynamic models are not directly interpretable from Table 3.4.1,
we illustrate the time-varying impact of FDI on job stability in Figure 3.4.1. The blue
lines in Panels A, B and C show time-dependent hazard ratios for separations and up- and
downgrades. For comparison, the horizontal red lines indicate estimates from the static
models. Shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals. The dashed line in each panel has
an intercept of one and therefore serves as reference to a scenario with no influence of
FDI.10
While time-invariant hazard ratios indicate no effect of FDI on workers’ separation
rates, more flexible time-variant estimates imply a short lock-in effect immediately af-
ter the investment. Specifically, the hazard of separation is 19% lower in MNEs in the
quarter of the investment. It increases by 1.9% in each following quarter. However, over
five years, the effect never becomes significantly positive. We conclude that there is no
evidence that FDI increases the risk of separations for the average worker. On the con-
trary, FDI has an advantageous lock-in effect, which, however, vanishes approximately
six quarters after the investment.
Panels B and C of Figure 3.4.1 illustrate the effect of FDI on the hazard ratios of
up- and downgrades. Both graphs show that there is no instantaneous effect of FDI on
the likelihood of job switches within the firm. Instead, the effects evolve over time and
become statistically significant approximately two years after the investment. The like-
lihood of upgrading to a more-complex job increases by 2.5% every quarter due to FDI.
The risk of downgrading to a less-complex job increases by 3.5% per quarter. There
are several possible explanations for the time lag between FDI and the occurrence of job
switches. For instance, it might well be that firms do not restructure their domestic plants
immediately after the investment. Further, it takes time to negotiate new positions with
incumbent workers, and it might be necessary to re-train workers before they can fill new
positions.
10 Because hazard ratios are exponentiated coefficients, the impact of FDI on the hazard ratio t quarters
after the investment is exp(γ0) × exp(γ1)t. As an example, the hazard ratio for job upgrades due to
FDI eight quarters after the investment increases by a factor of 0.996 × 1.0258 = 1.21. Note that
confidence intervals depend on the variance of the estimands γ0 and γ1, as well as their covariance.
Thus, standard errors from Table 3.4.1 do not suffice to infer the significance of the effects.
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Figure 3.4.1: Dynamic effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of separations and up- and
downgrades
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PANEL B: Upgrades PANEL C: Downgrades
Notes: The figures provide a graphical representation of the hazard ratios and 95% confidence intervals of the
estimated effects of FDI on separations and up- and downgrades. The results are obtained from the Cox regres-
sions presented in Table 3.4.1. The red lines display the level effects of FDI, i.e., the average effects over five
years after investment. The blue lines show the development of the estimated hazard ratios over time (see the
interaction effects of FDI × quarter in Table 3.4.1). The deviation of the estimated hazard ratios from one can
be interpreted as changes in the probabilities of the events attributable to FDI. For example, an estimated hazard
ratio for separation of 0.8092 indicates that FDI reduces the individual risk of separation by 19.08% in the quarter
of investment.
Sources: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
Job stability and tasks
Not all workers in the investing firms might be equally affected by FDI. Recent literature
shows that the effects of offshoring depend substantially on the tasks that are performed
on a job (e.g., Blinder, 2006; Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). In particular, scholars
classify routine (Levy & Murnane, 2004), codifiable (Leamer & Storper, 2001), and non-
interactive tasks (Blinder, 2006) as easily offshorable. In this section, we therefore explore
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heterogeneous effects of FDI depending on the offshorability of the tasks of the initial job.
Following the literature, we define the level of offshorability for every occupation as the
share of routine and non-interactive tasks.
Figure 3.4.2 illuminates the impact of FDI on job stability depending on the initial
offshorability of jobs. For ease of interpretation, the share of non-routine and interactive
tasks increases from left to right. Thus, more easily offshorable jobs are on the left and
jobs that are theoretically more resistant to offshoring on the right of the x-axis. Tech-
nically, the graphs show the interaction effect of FDI with the share of non-routine and
interactive tasks (see Table 3.A.5 in the Appendix). Note that the x-axis scale ranges from
40% to 100% because there are practically no occupations comprising less than 40% non-
routine and interactive tasks (see Figure 3.A.1 in the Appendix).
As can be seen from Panel A of Figure 3.4.2, the likelihood to separate from the firm
increases with the offshorability of occupations (right to left). While FDI significantly re-
duces the hazard of separation for workers in highly non-routine and interactive jobs, FDI
barely increases the risk of separations for workers in offshorable occupations. These re-
sults are in line with what we would expect theoretically. Internationalization means that
investing firms require more administration, management and supervision. Because these
tasks are mainly undertaken by workers with highly non-routine and interactive jobs, it
seems plausible that they stay. On the contrary, workers with jobs with a high share of
offshorable tasks could lose their jobs due to FDI. However, as argued by Grossman &
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), foreign activity can increase a firm’s productivity. This produc-
tivity effect can save workers with offshorable jobs from dismissal. This argumentation
might explain why we barely observe an effect of FDI on the separation rate for employees
with routine and non-interactive jobs.
The results for up- and downgrades in Panels B and C imply that the probability of
switching positions within the firm increases with the share of non-routine and interac-
tive tasks. In the following, we discuss several explanations for this pattern. Generally,
switching occupations requires adaptations. The share of non-routine and interactive tasks
presumably also reflects a worker’s ability and willingness to adopt. Therefore, the like-
lihood of switching should be higher for workers with non-routine and interactive jobs.
Moreover, occupational upgrades requires further training and are therefore more ex-
pensive than downgrades, which merely require a reduction in tasks. Thus, to fill jobs with
medium complexity, it is less expensive to downgrade workers with initially high shares
of non-routine and interactive tasks than to upgrade workers with initially low shares.
Our data reflect this argumentation. For instance, common downgrades in our data are
locksmiths (very non-routine) to welders. Welders typically only carry out some of the
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Figure 3.4.2: Effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of separations and up- and downgrades
depending on the share of non-routine and interactive tasks
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Notes: The figures provide a graphical representation of the hazard ratios and 95% confidence intervals of the
estimated effects of FDI on separations and up- and downgrades. The blue lines plot these estimated hazards
against a worker’s share of offshorable tasks, i.e., routine and non-interactive tasks, before investment. The
results are obtained from Cox regressions presented in Table 3.A.5 in the Appendix with an interaction between
FDI and the share of non-routine and interactive tasks. The estimated hazard ratios are averages over the five-year
post-investment period. As Figure 3.A.1 in the Appendix shows, the share of non-routine and interactive tasks
ranges between 40% and 100% in the data. The range of non-routine and interactive tasks in Figure 3.4.2 is
restricted accordingly.
Sources: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
locksmiths’ tasks. This reduction in the complexity of tasks is a plausible reaction to the
fragmentation of production processes where only some tasks of the locksmiths remain at
the home firm, while others become obsolete.
Similarly, to fill jobs with high complexity it is cheaper to upgrade workers with ini-
tially high shares of non-routine and interactive tasks than to upgrade workers with lower
shares. Furthermore, if FDI raises the demand for management and coordination, and
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only non-routine and interactive workers possess the abilities to take over such complex
tasks, the likelihood additionally increases for these workers.
In summary, these arguments imply that firms have strong incentives to up- and down-
grade workers in non-routine and interactive jobs. Moreover, our results reveal that firms
adopt their workforce after FDI by relocating their most flexible individuals. Separations
do not appear to be a popular adjustment channel.
Job stability and unobserved worker productivity
In this section, we shed further light on the mechanisms of separations, promotions and
demotions by investigating whether unobserved worker productivity influences the likeli-
hood of these events. To this end, we first obtain residual wages from Mincer-type wage
estimates. We use standard controls from the labor literature, such as age, experience,
tenure (and their squares), skill level as well as dummies for foreign nationality, two-digit
occupations and year. We then rank all workers according to their estimated wage residual
within the firm (in bins of 100). Technically, the wage residual captures positive or neg-
ative wage premiums that workers earn compared to workers with identical observable
characteristics (e.g., same education, work experience, occupation). Ranking residual
wages within firms additionally nullifies all time-invariant firm-specific effects on wages.
Economically, the ranking of residual wages within the firm should reflect unobserved
worker productivity. We expect that workers with high (low) unobserved productivity
have better (lower) chances of upgrades and be less (more) likely to downgrade or leave
the firm.
Table 3.4.2 presents estimates of our main specification extended with the workers’
position in the wage ranking and an interaction of the ranking with the FDI indicator.
Compared to our baseline estimates (Table 3.4.1), the sizes of the coefficients on FDI
change somewhat. However, these changes are simply the result of the interaction of FDI
and the wage ranking. For workers exactly in the middle of the ranking, the effects are
identical to our baseline estimates (e.g, for upgrades, 1.3918 × 0.998150 = 1.2656 ≈
1.2422). In particular, we find no effect of FDI on separations. At the median of the wage
ranking, FDI increases the likelihood of up- and downgrades by 27% and 36% percent,
respectively. Both effects are statistically significant.
The main coefficients on the wage ranking indicate that the job stability of workers
indeed depends on their unobserved ability. These results are in line with what we would
expect, i.e., more productive workers are less likely to be dismissed or demoted and more
likely to receive occupational upgrades. Specifically, an increase in the residual wage
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Table 3.4.2: Effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of separations and up- and
downgrades depending on unobserved worker productivity
separation upgrade downgrade
(1) (2) (3)
FDI 0.9477 1.3918∗∗ 1.2723
(0.0492) (0.1937) (0.2167)
FDI × wage rank 1.0002 0.9981 1.0013
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0018)
Wage rank 0.9962∗∗∗ 1.0093∗∗∗ 0.9914∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0014)
Subjects 376,411 376,411 376,411
Events 99,866 15,687 11,611
Notes: The table presents exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) and cluster robust standard
errors at the firm level (in parentheses). ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. “Wage rank” indicates the ranking of a worker’s unobserved
productivity within the firm. Additional control variables in all models are: age, age squared,
experience, tenure, a foreign dummy, skill dummies, firm age and a dummy if firm existed
in 1975 (all interacted with quarters since treatment), as well as occupation, year, and state
dummies. Estimates are based on a matched sample of MNEs and domestic firms.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
ranking of one (on a scale between one and 100) reduces the hazard of separations by
0.38% and that of demotions by 0.86%. The likelihood of promotions increases by 0.93%.
However, this effect does not differ between firms that invest abroad and domestic firms.
The insignificant interaction effects of FDI and wage ranking in all three models in-
dicate that MNEs follow the same patterns as domestic firms when choosing whom to
upgrade, downgrade or dismiss in terms of individual productivity. This result is not sur-
prising. Although this paper finds that MNEs are more likely to restructure, restructuring
is comparable to the dynamics in domestic firms. Workers with lower productivity always
face higher risks of dismissals and downgrades independent of FDI.11
Discussion of the empirical findings
In the following, we discuss our findings and derive their main implications. Contrary to
the widespread concern that MNEs substitute foreign for domestic labor, our main find-
ings suggest no effect of FDI on average separation rates. However, further investigations
with time-sensitive models and heterogeneous groups of workers reveal some exceptions.
First, we find a brief lock-in effect that saves workers from separations immediately af-
ter their employers go multinational. Second, the positive effect on employment security
is significant only for workers in highly non-routine and interactive occupations. These
11 In Appendix 3.A.5, we present additional results for different skill and age groups.
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workers experience a 10% to 20% greater likelihood of remaining employed at the firm
over the course of FDI.
Overall, the results on separations are in line with the literature, which generally finds
no or very limited employment effects of FDI. For instance, Bachmann et al. (2014)
find no significant evidence that industry-level FDI affects individual separation rates.12
In line with our results, Becker & Muendler (2008) find lower separation rates in MNEs,
particularly among high-skilled workers.13 Empirical evidence on the employment effects
of FDI by tasks is scarce. Thus, we compare our findings with the offshoring literature.
Comparable to our results, Baumgarten (2015) finds no significant effect of offshoring on
the hazard of non-employment on average. Moreover, he also shows that over the course
of offshoring, workers in non-routine occupations experience a decrease in the hazard of
non-employment.
Generally, our results are in line with the theoretical predictions by Grossman &
Rossi-Hansberg (2008). They argue that the positive productivity effect of offshoring
could outweigh the negative effects for workers with offshorable jobs. Thus, even if firms
want to save labor costs and offshore parts of their production abroad, this does not nec-
essarily lead to dismissals of domestic workers. Additionally, our results are in line with
the predicted employment effects of market-seeking FDI. To serve the foreign market
on-site, more complex coordination and management services are required at the head-
quarters, and there is thus no need for separations. We show that instead of separations,
MNEs adjust their workforce internally through promotions and demotions. For the aver-
age worker, the likelihood of upgrading to a more-complex job increases by 24% due to
FDI. The likelihood of downgrading to a less-complex job increases by 34%. Both effects
become measurable with a time lag of two years after the investment. Explanations for the
time lag of up- and downgrades include, e.g., time-intensive negotiations between firms
and employees over occupational changes. Moreover, it might be necessary to re-train
workers before they can fill new positions. Further, the positive impact of FDI on internal
job transitions applies only to workers in occupations with at least moderate shares of
non-routine and interactive tasks. Their likelihood of upgrading to more-complex jobs
increases by between 30% and 60%. For the same group of workers, the probability of
12 In their paper, separation rates comprise both transitions to other firms and to non-employment. When
Bachmann et al. (2014) exclusively consider transitions to non-employment, which is their main
measure of employment security, they find that FDI—especially to CEEC—significantly increases
workers’ risk of non-employment.
13 We also estimate occupational hazard ratios by skill levels; see Table 3.A.6 and Figure 3.A.2 in the
Appendix. Our results support the findings by Becker & Muendler (2008) inasmuch as the positive
lock-in effect of FDI exists among high-skilled workers. We additionally find an impact for medium-
skilled workers.
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downgrading to less-complex jobs increases by between 30% and 80%. The likelihood
of both types of switches does not increase for workers performing mostly routine and
non-interactive tasks.
The greater opportunities to climb the career ladder through occupational upgrades in
MNEs are in line with the theoretical expectations that MNEs require more administration
and management tasks and with our hypothesis that these firms attempt to fill these vacant
complex positions internally. Moreover, the increased risk of demotions through FDI is
in line with our expectation that MNEs might avoid the costs of dismissals by demoting
workers whose tasks become redundant over the course of FDI. Generally, the positive
effect of FDI on firm-internal job switches speaks in favor of our hypothesis that internal
labor markets are an important way in which MNEs can meet the changes in labor demand
due to FDI.
The task-specific analyses show that the hazard of up- and downgrades is significant
only for workers in jobs with medium-to-high initial shares of non-routineness and inter-
activity. As explained in Section 3.4, they have the opportunity to upgrade to new and
more-complex positions because routine and non-interactive workers might not possess
the prerequisites for these positions. However, highly non-routine and interactive work-
ers also face an increased risk of downgrades. A possible explanation for this is that in
the case of fragmentation, jobs at the middle of the complexity scale of tasks need to
be filled, and it might be less expensive for MNEs to downgrade these workers than to
upgrade workers with a low initial level of non-routine and interactive tasks.
There is no comparable study in the FDI literature that analyzes effects on job switches.
Instead, we take up some results of the offshoring literature. However, the offshoring lit-
erature considers imports of intermediate inputs mostly at the industry level and does not
specifically examine firm-internal transitions. Our results are in line with the positive
effect of offshoring to CEEC on job-to-job transitions observed by Baumgarten (2015).
Additionally, our results on job switches are, to some extent, comparable with studies on
workforce composition. In line with our results Becker et al. (2013) and Hakkala et al.
(2014) find evidence for a shift in tasks in German and Swedish MNEs. In contrast to our
results for FDI to the Czech Republic, Becker et al. (2013) do not find significant effects
on the workforce composition for FDI to CEEC.
Overall, our results provide unique evidence that firms restructure their labor forces
internally over the course of FDI. Some incumbent workers are promoted, while others
are demoted. Although demotions are per se not a positive occupational change, they
might be a more minor career disruption than dismissals. Further, the results suggest that
although FDI opens career opportunities for some workers, it might also exert pressure
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to adapt and keep up for others. The perceived pressure to adapt might partly explain the
fear of globalization in the public debate.
3.5 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform several robustness exercises. Specifically, we assess the com-
peting risk assumption, employ alternative estimators and test further definitions of occu-
pational up- and downgrades. The section concludes with a brief description of additional
robustness checks.
Non-competing risks
In Section 3.2, we argue that separations and up- and downgrades follow distinct causal
mechanisms. Therefore, we treat these events as competing risks and estimate separate
models in which we remove workers from the risk set after any other event. As a robust-
ness exercise, we now test an alternative specification for separations in which we retain
individuals after job switches within the firm. Table 3.5.1 shows the results (Column 2)
and repeats the estimates from our baseline specification (Column 1) for comparison.
Both models yield the same results and obtain no effect of FDI on job separations. Thus,
our conclusions from the main specification are not driven by the assumption of compet-
ing risks.
Moreover, we control for preceding up- and downgrades within the firm in Column 2
of the same table. Independent of FDI, a promotion reduces the hazard of a separation
by 25%. This finding is in line with the expectation that only good workers receive pro-
motions and are therefore less likely to be dismissed. The robustness exercise further
indicates that past downgrades do not influence separations.
Alternative estimators
To ensure that our findings are independent of the chosen estimator, we further com-
pute the effects of FDI on job stability with simple logit and multinomial logit mod-
els. To do so, we construct a cross-sectional dataset that assigns the first event e ∈
{separation, upgrade, downgrade} within five years after the (pseudo) investment to indi-
viduals. Obviously, logit estimates ignore the chronological order of events. In the simple
logit models, we estimate each event separately, as we also do in our baseline specifi-
cation. In the multinomial logit model, we jointly estimate the likelihood of all events
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Table 3.5.1: Effect of FDI on separations: competing vs.
non-competing risks model
baseline no competing risks
(1) (2)
FDI 0.9630 0.9595
(0.0440) (0.0437)
Upgrade 0.7471∗∗∗
(0.0291)
Downgrade 0.9525
(0.0504)
Subjects 383,098 383,098
Events 102,661 106,613
Notes: The table presents exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios)
and cluster robust standard errors at the firm level in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% lev-
els, respectively. Additional control variables in all models are:
age, age squared, experience, tenure, a foreign dummy, skill dum-
mies, firm age and a dummy if a firm existed in 1975 (all interacted
with quarters since treatment), as well as occupation, year, and state
dummies. Estimates are based on a matched sample of MNEs and
domestic firms.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
Table 3.5.2: Logit estimates of the effect of FDI on separations and up- and downgrades
separate logit models by events multinomial logit model
separation upgrade downgrade (base category: no event)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
separation upgrade downgrade
FDI 0.9722 1.2607∗∗ 1.4248∗∗ 0.9868 1.2968∗∗ 1.3973∗∗
(0.0534) (0.1236) (0.2236) 0.0541 0.1375 0.2232
N 383,097 382,776 382,664 383,098
Log lik. -211949.4449 -61383.9606 -48363.6299 -316837.68
Chi-squared 3624.3332 3388.7212 4093.1349 6064.85
Notes: The table presents exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) and cluster robust standard errors at the firm level
(in parentheses). ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Additional control
variables in all models are: age, age squared, experience, tenure, a foreign dummy, skill dummies, firm age and a
dummy if a firm existed in 1975, as well as occupation, year, and state dummies. The multinomial logit does only
include one-digit occupational dummies. Estimates are based on a matched sample of MNEs and domestic firms.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
(against the baseline outcome no event). Table 3.5.2 summarizes the results.
Overall, the estimates of the separate logit models and the multinomial logit model are
well in line with our main findings. The computed odds ratios are only marginally larger
than in the proportional hazard models. We conclude that our results are independent of
the chosen estimator. Nevertheless, we prefer hazard models because they allow us to
explicitly model the time structure of the impact of FDI.
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Alternative definitions of up- and downgrades
Throughout the paper, we interpret switches to occupations with higher (lower) shares
of analytical and interactive tasks as upgrades (downgrades). We now corroborate the
validity of this interpretation with a range of alternative definitions.
We begin with the possible concern that switches with only marginal changes in the
complexity of tasks might not reflect real up- or downgrades. For instance, a switch from
metalworker to mechanic increases the share of complex tasks by only five percentage
points and thus might not be considered a significant promotion. As a robustness exer-
cise, we therefore define significant up- and downgrades as job switches with changes in
complex tasks of at least ten percentage points. In Figure 3.3.2, these switches are in the
bins to the left of -10% and in the bins to the right of +10%. The estimates for significant
up- and downgrades in Panel B of Table 3.5.3 are comparable in sign and significance
to our baseline results (Panel A). We conclude that our main findings are not biased by
including job switches with only marginal changes in the complexity of tasks.
Next, we assess whether considering an alternative definition of the complexity of
tasks alters our results. In our main specification, we measure the complexity of tasks
as the share of analytical and interactive tasks. We now quantify the complexity of oc-
cupations by the share of all non-routine tasks. Accordingly, workers receive upgrades
(downgrades) if the percentage of routine tasks decreases (increases). As the share of rou-
tine tasks is analogous to one minus the share of interactive, analytical and non-routine
manual tasks, our alternative definition essentially extends our original definition of com-
plexity along the manual dimension. Importantly, this definition also corresponds to the
definition of offshorable tasks in the trade literature. As Panels A and C of Table 3.5.3
indicate, adding the manual dimension to our task measure does not affect the results.
Finally, inspired by Liu & Trefler (2011), we completely refrain from a task-based
classification and identify occupational up- and downgrades based on wages. Therefore,
we use a large, representative register sample of workers in Germany (Sample of Inte-
grated Labour Market Biographies, SIAB) and compute yearly median wages in two-digit
occupations. To remove noise, we further fit a quadratic time trend to the data. The result
is an occupational panel with smooth median wages over the time frame of our analysis.
We link the occupational panel to our main dataset and re-define upgrades (downgrades)
as job switches within the firm to occupations with higher (lower) median wages. Panel D
of Table 3.5.3 summarizes the according estimates. Both our task-based definition from
the baseline model and the alternative wage-based definition of job switches lead to simi-
lar results. Overall, our main finding that FDI leads to notably more up- and downgrades
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Table 3.5.3: Effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of up- and downgrades (alternative defini-
tions)
upgrade downgrade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Baseline model (complex tasks):
FDI 1.2422∗∗ 0.9960 1.3413∗∗ 0.9781
(0.1315) (0.1896) (0.1980) (0.2094)
FDI × quarter 1.0252∗ 1.0352∗
(0.0141) (0.0205)
Subjects 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098
Events 15,880 15,880 11,731 11,731
Panel B: Significant up- and downgrades with at least 10 percentage points changes:
FDI 1.3448∗∗∗ 1.2031 1.4476∗∗ 1.0333
(0.1231) (0.1786) (0.2489) (0.2731)
FDI × quarter 1.0121 1.0365
(0.0109) (0.0246)
Subjects 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098
Events 10,580 10,580 6,255 6,255
Panel C: All non-routine tasks:
FDI 1.2501∗∗ 0.9847 1.3248∗ 0.9962
(0.1267) (0.1662) (0.1903) (0.2435)
FDI × quarter 1.0270∗∗ 1.0321
(0.0135) (0.0205)
Subjects 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098
Events 14,017 14,017 13,594 13,594
Panel D: Median wages:
FDI 1.2533∗∗ 1.1140 1.3137∗ 0.8730
(0.1305) (0.2039) (0.1898) (0.1905)
FDI × quarter 1.0132 1.0467∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0180)
Subjects 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098
Events 14,006 14,006 13,605 13,605
Notes: The table presents exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) and cluster robust standard errors at the
firm level (in parentheses). ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A repeats our main findings, where upgrades (downgrades) are defined as increases (decreases) in
non-routine and analytical tasks. Panel B classifies upgrades (downgrades) as job switches with at least
a ten percentage points increase (decrease) in analytical and interactive tasks. Panel C identifies upgrades
(downgrades) as job switches with increases (decreases) in analytical, non-routine manual and interactive
tasks. Panel C specifies job switches as upgrades (downgrades) if the occupational median wage increases
(decreases) with the job switch. Control variables in all models are: age, age squared, experience, tenure, a
foreign dummy, skill dummies, firm age and a dummy if the firm existed in 1975 (all interacted with quarters
since treatment), as well as occupation, year, and state dummies. Estimates are based on a matched sample
of MNEs and domestic firms.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
within the firm, holds independent of the exact definition of up- and downgrades.14
14 Figure 3.A.4 in the Appendix present the unconditional hazard rates for the alternative definitions of
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Additional robustness checks
In an additional robustness check, we test whether our main findings are driven by small
firms. To ensure that the investment decision is independent of the individual worker,
we exclude small firms with fewer than 50 employees in Panel B of Table 3.A.8 in the
Appendix. The results point in the same direction, and deviations from our main speci-
fication are minor (see Panel A of the same table). We conclude that small firms do not
drive our results.
While for workers in MNEs, the onset of the risk of job changes naturally begins with
FDI, there is no such inherent start date for domestic firms. For this and other reasons,
we match domestic firms to MNEs and assign the investment quarter of the MNE to its
domestic counterpart. To determine whether this assignment influences our findings, we
now randomly change the pseudo investment date of domestic firms. In particular, we
randomly draw pseudo investment quarters from a uniform distribution ranging from four
quarters before to four quarters after the initial assignment. We do not alter the investment
dates of MNEs. As Table 3.A.8 in the Appendix shows, this robustness exercise does not
affect the results on separations. In the static model, the effects on job switches are also
stable and even larger for upgrades. However, the dynamic effects on up- and downgrades
are insignificant. If the likelihood of job switches within the firm follows time-dependent
trajectories, it is substantial for a dynamic analysis to compare temporal twins of MNEs
and domestic firms and not just time-averaged twins. Shuffling pseudo investment dates
breaches such a prerequisite and therefore potentially leads to insignificant estimates.
To identify the causal effects of FDI on job stability, we restrict our sample to workers
who were already employed two years prior to the (pseudo) investment. This restriction
ensures that individuals do not self-select into future MNEs. However, it also removes
20% of workers from our sample, to whom our findings might not be applicable. To test
the generalizability of our findings to workers with less than two years’ tenure, we discard
this restriction and re-estimate our models. The resulting estimates are almost identical to
our main findings (see Table 3.A.8 in the Appendix). Although the unrestricted estimates
should not be interpreted causally, they suggest that our findings also apply to workers
with less than two years’ tenure.
up- and downgrades.
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3.6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to analyze how FDI affects the job stability of workers. In
an extension of the results in the previous literature, we suggest that firms use internal
reorganizations of their workforce as an important adjustment channel to the changes in
labor demand induced over the course of FDI. Particularly, we consider occupational up-
and downgrades of workers to more- or less-complex jobs, respectively. Especially in
labor markets with strong labor protection laws and rigid wages, internal labor markets
offer investing firms the opportunity to adjust their incumbent workforce to changes in
labor demand. Internal restructuring circumvents the costs of hires and dismissals and in-
formation asymmetries and retains firm-specific human capital. To identify occupational
switches within and out of the firm, we use employer-employee data on German firms
that invest in the Czech Republic and those on comparable domestic firms.
Our results show that workers in MNEs have a significantly greater likelihood of up-
grading to more-complex jobs over the course of FDI. However, the risk of downgrading
to less-complex occupations also increases. The probability of up- and downgrades grows
with the workers’ share of non-routine and interactive tasks in their job before FDI. Both
effects become significant two years after investment. Further, we show that FDI has
no impact on separations of workers and firms on average. At most, we find a temporal
lock-in effect of FDI shortly after investment.
In summary, our results imply that MNEs use internal restructuring rather than dis-
missals as an important adjustment channel to meet labor demands that change over the
course of FDI. Our findings therefore rebut the common fear that foreign labor substitutes
for domestic labor in MNEs. However, workers in investing firms need to be more flex-
ible and willing to take on new tasks. As further training is indispensable for successful
occupational transitions, this paper underpins the importance of lifelong learning.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Iterative matching algorithm
Algorithm 1: Iterative matching
input : List with three potentially best matches: P·
output: List with single best matches: M
define : Match of treatment firm t and control firm c: mtc
Distance of logit propensity scores of mtc:
∆tc = |logit(PSt)− logit(PSc)|
1 repeat 3×
2 for each treatment firm t
3 find best match m˜t· ∈ Pt with smallest ∆t·
4 add match m˜t· to M
5 for each control firm c
6 find best match m˜·c ∈M with smallest ∆·c
7 drop other matches m·c 6= m˜·c from M
8 for each treatment firm t
9 if match m˜t· /∈ M
10 drop match m˜t· from Pt
11 drop matches m·· with ∆·· < [0.2× sd(logit(PS))] from M
3.A.2 Matching results
Table 3.A.1 illustrates the distribution of firm characteristics of (future) MNEs and domes-
tic firms in our raw data. Notably, the sizes and average wages of MNEs are considerably
larger and show higher variability.
To create a homogeneous dataset of MNEs and domestic firms with equal probabilities
of investing, we propose an iterative matching procedure. We match firms between 1990
and 2010. Firms with just one employee in the year of treatment are excluded. Further, we
restrict our sample to MNEs smaller than 30,000 employees because the largest control
firm has only 23,000 workers. We also drop firms in the public sector as well as private
households and extra-territorial organizations.
First, we estimate propensity scores based on the following variables: log number
of employees, average age and wage of the workers, the share of female, regular, Ger-
man, unskilled-manual, full-time, low-, medium- and high-skilled employees, the share
3.A. APPENDIX 125
Table 3.A.1: Firm characteristics (unmatched sample)
MNEs two years prior FDI MNEs two years after FDI domestic firms
obs. mean std. obs. mean std. obs. mean std.
No. of employees 1,996 383.8868 1133.8480 2,164 382.5873 1113.0740 7,767 185.5134 420.8820
Employment growth rate 1,992 0.3699 2.4167 1,870 0.3816 5.0398 7,767 0.6443 4.2290
Firm age 1,996 15.2169 8.5461 2,164 17.4205 9.5959 7,767 16.0055 8.8191
Av. wage of emp. 1,996 88.8361 38.0267 2,164 98.4771 43.4784 7,767 82.9027 32.1573
Wage growth rate 1,992 0.0717 0.1748 1,867 0.0736 0.1796 7,767 0.0584 0.1252
Av. age of emp. 1,996 38.3412 4.9081 2,164 39.4725 4.8128 7,767 39.3095 4.4908
Share of female emp. 1,996 0.3539 0.2322 2,164 0.3559 0.2239 7,767 0.3828 0.2589
Share of trainees 1,996 0.0341 0.0507 2,164 0.0362 0.0595 7,767 0.0445 0.0620
Share of regular emp. 1,996 0.9141 0.1255 2,164 0.8912 0.1381 7,767 0.8496 0.1537
Share of full-time emp. 1,996 0.8609 0.1509 2,164 0.8367 0.1639 7,767 0.7707 0.2082
Share of low-sk. emp. 1,996 0.1486 0.1396 2,164 0.1358 0.1257 7,767 0.1519 0.1280
Share of med.-sk. emp. 1,996 0.7065 0.1922 2,164 0.7007 0.1897 7,767 0.7289 0.1720
Share of high-sk. emp. 1,996 0.1304 0.1794 2,164 0.1499 0.1839 7,767 0.1019 0.1447
Share of German emp. 1,996 0.9160 0.1101 2,164 0.9188 0.1076 7,767 0.9258 0.1077
Share of unsk.-man. emp. 1,996 0.2197 0.2585 2,164 0.1986 0.2429 7,767 0.1786 0.2399
Share of engineers etc. 1,996 0.0303 0.0800 2,164 0.0311 0.0758 7,767 0.0226 0.0671
Notes: The table compares the number of firms, the means and standard deviations of various characteristics of investing
and domestic firms in the raw data before matching. For MNEs we report the values two years prior to investment and two
years after the investment. For the control group of domestic firms we show averages over all years they are in the data.
Source: ReLOC and BHP, own calculations.
of trainees, the share of engineers and scientists, wage and employment growth rates over
the last two years, firm age, a dummy for whether the firm existed before 1975 and fed-
eral state, year and industry dummies. These variables either directly affect the firms’
probability of investing (e.g., firm age) or are a good proxy for variables that have a di-
rect impact on the firms’ decision to conduct FDI (e.g. firm-size for productivity.) All
variables are measured two years prior to investment to avoid adjustments to FDI already
having been made. If a firm did not exist two years before, we do not receive a growth
rate of wage and employment. Growth rates in these firms are imputed with the average
growth rate for the year in question. We include a dummy to tag these observations in the
logit model.
We match every MNE two years before investment to its three nearest neighbors ac-
cording to the estimated propensity score among the control firms exactly in the same
year.
To obtain an unambiguous start date for domestic firms, we need to ensure that every
control firm is only matched once to a treatment firm (see Section 3.2). Therefore, we
propose an iterative matching procedure (see Algorithm 1) to identify the single best pairs
of MNEs and domestic firms over the entire observation period. To ensure that nearest
neighbors are not too far away, we calculate the optimal caliper width as recommended
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Table 3.A.2: Balancing test results after matching
standardized mean differences variance ratios
raw 1st match 2nd match raw 1st match 2nd match
Log no. employees 0.0126 -0.0129 -0.0055 1.4268 1.3381 1.3067
Av. wage 0.2569 0.0714 0.0872 1.6021 1.1804 1.1692
Firm age -0.1861 -0.0238 0.0233 0.9263 0.9375 0.9036
Av. age -0.0674 -0.0229 -0.0023 0.9634 1.0325 1.0416
Share female emp. -0.0690 0.0133 0.0384 0.7704 0.8431 0.8521
Share trainees -0.1850 0.0216 0.0273 0.5424 1.0195 1.0923
Share regular emp. 0.2035 0.0043 0.0330 0.6570 0.9031 0.8697
Share full-time emp. 0.2973 0.0047 0.0217 0.5262 0.8325 0.7948
Share low-skilled emp. -0.1044 -0.0480 -0.0356 0.8927 0.9241 0.9718
Share medium-skilled emp. -0.1477 -0.0397 -0.0362 1.1235 1.0230 0.9784
Share high-skilled emp. 0.2666 0.0859 0.0690 1.6013 1.1090 1.0281
Share german emp. -0.0464 0.0229 0.0141 0.8735 0.8854 0.9236
Share unskilled-manual emp. 0.1155 -0.0677 -0.0518 1.0628 0.9187 0.9261
Share engineers etc. 0.1206 0.0130 0.0154 1.3399 0.9416 0.9979
Employment growth -0.0201 -0.0204 -0.0348 0.0491 0.2411 0.1758
Av. wage growth 0.0348 0.0159 -0.0025 0.2527 1.1729 0.8502
Notes: The table compares the standardized mean differences and variance ratios of the variables used for match-
ing. “Raw” represents the standardized mean differences and variance ratios before matching. “1st match” give
the results for the first part of our matching procedure two years prior to investment with three-nearest neighbor
propensity score matching exactly by year. “2nd match” presents the results after applying our iterative matching
algorithm (1). The cells with the best balance statistic are highlighted, i.e., figures closest to zero in case of the
standardized mean differences and figures closest to one for variance ratio.
Source: ReLOC and BHP, own calculations.
by Austin (2011b).15
Table 3.A.2 presents the balancing test results of our matching approach. We calcu-
late the standardized differences and variance ratios of our resulting sample according
to Austin (2011a). Standard propensity score matching (1st Match) and Algorithm 1 (2nd
Match) reduce the standardized differences of almost all variables (expect for the log num-
ber of employees and employment growth) and lead to a variance ratios closer to one. The
results indicate that matching substantially improves the balancing of firm characteristics.
Further, Table 3.A.3 shows that the distribution of firms across industries is also re-
markably similar after matching. The matched dataset consists of 1,876 matched treat-
ment and control pairs.
15 We use a logit of the estimated propensity score for matching. Here, we follow Austin (2011b),
who recommend setting the optimal caliper width to 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the
propensity score.
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Table 3.A.3: Balance of industries after matching
Industry No. domestic f. No. MNEs Total
Manuf. food products, beverages and tobacco 21 28 49
Manuf. textiles and textile products 35 34 69
Manuf. pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing 30 38 68
Manuf. chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 48 44 92
Manuf. rubber and plastic products 79 66 145
Manuf. other non-metallic mineral products 36 32 68
Manuf. basic metals and fabricated metal products 147 142 289
Manuf. machinery and equipment n.e.c. 130 130 260
Manuf. electrical and optical equipment 129 147 276
Manuf. transport equipment 30 25 55
Manuf. n.e.c. 21 25 46
Construction 79 72 151
Wholesale/retail; repair of motor vehicles/household goods etc. 262 247 509
Transport, storage and communication 95 83 178
Real estate, renting and business activities 130 150 280
Total 1,344 1,340 2,684
Notes: The table presents the balance of firms over industries after applying our iterative matching algorithm. For
reasons of data protection the table only includes industries with more than 20 firms.
Source: ReLOC and BHP, own calculations.
3.A.3 Main results of Cox regression
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Table 3.A.4: Effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of separations and up- and downgrades (full table)
separation upgrade downgrade
FDI 0.9630 0.8092∗∗ 1.2422∗∗ 0.9960 1.3413∗∗ 0.9781
(0.0440) (0.0691) (0.1315) (0.1896) (0.1980) (0.2094)
FDI × quarter 1.0190∗∗ 1.0252∗ 1.0352∗
(0.0083) (0.0141) (0.0205)
Age 0.7875∗∗∗ 0.7875∗∗∗ 1.0070 1.0068 0.9761 0.9762
(0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0333) (0.0335) (0.0543) (0.0552)
Age squared 1.0030∗∗∗ 1.0030∗∗∗ 0.9997 0.9997 1.0003 1.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Experience 0.9999∗∗∗ 0.9999∗∗∗ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Tenure 0.9998∗∗∗ 0.9998∗∗∗ 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999∗∗∗ 0.9999∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Foreign 1.2165∗∗∗ 1.2170∗∗∗ 0.8614 0.8646 1.2759 1.2687
(0.0915) (0.0892) (0.1359) (0.1351) (0.2026) (0.1976)
Medium skilled 0.9779 0.9788 1.3636∗∗∗ 1.3647∗∗∗ 0.9639 0.9646
(0.0460) (0.0458) (0.1141) (0.1154) (0.1086) (0.1105)
High skilled 1.2300∗∗∗ 1.2449∗∗∗ 2.9824∗∗∗ 3.0368∗∗∗ 0.5418∗∗ 0.5494∗∗
(0.0851) (0.0871) (0.6202) (0.6263) (0.1373) (0.1405)
Firm age 1.0201∗ 1.0206∗∗ 1.0623∗∗ 1.0629∗∗ 1.0388 1.0398
(0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0273) (0.0271) (0.0394) (0.0390)
Dummy firm < 1975 0.7874 0.8074 0.5501∗∗ 0.5779∗ 0.5013∗ 0.5394
(0.1825) (0.1854) (0.1559) (0.1624) (0.1932) (0.2087)
Interaction with quarters since treatment:
Age 1.0050∗∗∗ 1.0050∗∗∗ 0.9920∗∗ 0.9920∗∗ 0.9970 0.9970
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0054)
Age squared 0.9999∗∗∗ 0.9999∗∗∗ 1.0001∗∗ 1.0001∗∗ 1.0000 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tenure 1.0000∗∗∗ 1.0000∗∗∗ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Foreign 1.0013 1.0013 0.9921 0.9917 1.0118 1.0126
(0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0132)
Medium skilled 1.0007 1.0006 0.9889 0.9888 0.9610∗∗ 0.9609∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0171) (0.0170)
High skilled 0.9884∗ 0.9871∗ 0.9772 0.9752 0.9531 0.9517
(0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0310) (0.0311)
Firm age 1.0002 1.0001 1.0011 1.0010 1.0027 1.0027
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Dummy firm < 1975 0.9846 0.9819 0.9915 0.9859 1.0071 0.9992
(0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0230) (0.0354) (0.0359)
Subjects 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098
Events 102,661 102,661 15,880 15,880 11,731 11,731
Notes: The table presents exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) and cluster robust standard errors at the firm level
in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The models further
include occupation, year, and state dummies.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
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3.A.4 Additional material on job stability and tasks
Distribution of non-routine and interactive tasks
Figure 3.A.1: Histogram of non-routine and interactive tasks
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Notes: The histogram shows the share of non-routine and interactive tasks that workers perform in our data
(in the quarter of the (pseudo) investment). The actual range of non-routine and interactive tasks is between
40% and 100%. Only 0.1% of workers are in occupations with less than 40% non-routine and interactive
tasks.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
Job stability by initial share of non-routine and interactive tasks
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Table 3.A.5: Effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of separations and up- and downgrades depending
on the share of non-routine and interactive tasks
separations upgrades downgrades
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI 1.5853*** 1.9558 0.6514 0.6542 0.4373 0.2429
(0.2825) (1.4482) (0.2155) (0.7855) (0.2399) (0.6932)
Non-routine & interactive 1.0100*** 0.9997 0.9805*** 0.9511* 1.0078 1.0414
(0.0017) (0.0143) (0.0027) (0.0284) (0.0051) (0.0565)
FDI × non-routine 0.9934*** 0.9872 1.0093** 1.0096 1.0147** 1.0308
& interactive (0.0023) (0.0206) (0.0044) (0.0375) (0.0073) (0.0792)
FDI × (non-routine 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999
& interactive)squared (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Subjects 383,009 383,009 383,009 383,009 383,009 383,009
Events 102,626 102,626 15,862 15,862 11,730 11,730
Notes: The table presents exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) and cluster robust standard errors at the firm level
in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Additional control
variables in all models are: age, age squared, experience, tenure, foreign dummy, firm age and a dummy if firm existed
in 1975 (all interacted with quarters since treatment), as well as year and state dummies. Estimates are based on a
matched sample of MNEs and domestic firms.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
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3.A.5 Additional results
Job stability by skill level
Figure 3.A.2 shows the effect of FDI on job stability by skill level. We distinguish be-
tween low-skilled workers, without any occupational degree, medium-skilled workers,
with an occupational degree, and high-skilled workers, who hold a university degree. The
graphs show the estimated hazard ratios and 95% confidence bands for the Cox models
presented in Table 3.A.6.
Figure 3.A.2: Dynamic effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of separations and up- and
downgrades by skill groups
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PANEL A: Low-skilled workers
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PANEL B: Medium-skilled workers
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PANEL C: High-skilled workers
Notes: The figures provide a graphical representation of the hazard ratios and 95% confidence intervals
of the estimated effects of FDI on separations and up- and downgrades by skill groups. The regression
results are shown in Table 3.A.6 in the Appendix. The red lines display the level effects of FDI, i.e., the
average effect over the five years after investment. The blue lines show the interaction effects of FDI and
time, i.e., quarters.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
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Table 3.A.6: Effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of separations and up- and downgrades by skill
groups
separations upgrades downgrades
low medium high low medium high low medium high
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Level estimates:
FDI 1.0742 0.9484 0.9210 1.1738 1.2786∗∗ 1.4573∗ 1.6877∗∗ 1.2183 1.6393∗∗
(0.0652) (0.0489) (0.0629) (0.2236) (0.1389) (0.3093) (0.4155) (0.1733) (0.3254)
Panel B: Time-variant estimates:
FDI 0.8960 0.8039∗∗ 0.7639∗∗∗ 0.7075 1.0818 1.1674 0.6255 1.0388 1.4946
(0.1124) (0.0698) (0.0765) (0.2171) (0.1897) (0.4129) (0.2256) (0.2275) (0.4922)
FDI× quarter 1.0199 1.0179∗∗ 1.0211∗∗∗ 1.0588∗∗ 1.0189 1.0269 1.1065∗∗∗ 1.0179 1.0109
(0.0122) (0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0254) (0.0124) (0.0262) (0.0397) (0.0190) (0.0241)
Subjects 52,591 282,017 48,490 52,591 282,017 48,490 52,591 282,017 48,490
Events 14,461 73,104 15,096 2,353 12,348 1,179 2,120 8,476 1,135
Notes: The table presents exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) and cluster robust standard errors at the firm level in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Additional control variables
in all models are: age, age squared, experience, tenure, foreign dummy, firm age and a dummy if firm existed in 1975 (all
interacted with quarters since treatment), as well as year and state dummies. Estimates are based on a matched sample
of MNEs and domestic firms and separably shown by the skill-level of workers. “Low” classifies all workers without
an occupational degree, “medium” all workers with a vocational degree and “high” all workers with a degree from an
university or an university of applied sciences.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
None of the average separation rates of the skill groups is significantly affected by
FDI (red lines). However, the time-flexible models (blue curves) show that low-skilled
workers in MNEs face a small but significantly higher risk of separation that sets in with
some delay. This result is in line with theoretical considerations (e.g., Feenstra & Han-
son, 1996a) that predict that to save labor costs, FDI in low-wage countries is particularly
harmful to low-skilled workers. By contrast, medium- and high-skilled workers in MNEs
face significantly lower risk of losing employment immediately after the investment than
comparable workers in domestic firms. This outcome is in line with the expectation that
MNEs require more communication, management and organizational tasks, which are
typically possessed by workers with at least a vocational degree. These findings are also
in line with earlier studies, e.g., Görg & Görlich (2015), who find that offshoring in-
creases the risk of unemployment for low-skilled workers and reduces the risk for high-
and medium-skilled workers.
Investigating job changes within the firm, we find a significant level effect of FDI
on job upgrades only for medium-skilled workers. Their likelihood of experiencing an
upgrade increases by 28% following FDI. However, time-flexible estimates show that
after some delay, the likelihood for low- and high-skilled workers to upgrade to more-
complex jobs increases due to FDI. Overall, five years after investment, all skill groups
have 20% to 30% greater likelihoods of occupational upgrades than workers in domestic
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firms.
For low- and high-skilled workers, we also find a significant effect on the risk of
downgrades through FDI. On average, low-skilled workers in MNEs face a 69% higher
risk of switching to a less-complex job than workers in domestic firms. This large effect
might explain why we do not observe a significant effect on average separation rates
for this group and only find a slight increase in their separation rates some years after
investment. Although they might perform labor-intensive tasks that can be offshored
easily, low-skilled employees without any occupational degree are rather inexpensive.
Thus, instead of dismissing them, the investing companies may retain the most productive
low-skilled employees and assign them new tasks. Following such a strategy would allow
MNEs to preserve their firm-specific human capital.
Job stability by age
In our paper, we have shown that the effects of FDI depend on the task composition of
employees. We might also expect the results to vary by worker age. Medoff & Abraham
(1981), e.g., find that younger workers are more likely to receive a promotion than older
workers. In this section, we therefore separate the sample into three age groups. We
categorize workers as “young” if they are younger than 33, “medium” if they are between
33 and 45, and “older” if they are older than 45. We expect young workers in particular
to have less firm-specific human capital given their lower seniority. They might not be
as valuable for the firm as older workers and might face a higher risk of being fired.16
Moreover, we expect that young workers might be particularly likely to be promoted after
their firm goes multinational because firms might invest in further training these workers
to benefit from their new knowledge for the longest possible time.
Figure 3.A.3 provides the results that support the hypotheses discussed above. On
average, we find no effect of FDI on the probability of separations for all age groups.
However, young and middle-aged workers in MNEs have a significantly lower risk of
losing employment in the year of investment (19% and 22%; see also Table 3.A.7). Thus,
we refute our hypothesis that younger workers, who likely have less firm-specific human
capital, are among those dismissed over the course of FDI. The risk of separation due to
FDI does not seem to depend on workers’ age. Across all age groups, we find a significant
positive effect of FDI on the likelihood of experiencing a job upgrade that appears with a
16 All workers in the sample have seniority of at least two years with the firm because one prerequisite
of our estimation is that all workers already worked for the firm two years prior to investment. Thus,
the estimates for separations cannot depend on lower employment protection rules during a probation
period. Panel D in Table 3.A.8 includes a robustness check without the tenure restriction. The results
are highly comparable with our main findings in Table 3.4.1.
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Figure 3.A.3: Dynamic effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of separations and up- and
downgrades by age groups
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PANEL A: Younger than 33
.7
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
ha
za
rd
 ra
tio
4 8 12 16 20
quarters
level linear
.7
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
ha
za
rd
 ra
tio
4 8 12 16 20
quarters
level linear
.7
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
ha
za
rd
 ra
tio
4 8 12 16 20
quarters
level linear
PANEL B: Between 33 and 45
.7
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
ha
za
rd
 ra
tio
4 8 12 16 20
quarters
level linear
.7
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
ha
za
rd
 ra
tio
4 8 12 16 20
quarters
level linear
.7
.8
.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
ha
za
rd
 ra
tio
4 8 12 16 20
quarters
level linear
PANEL C: Older than 45
Notes: The figures provide a graphical representation of the hazard ratios and 95% confidence intervals of
the estimated effects of FDI on separations and up- and downgrades by age groups. The regression results
are shown in Table 3.A.7 in the Appendix. The red lines display the level effects of FDI, i.e., the average
effect over the five years after investment. The blue lines show the interaction effects of FDI and time,
i.e., quarters.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
delay of approximately 2.5 years after investment. This result contradicts our considera-
tion that firms might be particularly likely to offer promotions to younger employees. On
the contrary, the last column of Figure 3.A.3 shows that younger and middle-aged work-
ers face a higher risk of demotion. Older workers, however, are not affected. Overall, FDI
primarily affects the job stability of young and middle-age workers. They face a lower
risk of separation from the firm, but at the same time, their risk of demotion is higher in
MNEs after investment. Moreover, we find that independent of age, all workers seem to
have a higher chance of promotion due to FDI.
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Table 3.A.7: Effects of FDI on the hazard ratios of separations and up- and downgrades by age
groups
separations upgrades downgrades
< 33 33− 45 > 45 < 33 33− 45 > 45 < 33 33− 45 > 45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Level estimates:
FDI 0.9461 0.9392 1.0075 1.2194∗∗ 1.2669∗∗ 1.2385 1.3234 1.4030∗∗ 1.2376
(0.0435) (0.0482) (0.0673) (0.1204) (0.1410) (0.1697) (0.2308) (0.2191) (0.1651)
Panel B: Time-variant estimates:
FDI 0.8138∗∗∗ 0.7758∗∗ 0.8652 1.0844 0.9755 0.9114 0.9181 0.9768 1.0577
(0.0601) (0.0797) (0.0915) (0.1741) (0.1985) (0.2341) (0.2162) (0.2166) (0.2426)
FDI× quarter 1.0183∗∗ 1.0206∗∗ 1.0152∗ 1.0133 1.0297∗ 1.0355∗ 1.0424∗ 1.0401∗ 1.0170
(0.0074) (0.0100) (0.0087) (0.0110) (0.0163) (0.0206) (0.0228) (0.0224) (0.0210)
Subjects 96,579 181,562 104,957 96,579 181,562 104,957 96,579 181,562 104,957
Events 30,530 42,924 29,207 5,460 7,103 3,317 3,309 5,329 3,093
Notes: The table presents exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) and cluster robust standard errors at the firm level
in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Additional control
variables in all models are: age, age squared, experience, tenure, foreign dummy, skill dummies, firm age and a dummy
if firm existed in 1975 (all interacted with quarters since treatment), as well as occupation, year, and state dummies.
Estimates are based on a matched sample of MNEs and domestic firms and separably shown by the age of workers.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
3.A.6 Alternative definitions of job up- and downgrades
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Figure 3.A.4: Cumulative hazards for alternative definitions of up- and downgrades
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Notes: The figure shows the cumulative hazards for the two events internal up- and downgrades by quarters
after (pseudo) investment and by investing (MNE) and domestic firms. The graphs depict the cumulative
hazards for alternative definitions of up- and downgrades. The graphs in the first row include switches
defined by changes in the share of analytical, interactive and non-routine manual tasks. The graphs in the
second row show switches defined by changes to jobs with a higher or lower median wage. For details,
see Section 3.5. Light blue and light red colors indicate 95% confidence bands. The cumulative hazard
indicates the probability of an event within a given timeframe.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
3.A.7 Additional robustness checks
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Table 3.A.8: Estimated hazard ratios for the effect of FDI on separations and up- and down-
grades
separations upgrades downgrades
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Main results:
FDI 0.9630 0.8092∗∗ 1.2422∗∗ 0.9960 1.3413∗∗ 0.9781
(0.0440) (0.0691) (0.1315) (0.1896) (0.1980) (0.2094)
FDI × quarter 1.0190∗∗ 1.0252∗ 1.0352∗
(0.0083) (0.0141) (0.0205)
Subjects 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098 383,098
Events 102,661 102,661 15,880 15,880 11,731 11,731
Panel B: Without small firms (>50 employees):
FDI 0.9576 0.8019∗∗ 1.2463∗∗ 1.0019 1.3425∗∗ 0.9756
(0.0450) 0.0700 (0.1337) (0.1928) (0.2013) (0.2123)
FDI × quarter 1.0193∗∗ 1.0249∗ 1.0354∗
0.0085 (0.0143) (0.0208)
Subjects 376,847 376,847 376,847 376,847 376,847 376,847
Events 100,316 100,316 15,708 15,708 11,592 11,592
Panel C: Random starts (plus minus 4 quarters):
FDI 0.9494 0.8573∗∗ 1.3317∗∗∗ 1.2961 1.3600∗∗ 1.1711
(0.0427) (0.0620) (0.1331) (0.2140) (0.2028) (0.2160)
FDI × quarter 1.0112∗ 1.0030 1.0166
(0.0064) (0.0112) (0.0170)
Subjects 264,427 264,427 264,427 264,427 264,427 264,427
Events 71,722 71,722 11,157 11,157 8,073 8,073
Panel D: No restriction to workers’ tenure:
FDI 0.9395 0.8027∗∗ 1.2523∗∗ 1.0484 1.3209∗ 0.9930
(0.0541) (0.0805) (0.1244) (0.1843) (0.1888) (0.1976)
FDI × quarter 1.0190∗∗ 1.0205 1.0323∗
(0.0083) (0.0131) (0.0189)
Subjects 490,679 490,679 490,679 490,679 490,679 490,679
Events 158,350 158,350 19,471 19,471 14,049 14,049
Notes: The table presents exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) and cluster robust standard errors at the firm
level in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A
repeats our main findings. Panel B shows estimates without firms with less than 50 employees. Panel C sum-
marizes estimates where we randomly shuffled the pseudo investment quarter of domestic firms. Panel D shows
estimates without restrictions on the tenure of workers. Control variables in all models are: age, age squared,
experience, tenure, foreign dummy, skill dummies, firm age and a dummy if a firm existed in 1975 (all interacted
with quarters since treatment), as well as occupation, year, and state dummies. Estimates are based on a matched
sample of MNEs and domestic firms.
Source: ReLOC, IEB and BHP, own calculations.
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Overall Conclusions
This dissertation contributes to two distinct research areas on human capital in labor eco-
nomics. First, I contribute to the literature on human capital externalities. In particular,
this thesis aims to add new perspectives on the dynamics and the spatial scope of human
capital externalities. Second, I contribute to the literature on the labor market effects of
globalization. Here, I present initial evidence that firms internally restructure their work-
force after investing abroad. Furthermore, the thesis proposes new estimation frameworks
to explore these perspectives empirically.
The first chapter of this dissertation, for the first time, analyzes human capital exter-
nalities from the internal migration of high-skilled workers. In particular, we use rich
administrative panel data to estimate externalities from the regional immigration and em-
igration of high-skilled workers on individual wages simultaneously. We also investigate
the impact of labor market entries of graduates and labor market exits of retiring high-
skilled workers. To disentangle spillovers from labor market demand and supply effects
and to address the sorting of workers, we control for an extensive set of time-varying
fixed effects. We find that immigration and labor market entries of high-skilled workers
raise the wages of incumbent workers. Contrarily, emigration and labor market exits of
high-skilled workers decrease the wages of locals. Over a period of ten years, positive ex-
ternalities from immigration and negative externalities from emigration compensate each
other. However, positive externalities from inflows grow over time, whereas negative ex-
ternalities from outflows remain stable. A possible explanation for this pattern might be
that spillovers mainly transmit through personal networks, which develop over time. In
the short run, negative externalities from emigration outweigh positive externalities from
immigration. It takes approximately three years until the inflow of high-skilled workers
compensates an outflow of equal size. In the long run, the immigration of high-skilled
workers eventually overcompensates the emigration of high-skilled workers of the same
size. The latter observation is in line with the hypothesis that diversity, i.e., the knowledge
that individuals accumulate in other regions, amplify human capital externalities.
The second chapter studies the impact of knowledge spillovers from the regional con-
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centration of high-skilled workers on the wages of neighboring workers. We are the first
to use precise geocoded social security data of an entire economy and a novel estimation
framework from the field of functional data analysis (FDA) to compute the spatial decay
of knowledge spillovers. Similar to the first chapter, we address labor market demand
and supply effects and sorting of workers with an extensive set of time-varying fixed ef-
fects. Primarily two developments in modern social science allow us to derive a precise
functional relationship between the concentration of high-skilled workers and individual
earnings. First, newly available geospatial data enables us to describe the distribution
of high-skilled workers around workplaces as functional objects with high resolution.
Second, FDA provides tools to fully exploit such detailed data. Our findings imply that
knowledge spillovers from the local concentration of high-skilled workers attenuate with
distance. Spillovers from the direct neighborhood of firms are roughly twice as large as
those from ten kilometers away are. After fifteen kilometers, the effects vanish.
The results from the first two chapters are in line with the common view that attracting
and training skilled individuals is beneficial for regions. However, although spillover
effects cover entire cities, workers and firms benefit most from the skill distribution in
their immediate neighborhood. To maximize external returns from human capital, firms
should, therefore, settle close to one another. Firms in remote regions do not gain from
knowledge spillovers. Because knowledge spillovers accrue over time, regions should
also aim to retain their human capital as long as possible. Migration increases diversity.
Therefore, on the national level, internal migration of high-skilled workers is, in sum,
beneficial for the economy if the frequency of relocation is not too high. Otherwise, the
frictional costs of building new local personal networks vitiate potential human capital
externalities.
To further illuminate the mechanisms of local knowledge spillovers a promising re-
search avenue may be exploring potential mediators, such as industry parks, local firm
networks, forums, and places for informal meetings (e.g., cafés). Importantly, identifying
mediators promises to generate highly practical policy recommendations. Finding me-
diators would also contribute to our theoretical understanding of knowledge spillovers.
Potential data sources to explore mediators might be publicly available geodata or admin-
istrative geodata on firms.
The third chapter investigates how foreign direct investment (FDI) affects the job sta-
bility of workers. Novel to the literature on globalization, the chapter suggests that firms
use internal reorganizations of their workforce as an adjustment channel to altered labor
demands induced over the course of FDI. Particularly, the chapter analyzes the effect of
FDI on occupational up- and downgrades of workers to more- or less-complex jobs, re-
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spectively. We base our analysis on employer-employee data on German firms that invest
in the Czech Republic and those on comparable domestic firms. To address endogeneity
issues, we propose a novel matching algorithm and carefully design a panel dataset with
comparable treatment and control firms.
Our results imply that FDI raises the likelihood that workers upgrade to more-complex
occupations. However, FDI also increases the risk of downgrading to less-complex jobs.
Furthermore, the probability of up- and downgrades grows with the workers’ share of
non-routine and interactive tasks in their initial job. We find no evidence that FDI raises
the hazard of separations of workers and firms on average. These findings imply that
firms use internal restructuring rather than dismissals as an adjustment channel to meet
labor demands that change over the course of FDI. Therefore, workers in firms that in-
vest abroad need to be more flexible and take on new tasks. Further training might help
individuals to manage such occupational transitions.
Similar to FDI, digitization can be a mean to fragment tasks and to increase the effi-
ciency of production processes. Digitization might, therefore, have a similar impact on the
job stability of workers. Because firms likely use both, FDI and digitization, jointly inves-
tigating labor market effects from globalization and digitization, constitutes a promising
avenue for future research.
Generally, all three chapters of this dissertation investigate novel perspectives on tradi-
tional topics in labor economics and propose new research strategies. Therefore, it would
be important to corroborate the described findings with data from other countries and to
refine the proposed empirical strategies further.
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